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Abstract 
During the 1990's the use of electronic communications became a part of everyday 
life through the explosion of both mobile telephony and Internet use. The next decade 
promises further rapid development, with multimedia mobile networking and the 
convergence of existing networks. These developments have not been without 
impediment, concern over privacy being important amongst these. Privacy in a mobile 
environment involves the protection of message content, identification and location, 
as well as service use behaviour. In addition, a user requires this protection against not 
only parties outside the network but also from the parties operating the network itself. 
In this thesis we have addressed the security and privacy requirements within mobile 
networks. A survey of existing literature shows that these requirements are not 
currently satisfied. In response to this we present the development of an architecture, 
the Mobile Network Privacy Architecture (MNPA). The MNPA proposes two novel 
physical components and two new protocols to perform important network tasks, 
namely location update and secure billing for services. The two new physical 
components are the Privacy Routing Capability (PRC), and the Privacy Token Issuing 
Authority (PTIA). The PRC facilitates network anonymity by enabling untraceable 
message transport between any two hosts. The PTIA is a third party authority that 
facilitates privacy-enhanced protocols through the issuing of privacy tokens to the 
network of each user. 
Our analysis and evaluation of the architecture shows that the MNPA protocols and 
components meet the requirements for achieving privacy. The analysis focuses on 
potential attacks on the system, including those of collusion between parties. This 
leads us to examine the most pressing assumption, that of trust between the user and 
the various components, which must be satisfied in order to complement the technical 
measures in place. Prototyping experiments are discussed and it is shown how the 
above system can be implemented. Finally we present a series of proposals for further 
research work that have been raised by this work, such as user interfaces for privacy, 
data access for law enforcement and the prevention of denial of service attacks within 
the MNPA. 
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An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Modem society recently experienced an enormous and ongoing change in the way 
in which we communicate, both in our work and in personal lives. This change 
was the phenomenal growth of electronic communications during the 1990s. 
First, the Internet grew out of the research community into a peoples network of 
370 million [NUA, 2000]. Second, the use of cellular mobile telecommunications 
grew from just 23 million in 1992 to 600 million [GSMWorld, 2000]. Moreover, 
it appears that this expansion in utilization will continue for the foreseeable 
future. Following the deployment of the next generation of mobile 
communications systems it is predicted that over a billion subscribers will be in 
place. 
However this change has not been totally positive. Increased reliance on 
computing and communications systems coupled with the inherent rising value of 
personal information has attracted a similar rise in attention from malicious 
elements. In addition to the threat of fraud a significant impediment to confidence 
and uptake of electronic communications is user privacy. The actions we take 
online inevitably make an electronic footprint that when linked together into an 
electronic trail threaten to usher in a scenario not dissimilar to the oppression 
portrayed in Orwell's famously insightful novel '1984' [Orwell, 1949]. 
The state was the perpetrator in '1984' and to some extent remains one of the 
biggest threats, despite a global agreement that privacy is a fundamental human 
right [UN, 1948]. Perhaps a more serious threat to privacy comes from the 
corporations and their marketing departments who may tap into gigantic 
databases of user information with scant ethical regard or sufficient restraint. 
Legal solutions to privacy are very difficult to implement [Agre and Rotenberg, 
1998, Froomkin, 2000, Litman, 2000] and it is our view that technical solutions 
must also exist to support privacy protection. The major aim of a technical 
solution is to return control of user data back to the user. 
Page I 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
Privacy in mobile communications consists not only of the protection of 
message contents but also the associated data attached to messages. This includes 
identification, location and behavioural. information, such as billing details. In 
addition to these requirements we add that such privacy must be achieved against 
not only outsiders but also the network operators. Against this privacy it is a 
requirement that the operators of the network are protected against fraudulent 
behaviour using strong authentication and integrity mechanisms. This thesis 
presents an architecture to satisfy our requirements for user privacy in mobile 
communications. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In sections 1.1 and 1.2 we 
introduce the nature and importance of distributed systems and mobile 
networking. The next two sections, 1.3 and 1.4, introduce the fundamentals of 
computer security and privacy from both technical and non-technical views. 
Section 1.5 sets out the aims of the thesis before we detail the novel results of our 
work in section 1.6. The chapter closes with a summary in section 1.7 and a 
description of the thesis structure in section 1.8. 
1.1 Distributed Systems 
A distributed system is a computing system based upon separate, autonomous but 
co-operating computers linked by a computer network [Coulouris, et al., 1994]. 
The aim of a distributed system is to enable the sharing of system-wide resources 
between individual nodes. Users should perceive a system that looks like a single 
entity. Various nodes in a distributed system provide services that other nodes 
may utilize. For example many organizations administer a corporate email server 
that all other corporate network users have an account with. In turn the email 
server co-operates with other email servers external to the company in order to 
deliver email to users whose accounts are administered elsewhere. 
The field of distributed systems is a sign of strongly maturing data 
communications technologies, particularly increasingly available bandwidth and 
computer processing power in general. The range of applications is constantly 
increasing, with multimedia services such as video-on-demand [Sumari, 2000] 
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becoming increasingly possible, as is the move towards electronic commerce. 
New categories of service frequently add significant complexity to distributed 
systems due their differing requirements in terms of properties such as robustness, 
quality of service (QoS), security, and wireless networking [Raychaudhuri, 19991. 
Each of these factors of complexity may require new or extended system services 
and designers are challenged with the task of finding ways to incorporate these 
into already complex designs. 
The key to solving these complexities in distributed systems is the inter-working 
of the autonomous nodes. The difficulty in inter-working lies in the range of 
difference found in individual nodes, such as different operating systems, 
different hardware and different administration policies. These differences can be 
overcome by standardizing network services. The Transmission Control Protocol 
& Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) [Socolofsky and Kale, 1991] suite that enables 
nodes to connect to the worldwide Internet is perhaps the best known of these 
distributed systems standards. 
TCP/IP does not solve all the inter-working problems of the Internet, far from it. 
In fact, TCP/1P is simply part of a 'stack' of protocols that specify various aspects 
of interconnection. For a distributed application to operate its communication 
must be abstracted through various layers of protocols. At the lowest layer 
standards specify the direct access to the hardware, followed up a layer by control 
of connection to the neighbouring nodes. At this point co-ordination between 
nodes is provided by protocols such as TCP/IP. Above this applications may 
define their own interconnection protocols, such as how to transfer email between 
nodes. 
This layering of protocols is fundamental as it enables flexibility as well as 
reducing complexity. Flexibility is provided since lower layer protocols are more 
hardware dependent (enabling different hardware in the system) whilst higher 
layer protocols are application dependent (enabling different applications). 
Complexity is reduced since applications only have to assume the existence of 
other applications operating the same protocols regardless of lower layer 
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constraints. Each layer in a protocol interacts only with the layers directly 
below and above. The implication of this is that a user is only aware of the 
application and the corresponding communications partners, whilst at the lowest 
level the access protocol is only aware of the underlying hardware and the link 
layer protocols. 
Layering of protocols also allows designers to abstract services to appropriate 
levels. Other layers can assume the provision of these services or perhaps extend 
them further depending on the context. Security is one such service that may be 
provided at various layers and abstractions. The lower layers tend not to provide 
security services; instead they concern themselves with error correction at the bit 
level. Network layers may provide authentication and integrity services whilst 
application layers usually provide end-to-end confidentiality and overall security 
policies for applications. 
1.2 Mobile Networking 
An extension of ordinary fixed networking is to allow the movement of nodes 
within the system, this is known as mobile networking. There are two main 
developments of importance in mobile networking. Firstly the extension of 
Internet technology to incorporate mobile nodes and second the expansion of 
mobile telephony to include data services. Indeed mobile networking is one 
important aspect of the inevitable convergence between all types of networking so 
that ultimately it may be that all computers are connected to one logical global 
distributed system. 
As we noted above mobile networks differ from fixed networks in the fact that 
mobile networks allow nodes to disconnect from one point of attachment and 
reconnect to another. This convenience for the user means that systems must be 
able to dynamically reconfigure routing as nodes move within the system, also 
known as mobility management. In Mobile EP [Perkins, 1997] for example, an 
association is maintained between a fixed Internet address and a temporary 
address. Despite the simple description mobility management is one of the most 
challenging aspects of mobile networking. 
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Mobile/wireless telephony has been the driving influence behind the 
development of mobile data networking and will continue to be so for some time. 
Originally the mobile telephone networks operated as analog voice networks that 
extended the Public Service Telephone Network (PSTN) by adding a wireless 
component. In the early nineties second generation mobile telephone networks 
were developed to pave the way for simple data services through mobile 
telephone handsets. Since the mid 1990's the vision has been focused towards a 
third generation of mobile network which can inter-network with data networks 
as well as telephone systems to provide a single access point for a high-bandwidth 
multimedia services [O'Mahony, 1998]. The so-called Martini' Effect of these 
systems is to enable any service to be provided at any time and in any location. 
To achieve the major goals of the Martini effect means overcoming several major 
constraints on resources. The most important of these constraints are as follows: 
first the bandwidth is likely to be scarcer than in wire-line networks, though the 
gap may close in the future. Second the power availability and computation speed 
of terminals means that processing must be more efficient. Third, user interfaces 
are likely to be more compact, which combined with the complexity of mobile 
access means that well thought out interfaces are needed. 
The challenges facing the development of third generation systems are immense 
and cover not just the technical aspects but also business, legal and political ones. 
A significant problem being addressed is that of security within these systems 
[ASPeCT, 1998, Pandya, et al., 1997]. First generation analog wireless networks 
were notoriously insecure and provided considerable motivation for the design of 
second-generation systems. However it is recognized that in order to provide 
adequate security for high value services such as electronic commerce and enough 
flexibility to distribute these services appropriately then the security of second- 
generation system is wholly inadequate. 
1 Martini is an alcoholic drink that was once advertised on television using the slogan $any time, 
any place anywhere - that's Martini. ' 
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1.3 Computer Security 
The fundamental concern of computer security is to provide the trio of services 
known as Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability [Pfleeger, 1996]. Whilst there 
are many security services in existing systems, ultimately they all attempt to 
achieve one or more of these three basic ones. Confidentiality is the protection of 
the data against unauthorized disclosure, more commonly referred to as privacy. 
Integrity is the protection of data against modification or deletion, which leads to 
the enabling of access controls and authentication. Availability is the protection 
against attacks on the use of data and services, often referred to as denial-of- 
service or DoS [Needham, 1994a]. 
Security is a problematic issue for system designers as it is both difficult and 
costly to design and implement. Costs are incurred in both the traditional sense of 
having to purchase security components and also due to the constraints it may add 
to the system in terms of performance and usability. The difficulty of security is 
well understood by researchers but surprisingly poorly understood by the software 
community. Indeed, it often seems like every program has at some point been 
broken at either design level or implementation level. The difficulty in security 
lies in the seeming impossibility of predicting all possible attacks (and 
subsequently incorporating defences against these). 
There are many mechanisms designers may use to incorporate security into 
systems, but we are most interested in those for enabling protection in distributed 
systems. The two most fundamental of these are encryption and authentication. 
Encryption algorithms produce ciphertext output based upon plaintext input and a 
(usually secret) parameter known as a key. Symmetric key algorithms use the 
same key for encryption and decryption of data [AES, 2000, Schneier, 1996]. 
Two users may share a key in order to establish a secure channel between each 
other. 
Unfortunately this requires a method to distribute keys between parties. This is 
achieved through the use of asymmetric encryption, or public-key cryptography. 
Public-key algorithms use two keys; one is kept secret whilst the other can be 
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made public (e. g. published on a web page). When one party, Alice, needs to 
establish a secure channel with another, Bob, and therefore share a symmetric key 
with Bob then Alice can encrypt the symmetric key using Bob's public key. Only 
Bob can decrypt this symmetric key, therefore the channel is established. The 
reason that public-key cryptography is not used for all encryption lies in the fact 
that it is many factors slower than symmetric key encryption [Schneier, 1996]. 
In addition to encryption, which is concerned mainly with confidentiality, the 
other major network security mechanism type is authentication. Authentication is 
concerned with the integrity of data and services. There are many forms of 
authentication but the overall purpose is to determine the authorization of a 
particular party by having that party produce some proof of this authorization. A 
typical authentication technique is to challenge one party to author an encrypted 
message that only they would be capable of authoring, i. e. using their secret key. 
Different applications require different security mechanisms to be used and this 
has resulted in an enormous variety now embedded into real-world applications. 
Due to the cost implications of security it is common to see applications, 
particularly networked applications, that bias their protection towards the system 
providers perspective. By this we mean that designers often trade off users 
concerns, most often privacy, against those of the service providers, namely 
protection against fraudulent and malicious activity. It is important therefore that 
we understand the notion of privacy, the users perspective in the networked 
world. 
1.4 Privacy 
There are numerous activities which people engage in during a typical day, either 
at work or at home, which they consider private. We might consider these actions 
private because we feel uncomfortable to be seen doing them, or because 
knowledge of them could affect other parts of our life. The expectation to be able 
to perform these activities without the knowledge of others is fundamental to our 
modem lives. Everyone has different expectations depending on who they are but 
this does not affect the underlying principle; that there needs to be a private 
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sphere in which we can live part of our lives [Froomkin, 2000, Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890]. 
As we live more and more of our lives electronically then there needs to be a 
similar ability to protect a space for actions that we wish to keep private. 
Unfortunately this space seems to be hard to realize for many people. 
Governments seem unwilling to legislate adequately for data protection and the 
corporate world values information about potential customers above and beyond 
the protection of those same customers. Indeed it is arguable that only through 
intense pressure by civil rights groups that progress is ever made. 
Technical measures, known as privacy enhancing technologies (PET's), offer a 
partial solution to the problem of electronic privacy. Encryption is perhaps the 
most important tool for privacy protection, allowing data to be either transferred 
or stored without attackers being able to observe the contents of data. However, 
encryption is not the end of the story for privacy since associated data may also be 
sensitive, for example identification data. In email, for example, it might be 
desirable to send messages anonymously. Other activities we perform online such 
as accessing services may also carry sensitive details which we would rather were 
private. 
The range of PET's available is also growing as the range of applications in need 
of protection grows. Perhaps the most important PET's are those that facilitate 
anonymity. The most common mechanisms for achieving anonymity are based on 
the idea of routing a message through several intermediate nodes which strip the 
massage of identifying data, thereby disallowing the recipient, or attacker, from 
determining the source - i. e. anonymity. 
1.5 Thesis Aims 
It is the aim of this thesis to describe a framework of privacy-enhancing 
technologies that combine to provide a mobile network user with capabilities to 
protect their privacy, should they choose to do so. In order to do this we must first 
address two issues: 
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* What are the requirements for privacy within mobile networking? Any 
requirements should take into account both the user perspective for 
privacy and the system provider perspective of ensuring fraud prevention 
and a commercially viable service. 
* What existing techniques are appropriate in developing solutions for these 
requirements? The literature survey shall examine the building blocks of 
privacy enhancement as well as those efforts that have contributed directly 
to the knowledge about mobile networking security. 
The design of a framework should allow the user to perform all the typical tasks 
involved in mobile communications, but enable them in a privacy enhanced way. 
Service providers should be confident that these tasks can be achieved in an 
authenticated manner. In particular the following are required: 
* Mobility shall be allowed to occur without the privacy of the user being 
compromised. The network will be able to authenticate a user despite their 
privacy requirements. 
* Whilst roaming within the network a user shall be able to communicate 
with other users without any compromise of privacy, to either the network 
or the other users, depending on the privacy required. 
9 Provision of services shall be enabled such that a user may access 
anonymously. Services that require payment shall not require a user to 
compromise privacy. Service providers shall be assured that despite 
anonymity, payment will occur. 
Finally the framework should enable us to better understand the complex problem 
of privacy, both generally, and specifically in terms of mobile networking. The 
framework should allow us to ask further research questions regarding the field. 
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1.6 Novel Aspects Of This Work 
The problem of user privacy in distributed systems is rarely dealt with in a serious 
enough manner. During the design of such systems the primary concern when 
examining security is to prevent attacks from a system perspective. Security is 
difficult to achieve and privacy may be seen to complicate this. Additionally, 
privacy appears not to be very well understood. Privacy is often carelessly 
thought to be simply the protection of message content against external attackers. 
This sorry state of affairs is unfortunate as it is becoming increasingly clear that 
privacy is a key factor in preventing many people embracing much of the 
networked applications that designers and commercial interests see as exciting. 
One of these exciting applications is the third-generation mobile network, 
currently in development. These networks will offer new high-bandwidth 
multimedia services and allow convergence with other networking technologies 
such as the Internet. We suggest that privacy will be a major user requirement in 
third-generation systems, but that privacy must live in harmony with the 
seemingly opposing requirements for system security. This thesis contributes to 
our understanding of privacy in mobile environments in the following ways: 
e Our first contribution is to provide a set of requirements for privacy in 
mobile networking environments and examine these against existing 
research literature [Askwith, et al., 1997]. These requirements enable the 
network providers to operate a secure system whilst allowing the user of 
the network to maintain very high levels of privacy against both external 
and internal attackers. A survey of research literature in the field revealed 
that no results completely meet these requirements. These techniques 
focus on either specific application domains or on particular parts of the 
system security. Others fail because they aim for a lower level of 
protection against internal attacks. Additionally we also bring together 
relevant ideas of use in the search for user privacy in mobile 
environments. 
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e Using the set of requirements and inspiration from relevant literature 
this thesis proposes a novel solution to afford strong user privacy to 
mobile communications users, the Mobile Network Privacy Architecture 
(MNPA) [Askwith, et al., 1998]. The architecture consists of two physical 
components that extend the mobile networking paradigm and two new 
privacy-enhanced communications protocols (many more are possible but 
these two are most important). 
9 The first new physical component we have developed is the Privacy 
Routing Capability (pRC) [Askwith, et al., 2000b]. The PRC allows 
messages to be sent across the network without being able to be subject to 
unauthorized tracking. The PRC is an extension of previous work in 
anonymity, designed to suit the mobile environment and the MNPA- 
9 The second physical component we have developed is the Privacy Token 
Issuing Authority (PTIA) [Askwith, et al., 1998] (Askwith, et al., 2000a]. 
The PTIA is a novel third-party distributed application that manages 
subscriptions from network providers on behalf of mobile users. The 
PTIA facilitates behavioural privacy for users by allowing users to access 
the network anonymously, yet remain accountable. We believe the PTIA 
to be a particularly novel approach to solving privacy-enhanced network 
access. 
e One of the most important network management tasks in mobile 
environments is location update management. A new protocol for 
allowing secure location update management is provided within the 
MNPA [Askwith, et al., 2000a]. This protocol enables a user to connect to 
a network without identifying itself to the point of connection, and 
without revealing location information to the home network. 
* Billing is a particularly important aspect of modem distributed systems as 
the range, complexity and value of services develop (and thus the service- 
provider costs increase). The MNPA provides a novel protocol post- 
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payment of services within the mobile network [Askwith, et al., 
2000a]. Our billing protocol allows a user to receive service from a 
service provider without having to identify itself, yet simultaneously 
enabling post-payment through the home network. 
Analysis of our results examined the possibilities for attack within the 
MNPA. A range of attack types are categorized and each component is 
shown to be acceptably resistant to these. We also discuss the additional 
problems of trust and collusion between entities. Trust and collusion are 
serious problems since many new attacks potentially become possible if 
components of the system do not act honestly or competently. Analysis of 
these issues reveals that with reasonable understanding and knowledge a 
user may trust network and service providers within the MNPA- The 
analysis we conducted during development is interesting for the wide 
view we have taken. Rather than concentrate the analysis on formal 
examination we have attempted to use a more relaxed but wider approach 
that tries to determine trustworthiness rather than absolute security. We 
believe this could lead to a more practical and flexible (in terms of design) 
solution for the problem. 
Our final contribution is that this research poses some new questions that 
had not been made explicit before. Among the questions for further work 
are issues of application to existing mobile environments and potential 
application to fixed networking environments. Two other important issues 
raised are those of making complex privacy usable, and related to this is 
the difficulty of modeling trust within systems. These questions are 
examined together with an evaluation of the project in terms of the 
shortcomings of the architecture and a comparison with closely related 
work. 
1.7 Summary 
Media coverage of security incidents is often hysterical, giving rise to concern 
about ones safety in, the online world. Whilst it is true that coverage and 
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subsequent concern ollen focuses on the potential financial losses caused by 
malicious attackers significant weight is also given to privacy. Privacy violations 
may come from many sources, such as external attackers (often called, somewhat 
misleadingly, 'hackers'), corporations, and government agencies. Whilst there are 
numerous commercial interests proposing self-regulation schemes and 
governments attempt privacy legislation, consumers appear to remain extremely 
worried about privacy. This worry is likely to translate into reluctance on the part 
of the ordinary user to immerse themselves into cyberspace as much as they might 
(whether this is a good thing or not is left to the reader to decide). 
With this in mind we set out on this project to examine technical solutions to 
creating that relate specifically to the privacy of global mobile networking. This 
chapter has introduced the problem area and presented an outline of our results. 
We began by introducing distributed systems, before moving on to discuss the 
special nature of mobile networking. This was followed by an outline of the 
pertinent aspects of computer security, before we briefly looked at the nature of 
privacy. 
Having addressed this background work the aims of the thesis were presented. 
These aims range from setting out requirements for user privacy in mobile 
network, through developing a solution capable of meeting both mobility 
management and service provision requirements of network operators, towards 
ultimately contributing a new understanding of the of the initial problem domain. 
The remainder of the chapter was devoted towards a summary of the novel 
aspects of the work. Our contributions to the knowledge were stated as, firstly, an 
examination of the requirements for security and privacy in mobile networks 
against a comparison of existing literature. This was followed by the introduction 
of the Mobile Network Privacy Architecture (MNPA), which encapsulates our 
solutions to mobile network privacy. The MNPA contains two new physical 
components, the Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) and the Privacy Token Issuing 
Authority (PTIA). These components allow the implementation of novel privacyý- 
enhanced protocols for location update and post-payment billing. Analysis of the 
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MNPA enabled us to make statements about the trust requirements in mobile 
environments. Finally we propose a series of new research avenues resulting from 
the development of the MNPA. 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: 
* Chapter 2 presents the background to the field looking at computer 
networking, mobile networks, computer security including cryptography, 
and finally privacy and its associated protecting technologies. 
9 Chapter 3 examines the requirements for security (and privacy) from both 
the system and user perspective. Following this we examine the literature 
to determine the current state of the art in mobile network security and 
privacy. 
9 Chapter 4 presents our architecture, the Mobile Network Privacy 
Architecture (MNPA). First we give an overview before detailing the 
entities and protocols involved. 
9 Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the MNPA. The elements of the MNPA 
are analyzed in terms of attack potential, collusion opportunities and trust 
requirements. 
* Chapter 6 is an evaluation of the MNPA that includes discussion of 
prototype and overall project evaluation. 
9 Chapter 7 looks back at the achievements of the thesis and concludes what 
we have learnt from field of user privacy in mobile networking. The 
chapter is then able to pose some further research questions. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
This chapter examines the background to our research. First, we shall set the 
scene for computer networks in general including their uses and why they have 
become such an important part of everyday life. Following this we move on to 
look at mobile communications and particularly the evolution from early systems 
to the intended future generations soon to appear. 
Having considered the background to computer networks we then look at 
computer and communications security. We outline the basic goals of security 
before discussing computer security, cryptography and communications security. 
Then we take a detailed look at privacy, the techniques used to enhance privacy 
and the legal and political outlook for privacy. We close the chapter with a 
summary of networking and security. 
2.1 Computer Networks Basics 
Computer networks are ubiquitous in the modem 'information society' although 
their importance has to some extent appeared very suddenly. The Internet [Leiner, 
et al., 1997] began in the late 1960's yet only in the last five years, particularly 
with the advent of the World Wide Web, has it become a part of everyday life. 
Similarly with telephony, the age of digital mobile communications from the 
early 1990's has revolutionised the way we think about communicating with 
others. 
The Internet has been shown to grow at an exponential rate (though it is not clear 
how long this can continue) [MIDS, 1998]. Currently there are estimated to be 
around 370 million users (September 2000) [NUA, 2000]. The huge growth in 
cellular mobile communications has been corresponding and there were estimated 
to be around 650 million users [GSMWorld, 2000] in early 2000. So, having 
established the popularity of computer networks we need to examine what the 
basics of networking involve. 
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Essentially a computer network is any set of autonomous computers that can 
communicate with each other via some medium. We term a computer that is 
connected to a network a host and the connections between hosts we ten-n links. 
The media used to make network links can range from copper cables (typically 
found within office networks), optical fibre (typically for connecting networks), 
and microwave links (for wireless/mobile communications). 
In order to allow hosts to communicate on the given links the hosts must 
implement a set of protocols, such as the Open Systems Interconnection 
(ISO/OSI) [Halsall, 1996, Tannenbaum, 1996] or the Transmission Control 
Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/lP) [Socolofsky and Kale, 1991]. The 
protocol stack is created which places one abstraction on top of another such that 
it becomes relatively simple for programmers to implement networking in their 
applications. An important concept in networking handled by these layers of the 
protocol stack is addressing. Each host in a network must, in order to 
communicate usefully, be addressable by other network hosts. 
The simplest network is the Local Area Network (LAN) that has few users and 
covers only a small area administered by a single authority. Interconnection of 
LAN's is generally termed Wide Area Network (WAN), if control is still under a 
single authority or more commonly an inter-network where the control is 
federated. Inter-networks tend to be a heterogeneous mix of hardware and 
software rather than a series of similar hosts. The most well known inter-network 
is the Internet. 
Today's Internet grew out of DARPA research projects in the late 60's. It is now 
in excess of 370 million users strong and growing at a considerable (and steady) 
rate. Initially the main uses of the Internet were email (electronic messaging), 
Telnet (remote access to computer systems) and FTP (file transfer protocol). Now 
the major service is the World Wide Web, or WWW, which many would argue 
has been the catalyst to getting people online. The combination of the WWW, and 
the Internet in general, with business activities has led to the arrival of Electronic 
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Commerce. Many believe that the success of the Intemet is key to the 
economic growth of many nations. We do therefore, live in a 'dot com' world. 
Networks like the Internet allow the creation of Distributed Systems that allow 
the processing and storage load of a system to be placed at the convenience of the 
network rather than the user, whilst keeping the distribution transparent to the 
user. 
Computer networks allow users to share computing resources more freely, 
distribute workload, and create more reliable and easily expandable systems. 
Looking more broadly, networks and particularly the Internet, allow users to 
conduct their business over great distances without the need for face-to-face 
contact. They can bring together people with similar interests from all parts of the 
globe and spread information almost instantaneously. 
As we move forward into the twenty first century the uses of the Internet will 
continue to increase as more and more bandwidth becomes available. Perhaps 
more significantly, communications networks in general will begin to converge so 
that the Internet becomes the carrier for telephony as well as computing data 
based services. Part of this convergence will involve increased mobility for users, 
which we look at next. 
2.2 Mobile Communications 
Communications that are not bound to a physical location are very attractive to 
users. Although mobile communications predate computers (radio 
communications were in fact 100 years old in 1999 [Morton, 1999]) it is only 
since the late 1970's that people have been able to connect mobile devices to 
computer networks. Initially this was brought about by the development of the 
Cellular concept by AT&T but more recently this has moved into digital 
telephony such as the GSM network and mobile connection to the Internet via the 
MobilelP protocol. This subsection looks at the evolution of mobile telephony 
since it is envisioned that future networks will become integrated as general data 
networks. 
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2.2.1 First and Second Generation Systems 
The Cellular concept developed by AT&T [MacDonald, 1979] solved the 
problem of sharing limited radio spectrum amongst large numbers of users by 
splitting the network into geographic 'cells', which then share the spectrum over a 
smaller number of users. The first generation cellular systems were analog in 
nature in that they could only transmit analog voice information rather than digital 
data. The dominant standard was called AMPS. 
Towards the late eighties moves were being made to introduce a second 
generation of mobile communications system that still operated in a cellular 
manner but transmitted digital data. Digital systems enable more sophisticated 
telephony services to be provided. A particular advantage to such a system is 
increased fraud protection through the use of encryption over the air interface, 
which we shall discuss in the next chapter. 
Once again no single standard has been adopted worldwide although the 
European standard Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) [Rahnema, 
1993] is dominant. GSM, initially a pan European standards effort, now has in 
excess of 360 million users (August 2000) [GSMWorld, 2000] in many countries 
throughout the world and is considered the most important standard. Particular 
interest is paid to GSM since it is likely to form one of the most important 
stepping stones to future third generation systems. 
2.2.2 Third Generation Systems and Beyond 
Over the last few years considerable effort in both the research and commercial 
communities has been channelled towards the developments of standards for 
future mobile communication systems, generally known as third generation 
systems (or 3G systems) [Groves and Clapton, 1996, Kazovsky, et al., 19981. The 
principal aim of 3G is to provide 'any service, any time, anywhere'. In practice 
this means a permanent global reach for high bandwidth multimedia. 
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Now, in 1999, these efforts come in two flavours. The international standards 
effort is named IMT-2000 [Pandya, et al., 1997], or International Mobile 
Telecommunications 2000, whilst the European effort is termed UMTS [Cullen 
and Lobley, 1996] [O'Mahony, 1998] or Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System. 
Unlike GSM and other standards, these standards are more concerned with laying 
out a framework for implementations of 3G systems to fit into. This involves 
detailing aspects such as what services are possible and how systems should 
interconnect. A consequence of this approach is that existing systems will be able 
to evolve into 3G systems rather than be replaced. 
Introduction of UMTS/IMT-2000 is likely to begin very soon, though 
considerable effort is being targeted for 2002 with major deployment of full 
systems by 2005. In early 1999 commercial interests such as Ericsson began 
performing local trials of UMTS services in the UK. 
In terms of the future beyond 3G systems it is difficult to predict since it is 
dependant on the relative successes of 3G systems. Two things seem particularly 
likely though. Firstly that the penetration rates for data communications of any 
type will continue to rise and secondly that convergence will occur between 
computer networks such as the Internet, especially in view of the recent 
development of Mobile IP [Perkins, 1997], and telecommunications networks 
such as GSM. 
One thing is for certain; any fourth generation network will then have to be 'all 
things to all people'. The shape and form of these is left truly to the imagination, 
and beyond. 
2.2.3 Mobile[Wireless Networking Concepts 
Mobile networks are ones in which it is possible to change the point of 
attachment of a particular (or all) hosts. Wireless networks are a special case of 
mobile network in that the point-of-attachment is performed via transmission of 
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radio waves rather than the more familiar cabling connection. Wireless 
communications takes place by utilizing select radio frequencies from the entire 
spectrum. The range (spectrum) of frequencies is finite which has led to 
regulatory frameworks by government to determine access. Spectrum is therefore 
a scarce resource. A major breakthrough in wireless communications allowing 
mass use of the spectrum was the development of the Cellular concept by AT&T. 
This was the precursor to the first analog mobile phone system (AMPS). 
Cellular systems partition the geographical area into hexagonal cells, each of 
which has a range of the available frequency to work with. By allocating different 
frequency ranges to a cells' six neighbouring cells then signals from no two cells 
interfere with each other. Repeating the seven cell clusters across the entire 
geographical region enables the operators to reuse the available spectrum. See 
figure 2.1 below. 
Figure 2.1. The Cellular Concept. 
In Figure 2.1 we denote each frequency range with a letter ranging from A to G. 
Each range is used exactly twice and no letter appears adjacent to a cell 
containing the same letter. No two cells using the same frequency can thus 
interfere with each other. 
There are several major types of wireless network, the aims and uses of which 
vary considerably. The most basic is the paging network. This operates only as a 
broadcast network with paging terminals only able to receive messages. This 
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makes for a simple and cheap to operate network, but at the general cost of 
usefulness. Another simple type of wireless technology is the cordless phone. 
These operate under the principle of using short-range base stations catering for 
single users. Cordless telephones are cheap and uncomplicated but are inflexible 
in terms of accommodating users and allowing roaming. 
Roaming is better catered for in cellular telephony systems such as GSM. The aim 
of GSM (and similar systems) is to cater for a mass market. This results in a 
requirement for maximizing the cell capacity. The cost of this is expensive, low 
bandwidth, high complexity terminals, with long delay. Wireless data networks, 
or Wireless LANs are intended to offer a wireless option to the typical fixed 
desktop computer. This is most applicable where wireless is required but the 
likely mobility is low (e. g. same building). The final type of wireless technology 
is Satellite. In these systems there are only a few, very expensive, base stations 
(i. e. the satellites) but these cover a vast area, possibly global. 
Regardless of the type of network involved the architecture is essentially the 
same. A Mobile Terminal (MT) connects to the local Base Station (BS) over the 
radio interface. Each BS is connected to a Mobile Switching Center (MSC) that 
controls the interface to the backbone internetwork and performs routing within 
the domain. The MSC maintains a register of the locations of all its registered 
users and their current locations in a database called the Home Location Register 
(HLR). A second database, entitled the Visiting Location Register (VLR) records 
the identities of all MTs within the geographical control of the MSC. A series of 
MSCs may be connected over an intcrnetwork, e. g. PSTN. This is shown in figure 
2.2 below. 
The management of wireless/mobile networks consists of three major problems; 
9 Radio Resource Management. Since the resource is finite it must be 
carefully allocated to the users in the system. Radio resource management 
is mainly controlled at the base station and is the wireless part of a 
network (rather than the mobile part). There are three basic schemes for 
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radio resource management; TDMA, FDMA and CDMA. See [Li and 
Liao, 19971 for further discussion. 
Mobile Switching 
Backbone 
BS 
Figure 2.2. Wireless Network Architecture. 
9 Mobility Management. The primary diffcrence in mobilc networking 
over fixed networking is the ability flor hosts to easily alter their point of' 
connection. The first problem this poses flor the managcnient of' the 
network is actually locating users (Paging). When a Liscr moves hctwecii 
cells two issues need resolving; how to decide wlicn to connect to a new 
base station (Location Update) and then actually managing the transiler of 
the connection (Handover). Finally the wider problern of handmg over 
connections between wider areas, i. e. between MSCs or inter-domain is 
called Roaming. See [Akyildiz, et al., 1999] for further discussion. 
o System Management. The remaining probleiiis in nianaging mobile 
networks lie in the overall system issues. There are three particularly 
difficult problems for system management. Firstly the narning scheme 
must allow users to be identified with a meaningful static address yet 
allow the logical address to remain dynamic. The second problern is 
implementing efficient signalling protocols to interconnect witli the 
backbone. Finally, and the concern of this researcli is that of securing the 
network. Security must provide privacy for the user and fraud protection 
Pagc 22 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
for the network. We look at the requirements in greater depth in the 
next chapter. 
2.3 Computer and Communication Security 
The phenomenal growth in computer communications, particularly during the 
1990's, has led to a massive research effort to secure networking systems. The 
Internet was originally designed with a low security model in mind but now 
requires much higher security as people wish to conduct business over it. General 
media regularly feature headlines suggesting that there is a regular stream of 
serious security breaches and the IT media reports security news on a weekly 
basis. The economic seriousness of this threat is borne out by empirical research 
[CSI, 2000], which suggests loss figures in the billions of dollars per year. 
As we progress towards integration of networks and increasing the range of high 
value services such as electronic commerce there is a strong desire amongst 
commerce and users to solve the security issues. Whilst the majority of breaches 
tend not to affect the ordinary user trust is required in order to progress. This 
section looks at what security is, and how computers and communications can be 
secured. 
2.3.1 Security Basics 
Security of computer systems attempts maintain three properties of the given 
system; Confldentiality, Integrity and Availability [Pfleeger, 1996, Voydock 
and Kent, 1983]. These properties may be compromised through threats that 
exploit vulnerabilities in a system. Note that threats do not necessarily have to 
involve intruders but could indeed come from accidental compromise or from 
natural sources such as power outages. The three security goals can be described 
as follows: 
9 Confldentiality: The resources of a computer system should remain readable 
only by authorised users. The most common reference to confidentiality is to 
applications such as email, where only communicating parties may read 
messages, but it more generally refers to any resource that requires read 
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access. The threat to confidentiality is interception, and the main 
vulnerabilities are weak access controls to computers and insecure 
communications links. 
* Integrity: The resources of computer systems should remain writeable only 
by authorised parties. In other words unauthorised parties should not have 
write access to resources. In terms of communications then any received 
message should be the same as the sent one. The threats to integrity are either 
based on modification or fabrication of data. The vulnerabilities are similar in 
nature to those for confidentiality. 
* Availability: The resources of a computer system should remain accessible to 
authorised users. In addition to basic access, general properties of availability 
are timeliness, fair allocation, fault tolerance and usability. The threat to 
availability is interruption (often termed Denial of Service or DoS). The 
vulnerabilities for availability are often very different to those for 
confidentiality and integrity since exploiting valid actions of a program enable 
many such attacks. For example, by bombarding a Web server with requests 
an attacker can at least slow the server down and possibly cause it to become 
overloaded and halt totally. An interesting discussion of Denial of Service is 
made in [Needham, 1994b]. 
In order to achieve security in a computer system those responsible must first 
assess the threats and vulnerabilities and identify a set of controls to implement. 
However, like in any business activity, risk must be assessed in order and 
balanced against the cost of the measures. There is no economic sense in 
implementing controls that will cost more than any cost of compromise. The next 
three subsections deal with the controls for computer and communications 
security. 
2.3.2 Computer Security 
Computer security relates to the protection of hardware and software on 
individual computers. Hardware may be protected by controls that relate more to 
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other types of physical security. Software is more complex to secure and is 
best considered as operating system security and application security. 
Operating Systems: The most critical software on a computer is the operating 
system since it has the highest degree of access to the system resources. If an 
attacker can compromise the operating system of a computer then he may be able 
to easily perform devastating attacks on the systems confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Indeed there is inevitability about security failure if secure operating 
systems are not in use [Loscocco, et al., 1998]. 
Three major controls in operating systems are memory protection, access control 
and user authentication. Memory protection involves maintaining address space 
for programs whilst access control is the more general case for system object 
protection. Access controlTalls into three main types; mandatory, discretionary, 
and role-based. Discussion of access controls can be found in [Sandhu and 
Samarati, 1996, Sandhu and Samarati, 1994]. 
In order to implement access control the operating system must be able to 
determine the authority of the user, this is the problem of user authentication. 
Typically users are authenticated via passwords [Abadi, et al., 1997, Morris and 
Thompson, 1979] though the use of Biometrics is an emerging field with 
potential to combat many of the problems of password-based authentication. 
Biometrics are measurements of unique physical attributes of a person such as 
fingerprints, voice and face recognition. 
Since no system can be said to be 100% secure (quite often due to the human 
element of a system) there has been an effort to try to design Trusted Operating 
Systems. Such an operating system tries to posses trust rather than achieve a level 
of security. This trust is based on the presence of features appropriate to the 
intended use of the system and to any assurance given by external analysis. In 
both Europe and North America government assurance schemes, ITSEC [ITSEC, 
2000] and TCSEC [NIST, 2000] respectively, are in place to grade operating 
systems according to sets of rigorous criteria. An attempt to harmonize these 
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schemes called the Common Criteria [CCITSE, 1996] has recently been 
developed. 
Application Security: In order to be useful a computer system should allow users 
to run application programs. However applications may contain bugs that can be 
exploited by an attacker or may even be malicious in nature, such as viruses. 
Viruses are programs that attach to other programs with the intention of causing 
some unintended actions on the computer system. These may spread by any 
method that data can transfer and may perform any action possible for that 
system. As such they present a very difficult problem for security. Applications 
called virus-scanners are used to try to detect their presence. A recent virus that 
received much publicity was the Melissa virus [CERT, 1999]. 
Other malicious code, or Malware, includes trojan horses (programs that perform 
undocumented secondary tasks), logic bombs (programs that perform event 
driven malicious actions), trapdoors (undocumented access point into 
applications) and worms (self-replicating network aware code). Perhaps the major 
problem surrounding viruses and malware is the human element. Since the 
explosion of Internet use people feel free to download software from a variety of 
sources without any consideration as to the origin and potential effects. This 
underlines the idea that systems include the people. It is imperative that good 
security practice, through education, becomes part of the culture of computing 
and communications technologies. 
A particularly interesting class of malicious code threat that has become more 
important recently is mobile code. Programming languages such as Java allow 
programmers to create code that can move between hosts in a network. Much 
work is being done in addressing the security issues of mobile code [McGraw and 
Felten, 1998, Rubin and Geer, 1998]. 
Another major area in program security is Database security. Database security 
must be maintained in a similar manner to other software, however the complex 
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nature of databases makes them a special case. The logical structure needs to 
be maintained as well as the integrity of individual elements. Extensive logging 
and complex access control can control these. 
A unique problem in databases is inference that is to say the deduction of 
sensitive information based on other related (less sensitive) information. 
Concealing or suppression can control this. Concealing can be achieved by 
returning query results that approximate or hide the sensitive values whilst 
suppression involves rejecting attempts to query data that might lead to sensitive 
values being inferred. 
Of course not all security compromises are due to malicious activity. Poor 
programming and accidental events caused by users are undoubtedly the biggest 
risks to systems [Risks, 2000]. The recent and ongoing phenomenon that is 'Y2K! 
(Y2K is the affectionate name for date related computer bugs related the roll over 
from 1999 into 2000, caused principally by using two-digit codes for storing year 
data) is testimony to this. Jones provides an interesting survey of date related 
problems in [Jones, 1998]. 
We have stated that computer security does not attempt to achieve the goal of 
100% security, as this is unrealistic (and indeed not helpful as an engineering 
aim). In recognition of this much research has been carried out in detecting 
intrusions, either after the event or more proactively in real-time. Such Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) [Graham, 1998, Mukhedee, et al., 1994] examine 
system activity and report on either anomalous or misuse behaviour. The nature 
of attacks on systems is often complex and detecting them is non-trivial. Recent 
results have been made using Mobile Agents to distribute the detection process 
across the network [Gregory, et al., 1998]. 
2.3.3 Cryptography 
Cryptography is the science of secret codes. Although as a science it has been in 
use since at least Roman times, it is since the birth of computers that it has 
become of major scientific interest. Indeed, it has been said that the British allies 
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would likely not have won the Second World War had it not been for the 
efforts of the cryptographers at Bletchley Park [BP, 2000] who cracked the 
German Enigma machine using some of the first computers ever built. 
It is perhaps no surprise then that governments, or more precisely military and 
secret service agencies, still research cryptography and indeed it is one of the 
more political of computing fields with frequent controversy surrounding its use 
and development. 
In this section we shall discuss the basic types of cryptography, keeping in mind 
our research topic. We shall discuss both symmetric and asymmetric encryption, 
how encryption can be used for data authentication through Digital Signatures 
and finally how cryptography is applied in systems and its problems. Readers are 
referred to [Schneier, 1996] for an in depth treatment of Cryptography. An 
excellent survey of the mathematical underpinnings is presented by both [Rivest, 
1990] and (Goldreich, 1997]. 
Basic Encryption Terminology. An encryption function outputs ciphertext 
based upon some plaintext input and a second parameter known as a key. Thus if 
each user chooses a different key then the same algorithm may be used by all 
users without the same mapping being generated. Knowledge of the secret key 
allows the authorised user to access the plaintext given the ciphertext using 
decryption. Typically decryption is the same algorithm as encryption. 
The length of the key determines the attackers search space, so that if a 128 bit 
key is used the maximum number of possible keys is 2 128 . Such a number 
is 
considered large enough to deter even the thought of a brute force attack on most 
common secure secret key algorithms. The search space may not be quite of this 
order depending on whether some numbers are not safe to use as keys. There are 
two classes of encryption, symmetric (single key) and asymmetric (two keys). It is 
important to note that key length isn't necessarily a good metric of security since 
many other factors contribute to overall security. 
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Symmetric Encryption. This class of cipher requires a single key to operate 
both encryption and decryption. The implication of this is twofold, the key must 
be kept secret to prevent unauthorized parties from accessing messages and also 
that two parties must be able to share a key in order to communicate securely. 
Today, the most common implementation of symmetric encryption is the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) [NBS, 1977]. This was developed by IBM in the 
1970's as the US encryption standard and is still in use throughout the world 
today. Despite this DES is widely considered to be at the end of its useful 
lifetime. This is mostly due to the key-lengths used in DES, either with 40 or 56 
bits. The former can be cracked in hours by a single machine whilst the latter has 
recently be attacked within 24 hours by a team of activists who built a specialist 
machine called DES Cracker [EFF, 1997]. 
The implications of this are far reaching. Firstly all exported products containing 
DES were originally required to run at 40 bit key lengths whilst domestic use 
permitted up to 56 bits. Recent alterations to the US regulations appear to de- 
regulate the exportation of strong cryptography, with certain conditions. Second, 
if a team of researchers with a moderate budget (DES Cracker cost $250,000) can 
crack 56 bit DES then it is easy to suggest that a more determined attacker, for 
example a large multinational organization, might already have more powerful 
machines. It has been speculated that the National Security Agency (NSA) in the 
USA has many machines capable of cracking 56-bit DES in minutes. Whether 
this is true is hearsay, but the possibility remains high. 
In 1996 efforts began to replace DES with another more secure algorithm, to be 
known as the Advanced Encryption Standard, or AES. This will operate at 128 
bits and above and will be more flexible in its design making it suitable for many 
applications. In early 1999 the selection procedure was well under way which 
involved lengthy peer-review of a series of proposed algorithms by many of the 
worlds top cryptographers. Such an open process is encouraging and should result 
in a standard that suits everyone (except perhaps the security agencies). Within a 
matter of days prior to the completion of this thesis NIST announced that the 
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winner of the AES selection process was the Rijndael algorithm, developed 
by a research team based in Belgium [AES, 2000]. 
Asymmetric Encryption. Also (more commonly) known as Public Key 
Encryption, this class is distinguished by requiring two keys, one for encryption, 
and the other for decryption. Public key encryption works by keeping one key 
secret (the private key) and publishing the other (the public key). To send a 
confidential message you encrypt the message with the recipient's public key. 
Public key cryptography was first published in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman 
[Diffie and Hellman, 1976] with the first practical scheme appearing a year later, 
known as RSA after inventors Rivest, Shamir and Aldeman [Rivest, et al., 1978]. 
It has recently come to light that the British government security research 
department CESG came across asymmetric encryption in the 1960's [Ellis, 1997]. 
Due to the military nature of the research this was kept secret at the time. 
The RSA algorithm is generally accepted as the most secure practical public key 
scheme and is widely used. Despite 20 years of analysis no serious flaws have 
been found [Boneh, 1999]. The strength of RSA lies in its simplicity and that the 
problem is believed to be as hard as factoring prime numbers (NP-complete). 
However, patent issues surrounding RSA have meant that the Diffie-Hellman 
scheme is more popular amongst many programmers. Diffie-Hellman is believed 
to be similarly secure. The patent on RSA expired in September 2000 so this 
situation may change. 
Another technique for public key encryption is that of elliptic curve cryptography 
[Menezes and Vanstone, 1993] (Araki, et al., 1998]. The importance of elliptic 
curve cryptography is their potential efficiency due to reduced key lengths, 
making them particularly suitable for power-limited mobile devices. Currently 
elliptic curve cryptography is in the research stage and confidence about the 
security of these schemes is not enough to deploy widely in real systems. 
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In mathematical terms public key methods are one-way functions that have a 
private backdoor. For the user this means that if you publish one key (the public 
key) and keep the other secret then other users can encrypt messages using your 
public key which will enable only you (the holder of the private key) to decrypt 
them. 
This has the advantage that users need not share a secret key before 
communicating. This allows complex distributed protocols to be produced that 
would possibly not be possible using symmetric encryption alone. However, two 
disadvantages overshadow the use of public key cryptography; speed and trust. 
Public key methods are typically many orders of magnitude slower, e. g. DES is in 
the region of 1000 times faster than RSA [Schneier, 1996]. This is due to the 
computational operations involved, typically modular exponentiation to large 
powers (RSA uses between 512 and 2056 bit exponents). Whilst this means that it 
cannot practically be used for message encryption it has found great real world 
use in protocols to authenticate users and for symmetric 'session' key distribution. 
Symmetric keys, typically used only for one communication 'session' can be 
distributed by encrypting them with the recipient's public key before sending to 
the other party. A well-known application of such session key distribution is used 
in the secure email program Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [PGP, 1999]. 
Certiflcation. Trust becomes a problem in public key cryptosystems because 
although two users can share keys without having met neither party can determine 
anything about the other party. In other words there is no secure binding between 
a users claimed identity and the public key. This might not make immediate 
sense, but consider an attacker who simply replaces a users public key with his 
key. If such an attack were to succeed then the attacker could receive subsequent 
session keys. 
This problem can be relieved by the implementation of a certification authority 
(CA) [Chokhani, 1994] [Perlman, 1999]. The function of a CA is to provide the 
necessary bindings between public keys and identities (and usually several other 
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credentials such as organization, but we ignore this technicality). Thus a CA 
'certifies' a users public key. This certification is achieved when a CA digitally 
signs public keys (we discuss digital signatures shortly). The public key of the CA 
is widely known to its users. There are several major problems with CA's, 
specifically; structure, revocation [Cooper, 1998] and real-world implementation. 
A particular problem in electronic commerce with certificates is the common 
practice of linking identities rather than permissions to keys, as is more 
commonly required, see [Gladman, et al., 1999]. 
The number of certificates required is potentially large (with the additional 
influence that a user may possess many public keys used for different tasks). 
Therefore the task needs to be distributed in some way since one CA could not 
handle all possible public key certificates. Typically this is addressed via a 
hierarchical structure so that if a key does not belong to that CA it can be traced 
through the tree. 
It is possible that the trust in a public key becomes reduced beyond acceptability. 
For example if a user has his computer broken into or a user leaves the 
organization he works for. CA's provide cover for such eventualities by allowing 
certificates to be revoked [Naor and Nissim, 2000]. This means that an attempt to 
look up the certificate will result in a negative reply indicating to the user not to 
trust the public key. However, it is not necessarily a trivial matter since most 
damage is likely to occur between the time of compromise and revocation. 
Mechanisms to better cope with this are still to emerge. 
The last significant problem with CA's is actual real-world implementations. 
There is currently no global infrastructure supporting certification, due partly to 
political and partly to commercial reasons. It remains to be seen exactly what the 
business model for certification is and what physical provisions will be made to 
allow users to adequately trust providers of certification. 
That is not to say business isn't attempting to forge ahead. Commercial 
certification has typically become known as Trusted Third Parties, since they tend 
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to offer a range of services related to the operation of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). The UK! s Royal Mail has recently begun offering 
certification on a large scale through a service known as ViaCode [ViaCode, 
1999], based on technology from Canadian company Entrust [Entrust, 2000]. 
Cryptographic Authentication. Perhaps the most important application of 
public key cryptography is for authentication of either entities or data origin. We 
shall now look at the basic techniques for authentication, digital signatures, and 
hash algorithms. Finally we shall take a quick look at how these are typically 
applied in protocols and how the use of cryptography is more difficult than it 
looks. 
It is intuitive to think of authentication as establishing the provenance of some 
claim. In cryptography this is indeed the case however the way it is applied varies 
according to the claim being made. The fundamental concept in cryptographic 
authentication is to prove the possession of a cryptographic key, typically the 
secret key of a public key pair. Authentication allows us to provide integrity in 
computer systems, rather than confidentiality. This distinction is important since 
we need not be able to recover the original form of a message during 
authentication, rather we need to be able to prove that a party authored a message. 
Authentication can be used in two logically distinct ways, to prove identity and to 
prove origin of a message. Let us briefly explain these in turn. To prove identity 
we can request that a user encrypt some message that we choose using their secret 
key. If we decrypt this with their public key we should see our original message 
and, if we make the assumption that only this person knows the secret key, be 
confident of the identity of a party. Similarly to prove message origin (and 
integrity) we may add a signature to a message. A signature is usually a hash of 
the message encrypted with a private key, where the hash is the result of some 
collision resistant one-way algorithm. We can write this more formally as 
follows: 
Alice -4 Bob: M, Api, (h(M)) 
Page 33 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile NetwoTks 
Where Alice is sending Bob a message, M, and a signature of this message. Ap& 
is the secret part of her public key pair and h(M) is the hash of M. Note here that 
Bob would use Alice's public key Apub to verify the signature. For simplicity, and 
in order to avoid exact implementation details, we may abbreviate the above 
statement to: 
Alice 4 Bob: M, Aig(M) 
A special type of signature known as Blind Signature was introduced by Chaum 
in [Chaum, 1982]. These signatures allow one party to provide another with a 
message to be signed without letting the signing party see the message. Chaum 
suggested this would be a useful way to create digital coins by allowing a 
customer of a bank submit coins for a bank to sign. The bank would not be able 
to subsequently trace the spender of the coin. A merchant receiving the coin 
would be able to verify the coin be checking the signature. 
The simplest explanation of Blind Signature is that a message contains a blinding 
component before signing which is removed after signature. Although there are 
have been many proposals for Blind Signature we shall briefly describe the basic 
operation of Chaurn's method, based on RSA. Assume one party, A, has a 
message, m, which he wants another party, B, to blind-sign. First A sends the 
message m' to B where m' is equal to (m * i) where r is the random blinding 
factor chosen by A and b is the public key of B. The next step is for B to sign m' 
and return it to A. The random blinding factor can now be divided out using b 
revealing a signature, mb on the message m. Note that B did not see m. 
In a distributed system the authentication of users is required to allow access to 
the system. Authentication servers are an essential component of a secure system. 
This type of authentication is often referred to as authorization. Two well known 
authentication services are Kerberos [Bird, 1995] and KryptoKnight [Neuman 
and Ts'o, 1994]. Distributed services authenticate their clients via the 
authentication server, i. e. the client authenticates to the authentication server that 
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provides the client with authorization to use the service (typically by 
generating a session key). 
Finally we should consider the difficulty of cryptography. The research literature 
is littered with broken cryptographic algorithms and protocols, even ones 
designed by highly respected researchers. Indeed it may be suggested that 
algorithms and protocols designed by people without an understanding of this 
difficulty will inevitably contain flaws. The following quote from Schneier 
suggests the reason for this, "Conventional engineering is about making things 
work It's the genesis of the term 'hack' as in 'he worked all night and hacked 
the code together. ' The code works; it doesn't matter what it looks like. Security 
is different,, it's about making sure things don't NOT work" [Schneier, 2000]. 
This notion causes problems on many levels. Firstly it is still not yet properly 
understood how to formally define cryptographic processes. Logics for 
authentication, such as BAN [Burrows, et al., 1990], exist but have been widely 
criticized, e. g. [Boyd and Mao, 1993]. At a higher level many real-life systems 
are broken due to inaccurate implementation (due either to poor specification or 
poor programming). It is probably true that most security breaches occur by 
discovery of implementation flaws. Finally, incompetent management and 
operation of secure systems frequently leads to failures [Anderson, 1994]. By 
definition then, "no system is 100% secure". With this in mind security 
engineering is about reducing risks as far as possible. 
2.3.4 Network Security 
Cryptography alone does not provide network security, although it is probably the 
most important aspect. In this subsection we attempt to tie in the discussion in the 
previous subsection and look at the securing of networks as a whole. We do not 
attempt to tackle mobile networks at this stage, as we will look more closely at 
these in the next chapter. 
We start by looking at the possible threats in open networks and then briefly 
examine the controls available; access control, authentication, firewalls and 
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intrusion detection. Finally we examine the subject of Electronic Commerce 
security that addresses many of the network security challenges in interesting and 
novels ways. 
The threats to networks are many and varied, but ultimately can be classified into 
those which breach confidentiality, integrity or availability. Threats to 
confidentiality might include disclosure of email, company documents or 
database records. Confidentiality is dealt with by a combination of encrypting 
communications and applying access controls to stored data. Access controls are 
an operating system mechanism that allow the owners (or administrators) of data 
to set permissions on the respective data. Research in access controls is currently 
focused on Role-based Access Controls, e. g. [Tari and Chan, 1998], known as 
RBAC. These types of controls allow a more dynamic and flexible approach by 
enabling different roles to be applied to users in order to control their access 
depending on the current business role they are in. 
Integrity in networks is controlled through authentication, such as those methods 
discussed in the previous subsection. The protection of integrity involves 
preventing impersonation of users. For example a user who is able to guess 
another users' password will have legitimate access to their files and network 
services - in the eyes of any access control. 
Control of confidentiality and integrity cannot always be provided by these 
methods. Suites of security applications are often used in the case of more open 
networks, such as when e-commerce services are provided (e. g. Web Servers), 
security is usually monitored by security suites. These suites tend to combine 
several technologies, namely, Firewalls, Anti-virus protection, vulnerability 
testing and Intrusion Detection. Firewalls are a way of implementing policies to 
network traffic by defining what is and isn't allowed through the network border. 
For example a Firewall might prevent connections to ActiveX controls. By 
combining Firewalls with encryption it is possible to create Virtual Private 
Networks (VPN) over open networks. This is particularly useful for enabling 
businesses to create secure links with their partners. Anti-virus software scans 
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code entering the network against known virus signatures. Vulnerability 
testing software examines the configuration of a network for known problems. 
Intrusion Detection software, as mentioned in 2.3.2, monitor apparently legitimate 
traffic for patterns of anomaly or misuse, and prevent intrusions taking place. 
2.3.5 Electronic Commerce Security 
A major implementation issue in networking technology is that of creating an 
environment for Electronic Commerce (also referred to as E-commerce). Of 
particular concern is that involving business to customer relationships rather than 
just the traditional business-to-business relationship. Aside from creating the 
business models to enable such developments the main problem lies in the 
information security. 
We are interested in the techniques used because they confront several of the 
same problems we face. Firstly, E-commerce schemes strive to give the user a 
high level of privacy in order to mimic typical payment structures in the physical 
world (especially physical cash). Second, there is authentication and trust issues, 
the use of digital signatures is paramount in E-commerce. Finally, and more 
generally, E-commerce, by its very nature requires a high level of security. There 
is little point in having payment systems that are trivial to break. 
In order to examine E-commerce schemes we shall divide them into two classes, 
those that aim to provide e-cash and those that aim to produce payment systems. 
E-cash schemes all derive from the seminal early eighties work of David Chaurn 
[Chaum, et al., 1988]. In this scheme allowing a bank to use blind signatures on 
digital 'coins' produces anonymous cash. These can then be traded with vendors 
who are able to verify the 'coin! as coming from the bank. Since the banks 
signature is blind neither the vendor nor the bank are able to trace the coin. 
Many authors have extended this work by addressing the shortcomings or 
imposing new attack model requirements. Brands et al developed the concept of 
'wallets with observers' [Brands, 1993] that introduce off-line coins and prevent 
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double spending by allowing a double-spent coin to become traceable. Other 
developments include divisible coins (Chan, et al., 1998] [Okamoto and Ohta, 
1991], undeniable payments [Chen and Mitchell, 1997], electronic checks 
[Chaum, 1989], escrow cash [Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1998], fairness [Petersen 
and Poupard, 1997] and other privacy controls [Davida, et al., 1997] [Radu, et al., 
1997]. There has been much research interest in this area and it is not our 
intention to cover every aspect, this is merely a considered summary. 
Simon provided an interesting view on E-cash schemes in [Simon, 1996] by 
noting that if we make assumptions about the anonymity of the underlying 
network then anonymous e-cash schemes become a simpler task. Similar work 
has been carried out by Jakobsson [Jakobsson and Juels, 1998, Jakobsson and 
M'Raihi, 1998b] who looks at the use of anonymous communications in e-cash 
schemes. Syverson in [Syverson, et al., 1997] also considers how to achieve un- 
linkable serial transactions by assuming anonymity in the underlying network. 
E-cash schemes do not inherently consider the underlying network but much 
research has been carried out to look for suitable network-based payment 
schemes. Again similar properties are required, high security, privacy and trust. 
Again this is a broad field and we do not wish to survey it completely but some 
notable works include SNPP [Dukach, 1992], NetCash [Medvinsky and Neuman, 
1993], NetBill [Sirbu and Tygar, 1995], iKP [Bellare, et al., 19951, and 'ticks' 
[Pedersen, 1997]. 
Such schemes are interesting to us because they provide many novel methods of 
privacy-enhanced interaction between clients and servers; in particular we have 
been inspired by the use of Blind Signatures. 
2.4 User Privacy 
In this subsection we shall take a deeper look at privacy, introducing some 
notions of what privacy is, and why it is becoming such an important issue in the 
information society. Following this we examine efforts to achieve privacy in a 
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variety of settings, typically focusing on the Internet. Finally we examine the 
legal and political situation regarding privacy. 
2.4.1 What is Privacy anyway? 
Privacy is generally considered to be the 'right to be left alone' [Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890]. Provision for privacy has been widely accepted in the civilized 
world. Indeed, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the law against such interference or attacks" [UN, 1948]. 
Despite such commonly accepted rights an individual's privacy is increasingly 
under threat in the emerging information society. The principal reasons for this 
are firstly that information is easier than ever to gather [Clarke, 1997] [Froomkin, 
2000] [Privacy-International, 1997] and second that regulation is considerably 
behind these developments [Agre and Rotenberg, 1998, Bainbridge and Pearce, 
2000, Litman, 2000]. 
Modem techniques for data mining and market research mean that vast quantities 
of data can be brought together to form electronic trails or dossiers. Potentially, 
every on-line action a user makes can be recorded and related together. Although 
there is nothing new about having data about us recorded, it is the ease with 
which this can be achieved that is truly frightening. 
The picture is complicated further by many governments' reluctance to allow 
citizens the sufficient rights to privacy. Whilst it is difficult to assess accurately it 
would seem this reluctance may stem from government intelligence agencies 
inability to find a significant role in post-cold war society. These agencies appear 
to have considerable influence on government's communications policy. Three 
major recent events support this view: ECHELON [Campbell, 1999b], 
ENFOPOL [Campbell, 1999a] and the UK DTI E-commerce consultation 
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document [DTI, 1999] [UK-Crypto, 1999]. The latter has resulted in the 
widely criticized Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill [Gladman, 2000]. 
ECHELON is an alleged secret global surveillance network operated by the US 
National Security Agency that is capable of spying on much of the world's 
electronic communications. There would appear to be little justification for such 
an operation. ENFOPOL is the proposals for security agencies access to 
communications networks. The proposals could make it mandatory for service 
providers to build in access points. Again there appears to be no adequate 
justification and even less consideration for the enormous cost of modification 
and operation that would be needed. 
The controversy surrounding the UK Governments recent consultation document 
for building a safe environment for e-commerce suggested to many that their 
hands are tied somewhat by pressure from the intelligence agencies. Whilst the 
Government seemed relatively willing to back down over proposals for Key 
Escrow the manner in which it was handled left little room for proper 
consultation regarding alternatives (the implication of no alternative being found 
was a potential return to a policy of Key Escrow). This seems particularly 
surprising given the almost total opposition by industry and researchers to Key 
Escrow. 
Privacy advocates are frequently accused of paranoia in these circumstances but 
we feel this is unjustified. How are consumers supposed to gain confidence in 
electronic communications if their clectcd government is conducting such 
widespread clandestine activity? More importantly, in the light of the possibilities 
for privacy abuse, - how arc consumers supposed to gain confidence that 
commercial entities are acting in an ethical manner with their data. It is widely 
known that a major inhibitor to increased use of the Internet is concern for 
security and privacy [Wang, et al., 1998]. 
Interestingly it has become apparent that Privacy may be a marketable commodity 
[Szabo, 1995] [Laudon, 1996]. A scheme known as P3P allows Web surfers to 
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negotiate privacy levels with a Web server. The implication being that users 
personal information actually carries some value. For example, it is typical at 
many news service Web sites to require the user to register their name and e-mail 
address before accessing content, suggesting that users "don't get something for 
nothing" - the price being your personal information. 
This notion that privacy is a commodity is especially disturbing in view of the 
already apparent gap between information haves and information have-nots. A 
recent magazine article [Economist, 1999] suggested that privacy would not 
become a problem for those with wealth whilst the less financially fortunate will 
see increasing erosions to theirs. The article closes by noting a theory that 
suggests we should have no privacy whatsoever as this would make those in 
power (and thus more likely to be afforded privacy) more accountable. We accept 
this is an interesting idea but is perhaps a little too radical at the present time. 
2.4.2 Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
In this subsection we review some of the proposed methods for enabling 
anonymity and privacy protection within open networks. The goal of technical 
solutions to anonymity is to hide the identity of a sender from all other parties 
(though not necessarily including the recipient). Typically this is achieved by 
sending the message via one or more intermediaries in order to confuse any traffic 
analysis. 
Chaurn [Chaurn, 1981] formally described this idea, which he called a digital- 
mix. A digital-mix is a network host with an input message set and an output 
message set. The transformation performed at the mix is to decrypt the input 
message set and then batch, pad, and re-order messages to produce the output 
message set. By considering each message and its associated header information 
in this process, the relationship between input and output is known only to the 
mix itself By chaining a series of mixes together a user can foil traffic analysis 
within the network so long as at least one digital mix remains uncompromised. 
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Since the early work of Chaum many authors have tackled improving the 
digital-mix. Many researchers have focused on the formal aspects and 
strengthening the security model. Work such as [Franz and Jerichow, 1998, 
Kesdogan, et al., 1998] examine specific problems and pose interesting solutions 
to these, whilst others such as [Jakobsson, 1998, Jakobsson and M'Raihi, 1998a] 
propose more general solutions. Jakobsson's solution utilizes the idea of shared 
split-key cryptography to reduce opportunities for collaboration. However these 
fail to address the practical implementation problem. 
Whilst digital-mixes have proven to be useful in store and forward applications, 
e. g. Babel [Gulcu and Tsudik, 1996], they have some major drawbacks for use in 
real-time communications. The batching and reordering of messages place 
potentially unacceptable delays on messages. Computation in terms of the 
message senders being required to perform multiple layers of encryption on the 
initial messages is a particularly inefficient distribution of load. This point is 
particularly pertinent in a mobile environment where terminals may have certain 
constraints on resources such as computation speed and energy consumption. 
Some mix-based solutions have attempted to address these concerns. An ISDN 
based system known as Real-time Mixes [Jerichow, et al., 1998] has recently 
been developed and been shown to operate favourably. This system uses features 
of the ISDN system to create mix connections. Unfortunately this system is not 
suitable for non-ISDN modes of communications systems. 
Another recent solution is the Onion Routing project [Goldschlag, et al., 1999, 
Reed, et al., 1996]. This is an Internet based technique that draws the 
computational complexity away from the user and into the network by proxying 
the anonymity process. Each trusted network operates a proxy onto the outside 
network that performs the layering of encryption into 'onion' data types, which 
then form an anonymous connection. The proxy is required to be trusted since it 
has full knowledge of the source and destination addresses. This causes a problem 
since we assume that users may be in an untrusted network at any time. 
Nevertheless, onion routing has been demonstrated at near real-time speeds. 
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In addition to the mix-based solutions to privacy there are some other novel 
approaches. Chaum proposed an anonymous broadcast technique called the 
Dining Cryptographers. This method allows a sender to broadcast messages to the 
other network users without his identity. Although a very elegant solution it 
suffers from being terribly inefficient and doesn't scale well, thus rendering it 
impractical for large-scale real-time communications. Another anonymity method 
is the CROWDS project [Reiter and Rubin, 1998, Reiter and Rubin, 1999] which 
allows a user to join a crowd of anonymity seekers. A sender forwards messages 
into their crowd, which in turn eventually forwards to the recipient. Each 
recipient of a message cannot then be sure who sent the message unless they have 
access to every crowd member. 
Other significant research in anonymity includes anonymous auctions, e. g. 
[Franklin and Reiter, 1996], and e-cash systems. This latter category tends to 
focus on achieving anonymity within the protocols and the coinage rather than the 
network itself. A common theme is the use of blind signatures, which we use in 
our architecture. 
Practical schemes for privacy also take the form of agreements such as TRUSTe 
[Reagle and Cranor, 1999] and P3P [Benassi, 1999]. The former scheme is a 
privacy policy monitoring scheme. In return for a privacy 'clean bill of health' 
companies are audited on their data collection practices, while the latter is a 
markup language for privacy preferences. A user wishing to access a web page, 
for example, can only do so if their P3P settings are lower or equal to those of the 
web server. From a practical viewpoint these schemes are important to increase 
the profile of privacy but technically offer little protection. As a security engineer 
one must assume rules and policies are going to be broken, a technical solution is 
much easier to feel safe with. 
2.4.3 The Legal and Political Landscape 
Technical solutions must operate within legal and political constraints. The legal 
landscape for privacy is currently confused with few well defined provisions and 
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even fewer positive legislation. Political pressures are polarized between 
civil rights activists e. g. [CRCL, 2000], and law enforcement proponents. This 
section looks at some of the issues we consider important to our research with 
respect to the legal and political situation. 
Legal. Many countries, particularly those in the European Union (including the 
UK), are in the process of implementing strong data protection legislation 
[France, 1999]. Although these Acts do not necessarily prevent the collection of 
data there are many prohibitions on what can be done with the data. One 
important aspect of the Data Protection is the ability for the person to gain access 
to complete information businesses hold about them. Any protection for user 
privacy is welcome but such legal provisions need to be backed up by strong 
technical measures in order to ensure a progression towards ubiquitous use of 
consumer networks. 
The other aspect of law relevant to privacy is the range of controls on 
cryptography [Koops, 1997b] [EPIC, 1997]. Although the situation is in constant 
flux the broad trend is towards allowing law enforcement access to 
communications. In the UK for example, legislation [Gladman, 2000] has 
recently passed through parliament that would allow law enforcement access to 
cryptographic keys of criminal suspects. This proposed legislation has been 
widely criticized by industry and the research community [FIPR, 2000]. A major 
problem is that it encourages the escrow of key material. Key escrow was initially 
proposed in the USA [Denning, 1994] but public pressure forced the government 
to drop the proposals. The cost to networks of key escrow would be prohibitive; 
indeed it is not clear that Key Escrow is possible to operate securely [Abelson, et 
al., 1997]. Research into the use of encryption by criminals appears to be 
inconclusive [Denning and Baugh, 1997], which would appear to add weight to 
the view that controls should be relaxed. 
Engineering computer systems to include access for law enforcement is almost 
certain to introduce weaknesses, and would certainly add significant complexity 
to an already complex system. With this in mind we do not attempt to introduce it 
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into our requirements, though we shall discuss the possibilities for law 
enforcement where relevant. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter presents background analysis for the field of research we are 
concerned with in this thesis. We began by ex=ining the basics of computer 
networking, before extending these ideas by looking at mobile networking. The 
evolution of mobile networking towards a third generation of system is examined 
as well as the general architectures used and the main issues that are particular to 
mobility. 
The next part of the chapter discussed computer and communications security, 
covering the basic concepts of confidentiality, integrity and availability, followed 
by some analysis of the main issues involved in securing systems. We followed 
this by examining the field of cryptography, concerning ourselves not only with 
the technical detail but also legal and political influence that are very much part 
of the field. 
Having covered the main areas of basic security and cryptography we presented 
some information on network security and e-commerce security since these are 
pertinent to our work. Finally we provided some insight into the notion of 
privacy, examining both the threats to privacy and the technologies that attempt to 
redress the balance for the user. Some discussion is given of the political and 
legal situation regarding privacy. 
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Chapter 3: Security and Privacy Requirements 
in Mobile Communications 
The previous chapter introduces both the technologies of networking and the 
security solutions that may be used within them. In this chapter the requirements 
for security and privacy in mobile communication networks are discussed. These 
requirements fall in to two broad categories System Security and User Privacy. 
System Security we take as meaning the prevention of fraudulent activity within 
the network. This typically means such intrusions as false authentication of users 
in order to receive service without payment. Although this category affects both 
the users and service providers we chose to consider this a service provider 
problem since they take the responsibility for maintaining fraud prevention (since 
it is possible that the user themselves may make such attacks). 
The second category, User Privacy, concerns the protection of a users data from 
unauthorised parties. The obvious case for user privacy is the protection of 
message contents from external parties. However, there are many other 
requirements for user privacy that we shall discuss. 
In section 3.1 we look at System Security or equivalently the service providers 
requirements. We discuss the authentication of users, encryption over the air and 
security requirements for terminal equipment. Section 3.2 looks at the User 
Privacy requirements including both internal and external parties. We also discuss 
possible law enforcement requirements in mobile networks. In the final section, 
3.3, we look at related work in the area including privacy techniques for general 
communications networks and those specifically aimed at mobile networks. A 
summary of the chapter is given in 3.4. 
3.1 System Security: The Service Providers Perspective 
In order to run a successful business network service providers need to prevent 
fraudulent activity within their administrative domain. Of primary concern is that 
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a user account is accessed only by that accounts' registered user and that their 
activity is correctly accounted for. As with all networked computer systems, the 
computers involved in running the system may be vulnerable to attack. We shall 
consider these to be beyond the scope of our work, but would suggest that these 
will be subject to protection via secure operating system controls. 
User accounts may be secured through three main controls. These are: 
authentication of users actions, encryption of traffic on the network and through 
securing users' hardware terminals. We shall deal with each in turn. 
3.1.1 Authentication of Users 
In order to account for users actions (to provide billing to customers) 
authentication must take place. Such authentication must occur whenever any of 
the following actions takes place: 
9A user becomes visible to the network. This may take place when a user 
activates their terminal or when the user recovers from some connection 
failure. The network process resulting from network connection is called 
Registration. In addition to authenticating a users' connection the location of 
the mobile terminal is recorded in order to route messages to the user. This is 
a two-part process since both the local connection point (local network) and 
the registered home domain (home network) must jointly update locations for 
this user. 
9A user moves between separate sections of the network. The network process 
resulting from managing movement, called Location Update, is part of a 
wider group of techniques known as mobility management. Such a location 
update can be one of three types: 
9 Inter-cell. This is the smallest logical movement in a network. When a 
mobile terminal moves around a network the most suitable local cell will 
serve it. Typically when a user moves to a location that would be better 
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served by another cell service is handed over between the two. Note 
that intra-cell (i. e. movement within a cell) is of no relevance since the 
logical point-of-attachment remains constant. 
e Inter-switch. A single switch provides the infrastructure to control many 
cells simultaneously. Each service provider may run many switches under 
their administrative control. Although moving between two switches still 
requires a move between two cells it is more significant because inter-cell 
movement is not detectable outside of the switch concerned. This means 
that a location update only occurs when an inter-switch (or inter-domain) 
movement takes place. 
e Inter-domain. When a mobile terminal makes an inter-switch movement 
between two switches in different domains then this is called an inter- 
domain movement. This can either be between the users' home domain 
and a foreign domain or between two different foreign domains. This is 
usually more significant than a normal inter-switch movement because a 
location registration must take place with a new domain and the 
registration with the previous one must be cancelled. Also billing 
information may pass between different domains. 
eA user activates some service of the network. In telephony terms this is 
known as call initiation but more generally in packet-switching this would 
involve sending messages to other end users or connecting to a specific 
service provided by the network. Typically users would be expected to pay for 
services and so there is a need to provide secure billing to the user by 
authenticating the service use. We term this process Accountability. 
3.1.2 Encryption of Network Traffic 
In order to protect user accounts it is necessary to encrypt (at least) some network 
traffic on the network from evesdroppers. Service providers must be able to 
conceal any billing and authentication information in order to prevent fraud. In 
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addition to concealing such data from evesdroppers it may be considered 
necessary to prevent network elements in other domains from accessing such 
data. 
Encryption requires the management of key data. In order to protect 
authentication and billing data the service provider must be able to share keys 
with the mobile users. Strong authentication techniques (i. e. those where 
authentication is based on the knowledge of an encryption key) typically combine 
their purpose with that of key distribution. In other words the service provider and 
user possess keys that allow them to authenticate themselves and to then share 
session keys. 
We note that although it might make commercial sense to offer content 
encryption to users as a privacy-enhancing feature, it is of no intrinsic benefit to 
the service provider. 
3.1.3 Equipment Security 
Strong authentication in distributed systems, and hence mobile networks, can be 
bypassed if a terminal is stolen or subverted in some way. Thus by taking control 
of a terminal an attacker may compromise that users' account. Therefore the 
service provider requires some inherent protection in the hardware terminals 
used. This can be achieved in one of two ways: 
* Biometrics. This involves the authentication of the user to the terminal (and 
henceforth to the network) by some physical attribute such as a fingerprint 
scan or voice recognition [Jain, et al., 2000]. Biometric devices are becoming 
increasingly popular for network access although their deployment is far from 
straightforward. For instance, if biometric data is compromised then the 
technique is no longer possible for that user. Currently there does not appear 
to be any trend toward using biometrics in mobile envirom-nents. 
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* Smart Cards. These devices are small credit card sized objects that 
contain a chip with memory and processing capabilities [Guillou and Ugon, 
1986]. Sophisticated implementations contain cryptographic functionality. 
Smart cards can be used to secure a terminal by rendering the terminal useless 
without a valid smart card. However, in such a simple configuration, the 
smart card becomes the weak point of attack rather than the terminal 
[Anderson and Kuhn, 1996]. This can be overcome by allowing the smart 
card to be accessed via a password, although these too have there own 
problems [Schneier and Schostack, 1999]. 
3.2 User Privacy: The Users Perspective 
Although the prevention of fraud in mobile networks is the major aspect of 
security, our main concern is with the privacy of user data. In this section we 
define the requirements for privacy in mobile networks. First, we discuss the 
meaning of the relationship of privacy to anonymity and pseudonymity and 
describe the different types of privacy that user might then desire. Following this 
we describe what is required to protect user privacy from both external parties 
and from the network itself. Finally we discuss the possible requirements of law 
enforcement. 
3.2.1 Anonymity, Pseudonymity and Different Levels of Privacy Protection 
The terms Anonymity and Pseudonymity tend to get used in an interchangeable 
fashion in less technical literature. In our work we take anonymity to be 
untraceable communications whilst pseudonymity to be traceable 
communications which do not use the participants' proper identities. This leads to 
the question, are there different levels of privacy? In this subsection we look at 
two main aspects of privacy, what data is required for privacy protection and what 
levels of privacy protection are available. 
Privacy is the protection of user data. Traditionally this has tended to refer to the 
contents of users messages, such as in e-mail. However, particularly with the 
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advent of large scale Internet use, anonymity - the protection of identity, has 
become a topic of great interest to the user community. 
In mobile environments we have an additional problem not faced in traditional 
fixed networks, that of location. Ideally we would like to hide the relationship 
between location and identification, as well as keeping our message contents 
private. The notion of privacy thus becomes one of hiding ones' behaviour as a 
whole. This is convenient for us since it allows us to consider the aspects of 
system security as integral to privacy protection (meaning the protection of 
authentication and accountability data). 
Users may view the threats from the systems in different ways, and indeed may 
vary depending on the situation they find themselves in (e. g. a user may require 
higher privacy levels when roaming in a foreign network). We shall now discuss 
the variety of privacy levels available to the user. 
In (Sarnfat and Molva, 1994a] five categories of anonymity for mobile 
envirorunents are described. These are given as follows; note that each successive 
class includes the previous: 
" CO: No privacy. 
" CI : Hiding user identity from eavesdroppers 
" C2: Hiding user identity from foreign authorities 
" C3: Hiding the relationship between the user and the home authority 
" C4: Hiding the identities of the home authority from foreign authorities 
" C5: Hiding user behaviour from the home authority 
These categories attempt to simplify the complex description of privacy and 
anonymity in mobile environments. Clearly in CO the user is not provided with 
any privacy at all whilst in CI encryption may be used to prevent messages being 
read by external attackers. Temporary identities are also used in CI to protect the 
user identity. In C2 these temporary identities are incorporated into authentication 
procedures to prevent the local network from determining the true identity of a 
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user. This level of protection is currently provided by GSM. Level C3 
protects the home network association from external attacks whilst internal 
attacks are protected at C4. Finally the highest level, C5, protects the privacy of 
the user from all parties including the home network. It is this last level we are 
attempting to achieve. 
3.2.2 Protection from External Attacks 
External parties are considered to be those only with access to the network media 
(either the wireline or over-the-air segment). In order to protect from such attacks 
it is sufficient to encrypt all traffic between network nodes. Whilst this approach 
is suitable for content data it may fail in two respects to user information; 
* Initial connection setup. Is it possible for an eavesdropper to gain 
information from secure connection establislunent, i. e. prior to a session key 
being shared? 
Control/Header Information. If the system continues to use identification 
information to route messages to the user then an external party may simply 
read this despite all content being obscured. Additionally it may reveal 
location information that is deemed sensitive. 
3.2.3 Protection from the Network 
The above problems remain true for attacks at the network level, however there 
are additional considerations to bear in mind. In order to achieve higher levels of 
privacy it is necessary to protect certain information from the network itself. In 
order to do this we need to consider what information is allowed to be available 
to which nodes in the network and which information requires protection. The 
three main tasks of the network (either local or home) are: 
* Authentication. In order to connect to any part of a network a user must be 
able to mutually authenticate himself with the network. Where the user is 
roaming in a foreign network this means that the local network will need 
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three-way authentication between the user, local network and home 
network. For user privacy we must ensure that the location of the user is kept 
private from the home network and the identity is secure from the local 
network. 
9 Service Provision and Secure Billing. Once a user has established a 
connection then, typically, billing will occur for any services provided. This 
applies to services of foreign networks, which may be paid either locally or 
post-service through the home network. We must keep the service provision 
and billing aspects separate so that no behavioural links can be made. Note, 
we must also maintain location and identification privacy as above. 
* Routing. In order to receive messages a user must allow the network to 
associate a location with it. This is apparently contrary to our privacy goals. 
However, if we unlink the location from the identity then we can allow the 
local network to manage the precise location of a pseudonymous user and the 
home network can manage the pseudonymous location for the users identity. 
We call this Privacy Routing, which we describe a solution for in Chapter 4. 
Common to all operations provided in the network it must be possible for the user 
to provide unique messages. This can be achieved though the use of public key 
cryptography. We note however that the user must be able to keep their secret key 
safe at all times. An implication of this is that the network provider cannot be 
involved in key-creation operations. The manufacturer of the equipment usually 
performs this, however this clearly raises trust problems. We shall discuss this 
later but consider it to be generally outside the scope of this research. 
3.2.4 Law Enforcement and Privacy Negotiation 
It is possible that in some jurisdictions constraints on privacy may be applied. 
This can affect the user and the service provider in several ways. As we discussed 
in chapter 2, this may be key-length restrictions, key escrow/recovery, or other 
general limitations on privacy (most likely on anonymity). 
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With respect to mobile networks law enforcement may require access to data 
above and beyond message content, as this alone might not be useful. Specifically 
location and identification information would typically be of use. Of course, as in 
current telephony systems, details of billing would be subject to request. This 
poses the potential problem of linking up information that would otherwise be 
protected. 
We note again that many countries' electronic communications laws are in a state 
of flux and even where clear trends are apparent it would not be wise to make 
exact statements about what is required. Indeed, it is not even clear if law 
enforcement is aware of their exact requirements beyond a draconian 'need' to see 
and hear everything [UK-Crypto, 1999]. 
This problem may be addressed by grading achievable privacy levels according to 
the requirements of the likely legal requirement. A user and network can then 
negotiate a suitable level as necessary. Whilst this is not a trivial matter it is 
certainly more flexible that a fixed (and thus low) level. 
A user then might as part of connection negotiate the encryption algorithm and 
key-length to be used, the privacy level (CO... C5) and the presence of key 
escrow/recovery. A similar idea of security negotiation is used in many real world 
security protocols, perhaps the best known is the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
[Netscape, 1996] used widely in Web Browsing software. This protocol is used to 
secure web connections and requires the negotiation of encryption algorithm 
used. 
Aside from the law enforcement requirements for such a negotiation it may be 
prudent engineering practice to allow a local service provider and a user to select 
options based on other policy factors. For example, a user may only possess a 
particular algorithm or a service provider might not allow a high level of 
anonymity for internal policy reasons. 
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For the purpose of this research we shall try to achieve the highest levels of 
privacy required and then suggest methods for retrograding privacy into the 
framework, rather than building privacy upwards. It is certainly not the intent of 
this research to provide solutions to law enforcement but this must remain a 
consideration. 
3.3 Existing Solutions 
Now that we have discussed the requirements for security and privacy in mobile 
networks we can examine what existing efforts have been presented in the 
literature. We tackle this is two main areas. Firstly we recap from the previous 
chapter the attempts to achieve privacy in general networks and secondly those 
specifically aimed at mobile networks. 
3.3.1 Privacy in General Networks 
In chapter 2 we discussed various privacy-enhancing technologies (PET's). The 
major techniques of interest are based on the digital-mix invented by Chaum 
[Chaum, 1981]. A digital-mix is a set of nodes in a network that accept and 
forward messages from users wishing to attain anonymity. They do this by 
stripping header information and removing a layer of encryption from incoming 
messages. Other more complex mechanisms are used to further confuse traffic 
analysis, such as batching, padding and reordering messages. 
Several variants on the mix scheme have appeared, mostly in an attempt to solve 
the performance problems inherent in Chaum's original idea. Onion Routing, 
developed by Reed et al. [Reed, et al., 1996] is perhaps the state of the art in 
anonymity. This scheme works by proxying the some of the encryption overhead 
to a trusted node. Onion Routing is unsuitable for our work because of this trust 
requirement. Other schemes were reviewed in chapter 2, but also found to be 
problematic. 
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3.3.2 Privacy in Mobile Communications 
The protection of privacy in mobile networks has been widely studied. In this 
subsection we consider firstly the security and privacy of the two most important 
mobile technologies, GSM (and briefly the successor system UMTS/IMT-2000) 
and Mobile IP. Following this we examine the major research efforts in the area. 
We show first that GSM and Mobile IP have low levels of privacy protection and 
second that although many research efforts surpass these levels they are still left 
wanting compared to our requirements. Our critique does not intend to show 
failures in approaches, but rather to highlight the lower requirements set by the 
various authors. 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
Perhaps the most important mobile communications network is the GSM 
network, centered on a series of standards developed by ETSI in the early 1990's 
[Rahnema, 1993]. GSM is currently mainly focused on providing mobile 
telephony in Europe, although it is becoming increasingly common in North 
America and Asia. In addition to mobile telephony there are efforts to provide 
basic data services such as short-message services and low bandwidth Internet 
access through the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) [WAPForum, 20001. 
A secure design for GSM was a very important driving factor in the 
standardization process, due partly to the considerable levels of fraud prevalent in 
Ist generation analog systems. User privacy is also given a greater level of 
importance in GSM; indeed it offers the highest level of protection amongst the 
2 nd generation standards. Despite this the privacy levels in GSM are still fairly 
low, consisting of over-the-air encryption and the basic use of temporary 
identities whilst roaming. These temporary identities give anonymity against 
external attackers and the local (foreign) network. Temporary identities in GSM 
may be attacked easily as the location management protocols allow the network to 
perform a query upon the mobile terminal asking for the true identity. 
More recently GSM has come under attacks from researchers in more 
fundamental ways. First, that the whole design may be fundamentally flawed 
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from an engineering point of view as the entire process was conducted 
largely behind closed doors, aka 'security through obscurity'. Experience has 
repeatedly shown that a lack of open development leads inevitably to serious 
flaws being discovered. It is with no great surprise then that the encryption 
schemes used in GSM have largely been broken [Wagner, et al., 1997] [Young, 
1998]. Due to export regulations at the time of standardization implementations 
of GSM outside of Europe have a crippled level of encryption (40bits) that 
renders its protection almost useless. Despite this, levels of fraud in GSM are 
widely believed to be very low (the most significant problem appears to be 
physical theft of terminals). 
3 rd Generation Systems 
Evolution from 2 nd to 3' generation systems is currently taking place and by 2005 
it is expected that much of this road will have been travelled. The standardization 
process is not yet complete in either Europe (UMTS) or worldwide (IMT-2000). 
However, it appears that both these efforts (the former is likely to be a subset or a 
close match to the latter) will contain strong security for both data and voice. In 
Europe a project sponsored by ACTS entitled ASPeCT examined the 
requirements and put forward various solutions [ASPeCT, 1998]. 
The suggestions of ASPeCT include strong authentication and relatively strong 
privacy requirements. These requirements stop short of providing high levels of 
protection against internal entities. Billing is also given considerable attention, the 
suggested scheme unsurprisingly based on binding identities to service contracts 
[Horn and Preneel, 1998]. ASPeCT is controversial for its suggestion of building 
in a form of Key Escrow (or Key Recovery as it is often called when not legally 
required) [Rantos and Mitchell, 1999]. It remains to be seen whether this is 
carried forward into the standards documents. 
Mobile IP 
The Internet is currently the largest and most visible network on the globe. The 
current IP protocol suite does not accommodate mobility. However a 
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specification for extending it has been proposed, known as Mobile IP 
[Perkins, 1997]. Its model is similar to that of PCS in that the user has a 
permanent IP address at its home location and registers for a care-of address when 
away from home. 
When a user roams out of their home domain and into another one they must 
obtain from the foreign domain a care-of IP address that allows the home network 
to route packets to the mobile no matter where they are. In order to do this a user 
has to send to the home domain, as part of a registration packet, a hash of a pre- 
agreed nonce. The two parties synchronize nonces during registration (they can 
also re-synchronize at a later stage if necessary). The hash function used is MD5 
[Rivest, 1992]. 
Anonymity is not considered in Mobile IP, however we consider that with some 
fairly simple conceptual extensions anonymity can be achieved within the model. 
The use of a MIX type network would be essential to maintain unlinkability 
between home and foreign domains, in IP this is called tunneling although MIX 
networks are a specific type of tunneling. Minor extensions to the headers would 
then be required to allow the necessary registration messages to flow. 
Work by Fasbender et al. [Fasbender, et al., 1996a, Fasbender, et al., 1996b] 
attempts to add anonymity to Mobile IP by using a concept called the Non 
Disclosure Method, or NDM. It adapts the MIX concept for use in a simplified 
manner within the Mobile IP structure. A user sends a registration request through 
several agents before reaching the home agent. The public key of the current 
agent encrypts each hop. All hops are encrypted before being sent out by the user. 
This is essentially a simplified version of a MIX that merely tunnels packets 
through several agents. They note that it would be quite simple to implement 
within Mobile IP without requiring any special nodes like in a MIX network. 
However it would not achieve the same security as a MIX network since traffic 
analysis measures like batching, reordering and padding are not used. The second 
of the two papers [Fasbender, et al., 1996a] examines some performance results 
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using NDM and finds that although it introduces delay into the system it is 
not as high as might have been expected and would be acceptable in many 
applications. We discuss this further in chapter 4 when we introduce our general 
solution to network anonymity in mobile environments. 
MIX-based Solutions 
Other research has been conducted that has primarily focused on the use of MIX 
[Chaum, 1981] networks employed in mobile systems. The first results were 
produced by Cooper in [Cooper and Birman, 1995] which details an anonymous 
messaging system where a user sends via a MIX but reads via a blinded shared 
memory concept. Whilst this does demonstrate the idea of using MIX'es to 
conceal location information outsiders it does not address the issue of insiders or 
of authenticating mobile users. 
The main body of work in this area are three papers from Germany, [Hoff, et al., 
1996] and [Federrath, et al., 1995, Federrath, et al., 1996]. These focus on the 
problem of anonymous location management in mobile networks. (Federrath, et 
al., 1995] is actually a broader paper on mobile security, detailing requirements 
and some possible ways forward. Amongst their findings are that MIX networks 
can be used to unlink a user location with their identity thus protecting sensitive 
user data. 
Federrath in [Federrath, et al., 1995] categorises the security problems in mobile 
networks as follows; protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Confidentiality is sub categorised as; content, location and address privacy. 
Integrity is sub categorised as content, addressee, and usage integrity whilst 
availability is stated as the enabling of communications between parties who wish 
to and are able to communicate. In order to achieve confidentiality (i. e. privacy) 
they note the possible use of MIX networks to unlink sender and recipient, their 
suggestion is based on having a protected home agent that can collaborate with 
the user whilst they are roaming. We do not consider this proposal to be feasible 
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in a PCS network since it would be difficult to show trust in such a device to 
the user. 
Hoff et al. [Hoff, et al., 1996] describe an anonymous mobility approach using 
MIX nodes to register location updates with the local and home networks. 
Authentication is not considered in this research. By placing the MIX network 
between the user and the local Mobile Switching Center (MSC) the local network 
can register the update without having to know the actual location. Whilst this 
achieves anonymity to a certain degree (C4) it does not completely hide 
information from the home network. It is not clear how the implementation of a 
MIX network between the user and the local network would operate, we suggest 
that this is an unnecessary complication. Also it may be possible to use these MIX 
nodes to fraudulently communicate since at the input to the node the final 
destination of messages is only assumed to be the local network for location 
update. 
Similar work carried out by Federrath in [Federrath, et al., 1996] places the MIX 
between the MSC and the home network. It is our consideration that a MIX-type 
network is always going to be required to achieve full anonymity so this paper 
offers only little towards the technicalities of implementation, which we consider 
to be difficult. We also consider authentication to be a greater problem than the 
actual location update, again this paper offers no solutions to authentication. 
Mobile Authentication Schemes 
Beller, Chang and Yacobi published the first detailed results in 1993 [Beller, ct 
al., 1993]. Their work proposed an authentication protocol for intra-domain 
registration using a hybrid public/secret key method. Performance considerations 
were such that public-key methods were reduced as far as possible. Whilst power 
continues to be a limitation in mobile devices this is a decreasing limitation, 
indeed certain classes of device are considerably more powerful than fixed 
networking devices of that time. Although these results were novel at the time 
they fall short of our requirements since they offer only intra-domain 
authentication and propose very limited privacy. In addition no consideration of 
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location tracking is made, which clearly violates our requirements from 
section 3.2. 
Later work by Carlsen [Carlsen, 1994] noted some flaws in the protocol that 
allow replay attacks and proposed some new protocols that extend the previous 
ones with additional ones for end-to-end user security (thus against the network). 
His work also added in a greater level of anonymity for the user against external 
parties during registration. Later work on these protocols was performed by 
Zheng [Zheng, 1996] who noted additional flaws and was able to increase the 
efficiency of the protocols involved. Mu and Varadharajan in [Mu and 
Varadharajan, 1996] noted some further flaws and presented a further protocol 
improvement, which again offers a level of anonymity against system user. An 
additional paper, [Varadharajan and Mu, 1996], addresses securing end-to-end 
inter-domain communications. As with their previous work, anonymity is 
provided against the visited network though this is weak anonymity according to 
our description in section 3.2. 
One of the most influential papers on mobile network security was by Molva, 
Sarnfat and Tsudik [Molva, et al., 1994]. Their work was the first to offer an 
inter-domain capability to mobile authentication. Based on the KryptoKnight 
[Molva, et al., 1992] family of protocols, it does not however offer higher levels 
of user privacy. Some suggestions are made at making the user identity 
confidential from the visited network but the home network is trusted to manage 
such a process. It is implicit from our requirements that the home network cannot 
manage such a process. 
Further research following on from [Molva, et al., 1994) has been published in 
(Asokan, 1994, Herzberg, et al., 1994, Samfat and Molva, 1994b, Samfat, et al., 
1995]. The work by Samfat et al in [Samfat and Molva, 1994b, Samfat, et al., 
1995] defined the five levels of anonymity CIX5, as discussed here in section 
3.2. In their work they define protocols to achieve anonymity to level C2. Of 
these, the work of [Herzberg, et al., 1994] achieves the strongest privacy, 
detailing protocols to achieve C3 anonymity. Discussion of possible ways to 
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achieve higher levels of anonymity is given involving utilization of a 
'homeless' mobile user model, where the user is authenticated based on previous 
location rather than a fixed home network, and also the inclusion of mixes to 
create anonymity. 
The use of the homeless model has the advantage that it is simpler to create 
anonyinity, but is insufficient in that it is only suitable for sending and not 
receiving messages as there is no method to contact a user for incoming calls. 
In parallel to the work just mentioned are a series of papers by Bharghavan 
[Bharghavan, 1994, Bharghavan, 1995, Bharghavan and Ramamoorthy, 1995]. 
He approaches the problem in a similar way although attention is only given to 
achieving anonymity from eavesdroppers. The first of these papers [Bharghavan, 
1994) deals only with Wireless LAN's where the anonymity problem is 
considerably less serious. Later in [Bharghavan, 1995] inter-domain anonymity is 
considered and the proxy approach to authentication is used. By this we mean that 
the home passes enough information to the local network to allow it to manage 
secure roaming whilst in that domain. Finally in [Bharghavan and Ramamoorthy, 
1995] accounting is introduced into the solution. By passing accounting 
information as part of the authentication process networks can be sure of the 
'solvency of a user and begin to charge for services used. Again, the home 
network is afforded trust by the user to achieve anonymity against other parties. 
Our requirements clearly do not allow this. 
Miscellaneous Related Research 
An interesting paper by Hardjono and Seberry [Hardjono and Seberry, 1996] 
looks at a very wide set of implications for mobile network security. Of particular 
interest to them is database security and the implications for mobility. Since 
location management involves large databases being queried at regular intervals 
regarding sensitive user data this proposes many challenges. For the purpose of 
our work we are considering only the network aspect and assume some trusted 
base including a secure set of database capabilities. 
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Aziz and Diffie in [Aziz and Diffie, 1994] examine Wireless LAN security 
and provide a key exchange scheme for end to end communications that protects 
against unauthorised access. No privacy issues are considered and this is only 
dealing with intra-domain security where the mobile user is known. Another 
scheme by Mohan [Mohan, 1996] looks at the existing US standard IS-41 and 
proposes some improvements, particularly towards performance. Again privacy is 
not a considered issue. 
Next we note a paper by Fox & Gribble [Fox and Gribble, 1996] that examines 
the use of inter domain Kerberos in a mobile environment. The main thrust of this 
paper is to have a local Kerberos server act as a proxy for the user by establishing 
an association between the local and home servers. Several changes to the typical 
Kerberos protocols are outlined. However, as with standard Kerberos, the service 
provides no anonymity. Also the trust model of allowing local proxy servers to 
have access to information limits the potential for creating anonymity through this 
method. 
An alternative approach to anonymity was provided in [Patel and Crowcrofl, 
1997] which discusses a method for user privacy that attempts to alter the 
paradigm for PCS in order to create anonymity with accountability. He considers 
the notion of a homeless user in that no registration is required with a home 
network. Services are paid for in advance, in this way a user need not identify 
them selves. This is analogous to someone using a phonecard at a public phone to 
communicate. An important note is made that such access even though not 
proving identity still authenticates since it provides credentials. 
Provision of tickets that are unforgeable, resistant to replay, modification, and 
resale are required for operation. We note that although this is a workable 
solution in certain situations such as the 'phone box' it suffers from the major 
shortcoming that a user cannot receive calls except through some form of call 
back. It is not feasible to make such a radical alteration to the mobile / PCS 
model. That is not to say that in some situations this could not happen but that 
really it has to occur within an existing framework. 
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There have been other research efforts concerning the authentication and privacy 
issues, we have reviewed the most interesting ones. Two additional areas that are 
currently emerging within mobile network security are personal reachability 
management [Reichenbach, et al., 1997] and Intrusion Detection [Buschkes, et 
al., 1998, Sarnfat and Molva, 1997]. Reachability management attempts to allow 
a user to control the flow of messages reaching a user depending on their location, 
current role and so forth. Mobile intrusion detection is significant from regular 
intrusion detection since it attempts to profile mobility of users. This has potential 
consequences for the privacy of users and network operators as likely to favour 
effective fraud prevention measures over privacy protecting measures. 
3.4 Summary 
The requirements for security and privacy in mobile networks can be divided into 
two sections, Systems and User requirements. Service providers need to be able 
to ensure against fraudulent activity against user accounts whilst the users may 
desire high levels of privacy. 
Security for the service provider consists of being able to register users onto the 
network (provide authentication at connection time), update locations of users as 
they move about and manage secure billing procedures for the services the users 
receive. Location update may occur between cells (inter-cell), between network 
switches (inter-switch) or even between providers (inter-domain). Each has 
different requirements. 
In addition to authentication of user activity the service provider can operate link 
encryption to protect external parties accessing information and may also provide 
some equipment security such as smart-card access and biometrics. Smart-card 
access looks like becoming the dominant method for securing terminals and is 
proposed for use in UNITS [O'Mahony, 1998] and IMT-2000 [Pandya, et al., 
1997]. 
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Users are concerned with protecting data about themselves. This data 
includes contents of messages, identification, location and behaviour when 
receiving service. Protection of these items runs contrary to the operation of the 
network so we noted that the real issue is unlinking occurrences of the data. For 
example, a local network is entitled to record a trace of the users movement so 
long as the identity is not known. 
Next we discussed the law enforcement requirements in mobile networks and 
how this might affect users. Key recovery and restrictions on encryption strength 
are likely in many jurisdictions. We suggest that a requirement for mobile 
networks is to provide some negotiation for security parameters so that laws can 
be abided. 
A survey of existing literature concerned with protecting privacy in mobile 
communications was presented. This literature is wide-ranging, drawing together 
existing implementations such as Mobile IP as well as theoretical efforts. Existing 
technologies favour a light approach to privacy whilst many research proposals 
suggest a need for greater privacy. Despite this recognition it remains that no 
single proposal attempts to achieve the highest levels of privacy, the levels we 
have set out in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The Mobile Networks Privacy 
Architecture 
So far we have presented background to our research in the form of both 
examination of networking and security followed by detailed requirements for 
security and privacy in mobile environments. In this chapter we introduce our 
solution to these requirements. This comprises an architecture that allows the 
secure management of user data to provide privacy. We have called this 
architecture the Mobile Networks Privacy Architecture (MNPA). 
We first outline our architecture explaining how the logical components fit 
together to provide mobility management and secure communications and system 
security. We follow this with a discussion of the two main components, the 
Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) and the Privacy Token Issuing Authority 
(PTIA). It is then demonstrated how these can be linked together to achieve 
anonymous communications via new location registration and 
accountability/billing protocols. 
Analysis of the MNPA is not provided in this chapter, which intends only to 
present the MNPA. Our analysis of the MNPA is presented in chapter 5. 
4.1 The Architecture 
This section introduces the architecture, MNPA. First we set out the assumptions 
made before introducing the outline of the architecture. Then we discuss how 
mobility management, accounting, and communications take place. 
4.1.1 Assumptions 
There are several principal assumptions we have made in the MNPA in order to 
develop a complete solution. Some of these assumptions may be considered to 
introduce weaknesses into the design, which we note, whilst others are simply 
choices between methods. 
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* Encryption. We assume the existence of secure encryption primitives in 
order to concentrate on the lager picture. Whilst we make no explicit claim to 
the existence of completely secure cryptography it would seem that relatively 
secure primitives would be adequate (e. g. RSA for public-key operations). We 
should note that a major problem in cryptography is in the correct 
implementation, as noted by [Anderson and Needham, 1995] [Schneier, 
1998]. Anderson also notes that the choice of algorithm can affect the 
properties of certain protocols. We assume that suitable algorithms are chosen 
and implemented well. See also chapter 7 for further discussion on 
encryption. 
* Network Properties. The networks to which we can apply our architecture 
are intended to be heterogeneous though we have assumed a minimum set of 
requirements. 
Firstly we do not assume any particular medium between various network 
hosts, particularly the air interface between the user and the network 
attachment point. Whilst the air interface is typical of mobile networks it is 
not conceptually important to our architecture (i. e. we are considering the 
more general case of mobile rather than wireless networking). 
Next we assume that in order to become active in the network the user must 
register their location with a'home'network (analogous to the HLR in GSM). 
We assume that as a user moves around that the location registered will 
change accordingly. This can be either between cells, switching centres, or 
networks. The switching centre nearest to a user, which we call the 'local' 
network, also records the location. These two location stores can then link 
communications bound for that user. This applies equally to the situation 
where the user has moved onto another network. This assumption seems 
sensible in view of the fact that most wide-area mobile networking 
environments operate under similar conditions. Note therefore that this work 
is not considering ad hoc, micro-cellular, or ubiquitous computing. 
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No assumption is made about the implementation of intermediate 
internetworks travelled across other than these may contain vulnerabilities 
matching similar to other parts of the network. 
e User Properties. We assume that the user carries with them a terminal 
capable of accessing a local network, and ultimately their home network. In 
addition to this we assume that the terminal is capable of performing various 
cryptographic primitives without undue performance and power hindrance. 
This has traditionally been an assumption which researchers has been unable 
to make and may still not be one suitable for this environment. However, we 
feel that it is necessary to make it at least to begin with in order to progress 
the theory. Indeed with the future promise of high-bandwidth mobile 
multimedia terminals it begins to seem quite a reasonable one. 
Another assumption we make is that the user accesses the network (wherever 
and for whatever reason) via a user account agreed upon with their service 
provider. This model is how typically mobile phone users access services and 
how we imagine much internetworking to operate in the future. UMTS 
provides for a two-tier service provision environment where network 
connection is provided by one subscription (the network domain) and services 
are provided by other subscription (service domains). 
Another assumption we make is that payment for at least some services is 
required, and that some of these payments are made post-service. Such an 
assumption implies the existence of a billing system. For the purpose of this 
research we have not considered any further how to achieve cash-like 
payments (commonly known as 'pay-as-you-go'). Many research proposals 
for electronic cash schemes have already been presented that may be adequate 
for use in mobile communications. See chapter 2 for some examples. 
e Network Host Security. Our next assumption is concerned with the security 
of the hosts in the network. Initially we assume the network hosts to be 
running secure operating systems. In a real world situation this might be 
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considered a foolish assumption. However this allows us to logically 
separate external and internal attacks. We can now class attacks on 
communications as external whilst attacks via the host are internal. An 
internal attacker might then be someone authorized to access user data but 
acting wrongly. We shall not consider the wider problem of intrusion 
detection in our work. Some work on Intrusion Detection in mobile 
environments already exists though this is primarily aimed at detection 
fraudulent call connection [Buschkes, et al., 1998, Sarnfat and Molva, 1997]. 
Similarly where we describe the operation of security functions such as key 
management we assume that these can be implemented in a secure manner. 
Again this is not an entirely practical assumption but it is one we must make 
in order to be clear about the presented theory. We hope that as technology 
progresses it will become simpler to construct software in a reliable manner; 
we most gladly leave this enormous problem to other researchers. In our 
analysis of the MNPA we shall briefly examine the effects of a variety of 
possible vulnerabilities. 
4.1.2 Architecture Overview 
Now we introduce the Mobile Networks Privacy Architecture (MNPA). As we 
saw from the previous chapter existing techniques are available to gain varying 
amounts of privacy in mobile networks. However, none of these methods meet 
the requirements we set out in chapter 3. The MNPA addresses these problems by 
implementing several new components and extending others in the mobile 
environment. The logical view of the MNPA is shown in fig 4.1. 
The two new components are the Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) and the 
Privacy Token Issuing Authority (PTIA). The PRC provides a mechanism by 
which the sender and receiver of communications can be unlinked. The PTIA is a 
third party that facilitates the privacy process by acting as a broker for access 
tokens. This builds on the standard logical view of mobile communications as 
presented in chapter 2. 
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PRC PTIA 
I 
Mobile 1 2. key Distribution 
Network ý-ýoken Issuing 
(see fig 2.1) 4. ispute Management 1 
5. 
rrtcr-PTIA 
messaging 
Key: 
PRC Privacy Routing Capability 
PTIA Privacy Token Issuing Authority 
Figure 4.1: Mobile Network Privacy Architecture (MNPA). 
The Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) takes the form of an efficient anonymity 
routing scheme similar in concept to MIX networks [Chaum, 1981]. This allows 
untraceable communications to occur between two parties and allows our 
authentication protocols to operate without the identification of parties involved. 
The other major addition in the architecture is the Privacy Token Issuing 
Authority (PTIA). Each domain is registered with one or more of these 
authorities, however control is left outside of the networks involved (i. e. a 
different Service Domain). It is our suggestion that these may be partly controlled 
and/or operated by telecommunications regulators in the country of operation 
since the PTIA can be considered as a watchdog for accountability in anonymous 
communications. The PTIA is a totally novel concept that by involvement as a 
third party acts not only as a facilitator of user privacy but also as a watchdog for 
network accounting. We discuss the PTIA in 4.3. 
The remaining elements of the architecture are logically unchanged from existing 
networks. Thus the user is connected to the terminal (possibly via a smart card). 
The terminal connects to the local network Mobile Switching Centre (MSC) via 
the air interface and base station (BS). Each MSC operates a Visitor Location 
Register (VLR) recording the logical locations of users currently registered within 
its domain. The users home domain also maintains a Home Location Register 
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H ir 'a It LIQ, part of which is the current address of its users. In the case of our 
privacy-enhanced solution this address is an entry point to the Privacy Routing 
Capability (PRC). A host wishing to communicate with a mobile user can do so 
transparently using the public international identity of the mobile user. 
In order for communications to occur several conditions must be satisfied. First, 
location registration of the user must occur so that the users' home network can 
perform routing. This must be performed with privacy for the user up to level C5. 
During registration commitment to settle any billing must be achieved. Once 
registration is complete the user should be able to communicate privately whilst 
allowing the local network to settle accounts for any service used. Thought must 
also be given to how to achieve lower level anonymity within the MNPA. How 
can we, in effect, retrofit weaker privacy for situations that either do not allow or 
do not require such high levels of privacy? We consider this later for further 
work, in chapter 7. 
4.1.3 Mobility Management 
We have seen that in order to communicate in a mobile network environment the 
roaming terminal (and therefore the mobile user) must have its location registered 
with the local and home networks in order to create a routing association. This is 
the main aspect of mobility management. Our concern for mobility management 
is how to update locations in a secure and privacy enhancing manner. 
In order to achieve registration securely the mobile and the local network must be 
mutually authenticated. A three party protocol is thus required. The local network 
and mobile user cannot always mutually authenticate themselves together since 
they may have no previous knowledge of each other (i. e. when roaming) so the 
home network is required to provide authentication of the local network to the 
user and of the mobile to the local network. An implication of this is that the 
home network must provide authentication of itself to the local network to allow 
the local network to trust the mobiles authentication. 
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In Chapter 3 we discussed the requirements for user privacy. So-called 'full' 
anonymity, or C5, requires that no information can be disclosed about the users' 
activity without the users' agreement. In practical terms there is in fact two pieces 
of information that can be disclosed during registration, which do not lower the 
privacy levels but which are required to operate correctly. Firstly the local 
network knows the physical location of a user, in order to perform local routing to 
the user. As long as the identification of the user, and its home domain 
identification, is not disclosed this infon-nation is of no use to the local network. 
Secondly the user must identify itself to the home network in order to update the 
previous location information. To maintain the highest level of privacy it is 
important that the location update does not refer to the actual location involved. 
The first thing we note from this is that protocol messages between the local and 
home network should not identify either party. We can realize this using the 
Privacy Routing Capability (PRC). A message travelling from A to B has source 
information stripped out so that B can only observe the exit point of the PRC. 
During registration all messages between the local and home networks must 
travel through the PRC to obscure the users' home domain relationship. Since the 
home network must record the location of the user we insist on this location being 
a PRC address rather than an actual location. Since the local network records the 
actual location, the PRC forms the untraceable link between the actual location 
and that recorded by the home network. 
At this point we see that although location update can be made private a method 
for providing authentication is required. We stated earlier that the home network 
could be allowed access to user identification. During registration if a user 
identifies himself then the home network can perform simple authentication. The 
result can be passed back to the local network. However this is not enough since 
we have already stated that mutual authentication between all three parties is 
required. This presents a bigger problem since no obvious mechanism is available 
for mutually authenticating anonymously in this circumstance. 
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In section 4.4 we outline a new protocols for location registration. This are 
based on work previously been presented in [Askwith, et al., 1998, Askwith, et 
al., 2000a, Askwith, et al., 2000b, Askwith, et al., 1997]. 
4.1.4 Accounting 
Service providers in mobile networks will expect users to provide some fonn of 
accountability. This would appear to conflict with the desire to achievb privacy 
whilst obtaining service since to bill someone for services it would seem sensible 
to log all the service usage for that user for billing at a later stage. Also when a 
user from a foreign domain is receiving service from a network provider then they 
must know to whom they should charge. 
We demonstrate that this can be achieved within the MNPA. Firstly, before 
receiving service a user can produce credentials demonstrating they are willing 
and able to pay (produced by the home network). The network providing service 
can be confident that service will be paid for since it can verify the credentials but 
not the identity of the user or who is going to pay on their behalf (i. e. who the 
users' home network is). Once service has taken place the local network can 
redeem the credentials in return for an appropriate form of recompense. A 
mechanism to provide fair play and non-repudiation is needed that should include 
interaction with the PTIA. 
Our mechanisms for providing accountable anonymity are provided in 4.4. This 
work has previously been presented in [Askwith, et al., 1998], and in more detail 
in [Askwith, et al., 2000a]. 
4.1.5 Private Communications 
In order to communicate in a private manner the user must not only have their 
message contents protected but also not have their location and identification data 
pair disclosed. The local network has access to the users' location but the user 
remains pseudonymous whilst the home network has access to the identification 
but has a pseudonymous location for that user. Other parties should have access 
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to neither the location information nor the identification information of 
communications that are taking place. 
Our work assumes some encryption scheme to protect message content that can 
be agreed upon by communicating parties either before or during 
communications. A typical example might be Pretty Good Privacy [PGP, 19991. 
Much research has been carried out in this area and it is generally well 
understood. As such we do not investigate this requirement in order to focus on 
the more difficult problem of location and identification privacy. 
This is achieved by obscuring the routing information via the Privacy Routing 
Capability (PRC) in our architecture. We recognise that in order to provide true 
anonymity then messages between two end points must travel through some 
intermediate points in order to add some obscurity to location and identification. 
Also we note that the main flaw with this type of model is that if all the 
intermediate stages are compromised or cooperate together then it is possible to 
compromise the users' privacy (of identification and location only). To reduce 
this possibility we suggest that the intermediate stages be as diverse and 
independent as possible. This brings about non-technical issues about how to set 
up a network to provide PRC that a user can trust, to a large extent this is outside 
the scope of our work but we shall discuss it for completeness. 
Now that we have given an overview of the architecture we shall discuss in detail 
the Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) and the Privacy Token Issuing Authority 
(PTIA) before presenting how these fit together to allow privacy-enhanced 
communications. 
4.2 Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) 
In chapter 3 we discussed various anonymity solutions to privacy and we noted 
various problems with these solutions. In this section we discuss our proposed 
solution to this problem, which we call PRC. This section is based upon work 
presented in [Askwith, et al., 2000b]. 
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4.2.1 Overview 
A solution to the PRC problem must solve the following problems with existing 
4 mix' schemes. Firstly it must remove as much encryption overhead as possible 
from the user. Secondly it must not rely upon any specific underlying network 
technology. Finally it must not require excessively trusted components. 
Our proposed PRC is, like a MIX system, composed of a series of nodes that are 
logically linked. Each PRC node is capable of processing messages for PRC 
users. In order to utilize the PRC a mobile user must have access to a range of 
PRC nodes. Ideally this would consist of a subset of possible nodes that is greater 
in number than the required number for any one route. In other words if there are 
M available nodes in the PRC then the user must have the option of using a subset 
of N nodes for a route requiring P nodes, where M ý: N ý. - P. 
The solution we have developed mainly utilizes symmetric encryption. Each 
message is encrypted a series of times with a symmetric key shared between the 
mobile user and the PRC host. The sharing of keys is achieved through the use of 
public key encryption. A simplified description of the operation of the PRC is as 
follows: 
Before roaming occurs the user must 
* Compute one or more symmetric keys for each accessible PRC node 
e Encrypt each symmetric key with the public key of the corresponding 
PRC node 
During roaming, when a message needs sending via the PRC the user must 
* Compute a route for the message to take through the PRC 
* Encrypt the message with each symmetric key in the reverse order of the 
route 
* Include the encrypted symmetric key of the next PRC node before 
encrypting 
* Send the message to the first PRC node in the route 
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Upon receipt of a message a PRC node must 
" Decrypt the symmetric key at the head of the message 
" Decrypt the remainder of the message using the symmetric key 
" Send the message to the node identified in the head of the decrypted 
message 
4.2.2 Detailed Operation 
Now we shall describe the operation of the PRC in more detail. Pre-computation 
of keying material enables the user to avoid the significant burden of real-time 
public-key cryptography. A different symmetric key, Kux, (or optionally, more 
than one) is computed for each node available to the user within the PRC. The 
key is then encrypted using the public key, Kx, of node X. This is denoted as 
Kx(Kux), where K(m) is the encryption of m using key K. 
The pre-computation phase may occur at any time and on any machine under the 
control of the user. A user may have a computer at home that could handle this 
task during an idle period and may be set up to allow the user to download the 
results before roaming. It may be possible to obtain keying material during 
roaming though obviously some keying material is required prior to roaming. 
In order to send a message through the PRC the user must now choose a route and 
apply the appropriate layers of encryption using the pre-computed keys. The 
method employed to choose a route is beyond the scope of this research, but a 
simple method might be to choose at random a route from a set of pre-selected 
routes. We look at this problem again in chapter 7 along with other further work 
ideas. 
Once a route is selected then the message to be sent is first encrypted with the key 
for the destination. Then, for each node in the PRC, the resulting message is 
encrypted with the symmetric key for that node and concatenated with the 
encrypted symmetric key for that node and the address of the next destination. 
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The following example shows a message, m, being transferred between two 
hosts A and B via PRC nodes X, Y, and Z. Figure 4.2 shows a representation of the 
route taken by the message. In this example it is assumed that A and B share a 
key, KA& where this is not the case but A can determine B's public key then the 
message might contain a session key encrypted with the public key, e. g. KB(KAB, 
KAB(M))- 
A -: >X: Kx(KAyj, KAx(Y, Ky[KAyl, KAy(Z, Kz(KAz), KAz[B, KAofmjjjj 
X -: > Y: Ky(KAy), KAy[Z, Kz(KAzj, KAz(B, KAB[mjjj 
Y -: >Z: Kz(KAzj, KAz(B, KAB(W)j 
Z9B: KAefmj 
A 
Logical PRC boundary 
/ 
Figure 4.2. Example route ofa message between two hosts using the PRC. 
Replies to messages sent through the PRC can be achieved in one of two ways. 
The simplest method is for the mobile user to request the destination host perform 
a similar PRC computation independently. This assumes that the destination host 
has access to the location information of the mobile user and can be trusted to 
utilize the PRC correctly to maintain the mobile users' privacy. Where this is not 
the case then the mobile user must also provide a return address for the 
destination. 
A method for achieving return addresses is to include the encrypted keys inside 
the destination message so the recipient can return them through the route. The 
simplest way to achieve this is to modify the pre-computation stage to include the 
previous-node identifier in the encrypted symmetric key. This prevents the PRC 
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having to perform extra public-key computation but does require more 
careful pre-computation. For each available node in the PRC the user should 
compute a key for each suitable following node in a route. Note that a different 
return route from the outgoing route is possible. 
The following example shows a message, m, being transferred between two hosts 
A and B via PRC nodes X, Y, followed by a response message, n, from B sent via 
PRC nodes Y and Z. For simplicity assume m contains the return address 
parameters. The leading parameters (FIR) indicate either forward or return 
directions. 
OF KKB A -> X»i, KXI AVP KAdyp KY[ A Y)p KA Yt o KA B[Mjjj 
X -: > Y: F, Ky[KA y), KA y[B, KA B fmjjp 
-; >B: F, KAB(mj 
B decrypts m to reveal the message plus return keying material for Y and X 
respectively; Ky(Z, KA y, Kz(A, KAz)). The reply now returns to A as follows- 
B4Y: R, Ky[Z, KAy, Kz[A, KAZJJ, KAs[n) 
Y -: >Z: R, Kz[A, KAzj, KA y[B, 
KAB(n» 
Z4A: R, KA z[Y, 
KA 
y[B, 
KA B 
Upon receipt of the latter message A is able to decrypt using K4z to reveal the 
identity of the next key, KAy, and finally the key of the recipient, KAB, Once again 
the mobile user does not have to perform any public-key encryption and the PRC 
nodes only perform one operation each, to recover the symmetric key and 
forwarding address. The major difference in the return protocol is that the entire 
route is pre-computed as a single message rather than as a set of parameters. 
A concern for implementation of the PRC is the choice of number of hosts to use 
to balance security against efficiency. Experience with the Onion Routing 
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network [Reed, et al., 1998] suggests that 5 hops offer sufficient security. We 
currently see no reason to suggest any other number for use in the PRC. What we 
would suggest is that each node used be operated by different domains, such as 
different commercial PRC providers. 
We have now described a PRC that enables untraceable routing of messages 
through the network. This is the first building block to providing privacy services 
in the MNPA. The other major component of the MNPA is the Privacy Token 
Issuing Authority, which we describe next. 
4.3 Privacy Token Issuing Authority 
4.3.1 Overview 
The Privacy Token Issuing Authority, PTIA, is a distributed third party 
application that manages the distribution of user-privacy tokens. The primary 
objective is to allow a simpler form of authentication by taking the computational 
burden away from the user. A user-privacy token allows a user to gain access to a 
network in an un-linkable yet authorized manner, therefore enabling the user to 
meet their privacy requirements. Assurance is given to the service provider by the 
PTIA who can trace the user by collaborating with the interested parties if 
necessary. The service provider - PTIA contractual agreement, legally backs this 
up. We will demonstrate later in this chapter how user-privacy tokens can be used 
as the basis for a novel billing technique. 
The home network of each user is subscribed to the PTIA and collects tokens on 
behalf of the user. Any PTIA subscriber can verify tokens. The distributed nature 
of the PTIA means that a particular token may have been created by one of a 
number of PTIA processes present across the entire network, each with a different 
PTIA key. In order to allow a network to verify any token the PTIA must also 
handle distribution of these keys. 
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The tokens are collected by service providers who subscribe to the PTIA, on 
behalf of their users, without a link being made between the user and token (using 
blind signatures). By pre-computing tokens in batches we aim to relieve the 
network and the user of this task in real-time. These tokens may be used for 
various purposes where some form of assurance is required by the network. 
Once issued to a user, a token can be submitted for various purposes (such as 
registration). During submission the token is cancelled from the system, disabling 
any further use. Attempts to reuse tokens are discovered by the home network and 
reported to the PTIA. This gives the PTIA a 'watchdog! like position in the 
architecture. This turns out to be of benefit since anonymous accounts can be 
arbitrated by the PTIA, a natural role for this third party. 
To summarize, the PTIA is responsible for the following functions: managing 
PTIA subscriptions, issuing and cancelling tokens, key distribution, inter-process 
communications, and dispute management. We shall now discuss the operation of 
each of these tasks within the PTIA. 
4.3.2 Subscriptions 
Here we examine what a subscription is, how it is created and how a network is 
able to connect with the PTIA to perform token management tasks. A 
subscription to the PTIA is much like a service account with any other distributed 
service, i. e. the network is provided with a service address (i. e. username) and an 
access key. 
Account creation begins with the physical process of signing an agreement 
between itself and the PTIA. This agreement enables the necessary assurance for 
future tokens. Once this is done the PTIA can send the network or service 
provider an account name and shared key, both encrypted under the nearest PTIA 
elements public key. A public-key infrastructure should be in place covering all 
the constituent PTIA elements. Since the number of PTIA elements is relatively 
small and under moderately homogenous administrative control the normal 
problems of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are reduced considerably. 
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Now that an account is created it is a simple task for the network to log in to 
obtain tokens for itself and for its users. This is achieved by making requests 
using the shared key provided at setup. This might be achieved as follows, where 
KNp, is the shared subscription key: 
Network 4PTIA : KNptRequest) 
PTIA 4Network : KNp[Response) 
Next we must examine the tokens themselves. 
4.3.3 Tokens 
In this section we examine what tokens consist of, how they are created, issued 
and deleted, and how service providers can validate them. A token is essentially a 
special type of public key certificate. Normal certificates create trust in an 
identified public key. With PTIA user-privacy tokens we create an anonymous 
public key certificate for the user that is also bound to the home network public 
key associated with that user. Only the home network is aware of the binding 
between the two keys, though the PTIA sees the public key of the home network. 
This allows tracing at a later stage, should a dispute occur. 
The process of token issuing operates as follows: 
Home 4 PTIA : KHp[Km, JKH, Kmj*RKPI 
PTIA -. ) Home : KUp(Kil(Id, Date, (Ku, Km)* RKP)jj 
To request a token the home network, Home, constructs a message containing its 
own public key, KH, and the section to be signed by the PTIA. This latter section 
contains both KH and the public key of the user, Km. These are multiplied by the 
blinding factor that is computed by raising a random number, R, to the power Kp, 
where Kp is the public key of the PTIA. The result is encrypted with the shared 
key between the home network and the PTIA, KHp, to prevent external attacks, 
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before finally being sent to the PTIA. The home network retains the random 
number whilst the token is still in use as it may be required during a dispute. 
Upon receipt of the token request the PTIA decrypts the message using the shared 
key, KHp. The remainder of the message is concatenated with a unique token 
identifier, Id, and a date-stamp, then signed using KI; '. Finally the message is 
encrypted with KHp before being sent to the home network. The home network 
produces the blind signature by dividing out RKp, leaving Kj'((Id, Date)IR K p, KH, 
Km), which becomes the token. The home network records the token along with 
the random blinding factor, R. 
Tokens provided to networks for network use arc similar but only provide a single 
key (for the network) rather than two keys. It is preferable that this key is different 
to that used for user tokens to lessen the risk of disclosure. When a token is 
submitted to a network it must contain an identifier for the PTIA element that 
created the blind signature. This enables the network element to decide which 
PTIA key to use to verify the token. 
Once a network has received a token on behalf of a user then it may issue user- 
privacy tokens to the user in question. The token acts as a certificate for the 
network so that a user receives as many tokens as required from the network 
based on one PTIA token. A token issued by a home network to a user is as 
follows: 
[Kil, KW'(rand, Id, Date, Kilf(Id, Da h ýj1) te), IRK KH., K 
Here the network includes its token signing key, KII, and uses this to sign the 
reminder of the token. This remainder contains a random number for the token 
identity, rand, the PTIA token identifier, Id, the date-stamp, Date, and the PTIA 
blind signature token. 
A token presented to a service provider can be validated by evaluating the 
signatures and checking that the message is formatted correctly in providing the 
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blinded segment and associated information. When the date-stamp in a token 
expires the PTIA removes the token number from its records and informs the 
network of the expiry. The network must then request a new token. The other 
scenario that causes a token to be cancelled is when a dispute occurs. A network 
should re . ect a token with an expired time-stamp. 13 
4.3.4 Key Distribution 
A problem in having the PTIA as a distributed application is that networks will 
come into contact with tokens issued by many different processes within the 
PTIA. Each PTIA element must be able to operate independently and to do so 
requires separate public-key pairs. This now brings about the problem of 
efficiency if networks have to look up public keys each time they want to evaluate 
atoken. 
Our solution to this problem is to distribute tokcn validation keys to each 
subscriber, using the subscription keys detailed above. Integrity of this 
distribution is achieved by attaching a hash of the new key table to the 
distribution. We justify this method of distribution by claiming that the amount of 
keying material is relatively small for the task being undertaken. The number of 
PTIA elements should be considerably smaller than the number of network and 
service providers. For example, if each PTIA clement provided subscriptions to 
103 service providers and there were 106 service providers in total then there 
would need to be between 103 PTIA elements, and therefore, keys. 
New keys will need to be distributed either when existing keys expire or when a 
key is revoked. It is not envisaged that revocation will occur frequently. A more 
sensible solution might be to distribute keys once a week or once a month 
depending on the administrative operating conditions of the respective PTIA. By 
organizing the PTIA into a hierarchy it is possible to avoid updating entire key 
tables all in one go, they can simply be done in sections at the respective expiry 
times. We discuss this hierarchy in the next section. 
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4.3.5 Inter-Process Communication 
By organizing the PTIA into separate sub-domains it is possible to make the inter- 
process communication tasks simpler to achieve. These tasks are key distribution 
(described in the previous section) and dispute management (described in the next 
section). Indeed if sub-domains were created it would be possible for the PTIA to 
be operated be many independent authorities. 
The following, and depicted in figure 4.3, is an example of how a hierarchical 
PTIA might be achieved. Suppose we have six PTIA elements numbered 1-6. If 
we split these into two groups of three, e. g. 1-3 and 4-6, we can organize each 
group as follows: 
Fig 4.3: example configuration of six PTIA elements 
First we place elements 1-3 in the hierarchy labeled 'A' and the element 4-6 in 
the hierarchy labeled V. These may represent separate domains. Next the two 
hierarchies are joined by a root element that is responsible only for moving data 
between hierarchies. Now, if PTIA element 3 is required to deal with a token 
issued by PTIA element 2 then it knows to pass the token to element 1. Element I 
can identify the token as coming from a child node so it is passed downwards, in 
this case directly to element 2. Normal tree traversal techniques can be used to 
locate the correct node. To ease the pressure on the root node it will probably be 
better to arrange a series of root nodes into a backbone web-like structure. 
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Under the hierarchy discussed above each PTIA element needs to 
communicate with only a small number of neighbouring elements. To prevent 
attacks on communications between these elements each must protect messages 
using keys shared between their hierarchy partners. 
4.3.6 Dispute Management 
Disputes requiring the intervention of the PTIA occur when either a service 
provider or a user does not correctly observe a protocol involving a PTIA token. 
Examples of disputes might be a user submitting a date-expired token, a service 
provider over-charging or a user attempting to falsify details. When a dispute 
occurs the token must be submitted to the PTIA by both the service provider and 
the home network of the user so the details can be examined allowing the PTIA to 
determine which party is right. 
If a PTIA element is called in to settle a dispute the first action to take is to make 
sure that the correct element is dealing with the dispute. This is achieved by the 
receiving PTIA element examining the token identifier and either keeping it (if 
the token was issued by that element) or passing it across the hierarchy as 
described in the previous section. Once the correct PTIA element has obtained the 
dispute information then it must evaluate the dispute. How this is achieved 
depends upon the nature of the dispute but it will typically involve working 
through a protocol with the given information. Details of how billing disputes are 
resolved are given later in this chapter when we discuss our billing protocol. 
Recall from the beginning of the PTIA discussion that the user is not identified in 
the token. In order for some disputes to be resolved identities may be required. 
The PTIA is able to trace a user identity by co-operating with the home network 
of the user. Each token identifies the subscribing network and the network can 
determine the associated user from the token. This raises an interesting point in 
that where an identity is not required it won't be automatically revealed. The 
decision to reveal a user identity may be written into service contracts rather than 
inherent in the technology. 
Page 85 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
Where entities (providers or users) are identified in disputes it may be 
appropriate for the PTIA to offer a form of 'crcdit-rating' for other entities. This 
has the benefit that the enquiring entities only find out overall ratings rather than 
full details. We have not provided this facility in the MNPA. 
The combination of the PTIA and PRC does not in itself achieve privacy for users 
within the MNPA. Instead they provide a framework for privacy enhancing 
protocols. We have developed protocols to achieve location registration, user 
communications and billing. These are described in the next section. 
4.4 Privacy-Enhanced Communications 
In this section we detail how the MNPA can be used to implement privacy- 
enhanced services for the mobile user. First we show how a user can 
anonymously update his location in both the local and home network databases - 
the VLR and HLR respectively. Then we show how a user can communicate with 
another user in an anonymous fashion. Following this, we look at how 
accountability can be introduced into the architecture by presenting a method of 
creating a post-payment billing account between a user and a service provider. 
4.4.1 Location Management 
In order for a mobile user to maintain a presence on the network he is required to 
register his location at appropriate intervals (e. g. when a terminal is activated). 
This procedure is termed location registration. This is achieved by the mobile 
terminal making a request for registration, which causes the local network to 
mutually authenticate the user before recording a location address in the local 
database. The home network needs to be informed of the registration so it can 
also record the update. 
To maintain the privacy of the user within the MNPA during registration the user 
submits a privacy token. This token gives assurance to the local network, as 
shown in the 4.3. The network must now inform the user's home network of the 
user registration request. In addition a network token is used to provide 
authentication to the home network, which is then used to form a reply for the 
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user. Communication between the networks is conducted via a PRC 
connection to hide the location of each network, and thus information about the 
user. The aim is therefore to enable identification-location pairs to be recorded as 
(Real Identification, PRC Address) at the home address register, and (Pseudonym, 
Current Address) at the local address register. 
We now present the registration protocol followed by an explanation of the 
contents of each message. Note that other implementation specific message 
components might be present but we are only concerned with those that are 
required for the security of the MNPA. 
Mobile4 Local : regmtKAj'/mtjmaKmu[rmq)j 
Local 4 Home : reg, It, KL"flt, mt, rand, KmH[rmq)j 
Home 4 Local : regKdl[randKmH[Kzj) 
Local -: ý Mobile : regKji I [rand, Kmjj[KL)jKC'[Km[Kmzj) 
To begin with the user, Mobile, sends a registration request message, reg, to the 
local network, Local. This message contains a token, mt, followed by two 
encrypted sections. The local network first attempts to validate the token. If the 
token is valid then the public key, Km, in the token is used to decrypt the first 
section. 
The first encrypted section contains a copy of the token and the PRC forwarding 
address, fma. The local network cannot read the second encrypted message that is 
encrypted under the key shared between the user and the home network. It 
contains a PRC return address. This section is forwarded to the home network as 
part of the second message. 
Following the first message the local network sends a message to the address 
given infma, which is actually bound for the home network, Home, via the PRC. 
This message includes a network token for the local network, It, followed by an 
encrypted section. The encrypted section contains It and the second encrypted 
section from the previous message. Also included is a random number used as a 
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challenge for the home network. These are encrypted under the secret key of 
the local network, ML-1. 
The token It contains the public key (without idcntity) of the local network. This 
enables the home network to decrypt the remainder of the message to reveal the 
user information. The home network must validate mt and It before continuing. If 
they are valid then the return address ma is entered into the user's record in the 
location database. 
Now the home network constructs a message containing two encrypted sections. 
The random challenge, rand, and an encrypted copy of the local network public 
key (encrypted under the shared key between the user and home network) are 
encrypted under the secret key of the home network. 
Upon receipt of this message the local network first checks the challenge 
response evaluates to rand, and if it does, it then sends the encrypted public key 
and the session key to the user. The session key is encrypted under the public key 
of the user and the secret key of the local network. The user can check the validity 
of this key by using the key encrypted by the home network, Kull(Kd. 
Discussion of Protocol 
The objectives of this protocol are to allow privacy enhanced location 
registration, mutual authentication between the three parties, and session key 
distribution between the user and local network. This subsection discusses how 
this is achieved by the protocol. 
In the first message the presence of mt enables the local network to recover a 
certified public key and provides authentication of the user. The signature 
provides the message with integrity and authenticity. Use of the shared key 
(between user and home network) provides origin authentication to the receiving 
party. 
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The second message provides authentication of the local network to the home 
network via It. The public key extracted from It allows the home network to 
witness the integrity of the message. The home network can now provide 
authentication of the local network to the user by sending the retrieved public key 
in the third message. This message also provides mutual authentication to the 
local network via the encrypted challenge, rand. 
The final message securely distributes the session key to the user. This is 
achieved by encrypting it with the public key of the user obtained in message one. 
In order to check the origin authenticity of the key it is signed by the local 
network. This signature is checked by the user using the key extracted by the 
home network from It in message two. 
So far this analysis demonstrates that session key distribution and mutual 
authentication occur. We now need to show that location registration occurs in a 
privacy-enhanced manner. The use of tokens combined with the PRC provides 
the support for this property. In the first message the local network has access to a 
certified public key in the user token. This provides no identifying information 
about the user. Similarly the PRC address, fma, provides no information. 
Messages two and three supply the respective networks with network tokens for 
authentication. Contained in these are the public keys for verifying tokens. In 
view of the relatively small number of service providers it might be arguable that 
the network could identify the key. However, these keys are only used for tokens 
since they are blinded by the PTIA no identifying infonnation is revealed. 
Moderately frequent replacement of these keys would reduce such a risk even 
further. 
4.4.2 Remote Host Communications 
We have demonstrated how a user can anonymously register his location. We 
now demonstrate how a user can maintain user privacy during communication 
with other users or service providers. Both these operations turn out to be fairly 
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trivial and do not require any special protocols. Much depends on the exact 
requirements for privacy of each party. 
Several levels of privacy are possible, as discussed in section 2.2. However these 
levels of privacy do not address privacy between two remote hosts. There are four 
possible levels of privacy between two remote hosts. From highest level to lowest 
these are; reveal no information (total privacy), reveal location (identification 
privacy), reveal identification (location privacy) and reveal both location and 
identification (no privacy). Note that whilst a user may reveal information to a 
remote host we assume that they can use protocols that do not leak identification 
information to the network. 
Following registration a mobile user obtains a pseudonym. Thus a user can 
achieve identification privacy using a direct connection to the remote host (thus 
avoiding the possible performance cost of the PRC). We envisage this to be the 
common case where a user is communicating with a service provider rather than 
another user. To most users this still represents a very high level of privacy since 
the location is only revealed to the granularity of the location area provided by the 
local network. Note that if the remote host also requires total or identification 
privacy, and is not currently pseudonymous, then a PRC connection must be used. 
Also, if the remote host is aware of the user identification and the user requires 
location privacy from the network then a PRC connection must be used. 
4.4.3 Accountability / Billing 
In certain instances a mobile user may wish to acquire services locally from the 
network and pay for these at a later date through their standard home network 
service provision account. This poses a problem for both the local network and 
the user. The user must be able to acquire such service without revealing 
information about himself yet must also be able to provide assurance of post- 
payment to the local network. 
We achieve this by developing an account of the service provision that we 
cryptographically tie to a user token. The local network then submits this 
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resulting account to the home network in order to gain payment. Our protocol 
to achieve this comes in three phases. Firstly, account setup where the user 
presents a token that is then cryptographically bound to a service agreement to 
create the account. This is followed by the service provision phase where the 
account is passed repeatedly between the user and the network for each unit of 
service. Each round provides a further binding for that unit of provision. The final 
stage of the protocol is the settling phase where the account is submitted via the 
PTIA for payment. The home network can evaluate the account by reversing the 
cryptographic process to reveal the user token and total billing details. Payment is 
made if the check succeeds, otherwise a dispute occurs and the PTIA is called to 
arbitrate. 
We now present the three phases of the accounting protocol followed by an 
explanation of the contents of each message after each phase is presented. 
Account Setup 
Mobile 4 Local : M, L, KmL JR, sr, sp, KAiltmt)] 
Local 4 Mobile : M, L, KmL /L, sc, sp, KL"[KAj'[mtjjj 
Mobile 4 Local : M. L, KmL IM, sa, sp, KAj'jKL"'[KAj'[mt))jj 
In the first message the mobile sends an encrypted service request to the local 
network. This request consists of the request, sr, any service parameters required, 
sp, followed by a user token, mt, encrypted by the private key of the user, KAj'. 
This message is encrypted with the key shared between the user and the local 
network, distributed during location registration. 
The second message allows the local network to confirm the service provision, 
sc, and any parameters, sp, with a similar encrypted message. The private key of 
the local network, KC, which forms the basis of the account, encrypts the user 
token again. Note that the account is bound to both parties and neither can now 
tamper with it. 
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The final message in the setup is a confirmation by the user of the terms (a 
negative confirmation would simply have the sa flag set accordingly, e. g. 0). 
Once again the user applies a layer of encryption to the token. To simplify the 
expression of this process we shall use the terrn, account, to refer to the layers of 
encryption performed on the token in previous messages. 
The network stores the original token in order to submit it to the home network 
along with the final account. An account can only be honoured if the token 
matches the processed account. An account is processed by recursively removing 
the signatures, leaving the initial token. The network cannot cheat since the 
signature of the user is required after each round. 
Service Provision 
Local 4 Mobile : M, L, KmLIM, ss, sb, KLý'[sb, account)] 
Mobile 4 Local : M, L, KmL[L, sd, KAil[sb, account]) 
One round of this section of the protocol occurs after each round of service. 
Firstly the network provides the service, ss, and any billing data, A The network 
encrypts the account and the billing details together. The user encrypts again and 
includes a data acknowledgment, sd, which may be more complex (e. g. inclusion 
of service performance indicators). Failure to encrypt the account will result in 
service termination. 
Note that the network can only receive payment for units that have an associated 
account. A weakness in this method is that by neglecting to sign the last service 
unit the user can gain this unit for free. We suggest that to lessen this risk service 
providers should think carefully about the size of service units and particularly 
those at towards the end of a session. 
The protocol is compact (only one public key encryption required per round), 
tamperproof (neither party can add, modify or remove a round and defraud the 
other), self-contained (an account is complete after each round) and of constant 
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size (the account data passed remains the same size regardless of the number 
of units). 
Account Settling 
Local -. 4 Home L, H, KH[KLHI, KLH[mt, KL, Km, account, adj 
Home 4 Local : L, H, KLufmt, nPayment) 
Once the service provision has terminated (either naturallY or otherwise) the local 
network submits the account with the service details, ad, the initial user token, 
int, and the verification keys, Km and KL. These are encrypted with the respective 
secret key, KLff. The service details, ad, are the full collection service parameters, 
sp, from each round of service provision. This message is now sent to the home 
network, via the PRC. 
The home network can now verify the submission by repeatedly applying the 
verification keys to account until mt is recovered (or not in the case of misuse). 
This verification process is compared with the claimed details, ad. If successful 
the home network will forward payment to the local network via the PTIA. We 
have simplified this for the purpose of this paper to nPayment. In reality this will 
be a more complex expression ensuring security between the local and home 
networks, of which a variety of methods are possible. 
Dispute 
Home 4 PTIA KHp[mt, KL, KM, account, ad] 
PTIA 4 Local KpL/mt, Dispute) 
or 
PTIA 4 Home : KHp/mt, Disagree) 
Failure to compute the original token results in the PTIA being asked to arbitrate 
the account. The PTIA must process the submission, identified by mt, in the same 
manner as described above and either produce a Dispute or a Disagree message. 
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A Dispute means that the local network is at fault. This can either require a 
reassessment by the local network or no further action. A Disagree means the 
home network is falsely claiming a dispute, which would probably result in 
payment being made as requested by the local network. The actual mechanisms to 
solve disputes are dependent on the contractual agreements between the parties 
and are outside the scope of this paper. 
This protocol allows post-payment of services between a user and a local 
network. It is possible to modify it to provide post-payment between a user and 
any service provider by modifying the account set up phase. We assume that the 
new provider is subscribed to the PTIA. The changes to the protocol must allow 
the user and provider to share a token each and one session key. We can achieve 
this by modifying the first two messages of the protocol as follows (we have 
included the last message of the account setup phase for completeness but note 
that no changes have been made): 
Mobile 4 Provider M, P, Kp [M, mt, Kmh sr, sp, K'sil[nit, Kmp)j 
Provider 4 Mobile MPKmpiPptscspKil[KAil[mtj)I 
Mobile4 Provider MPKmp[MsaspKAil[Kil[KAilfn: tlj)j 
Note that the initial encryption is done using the public key of the new service 
provider, Kp. Inside this encryption we have now included a mobile token, mt, 
and a shared session key, Kup. The second message now contains a token from 
the provider, pt. This will contain a different public key from Kp in order to allow 
the users' service provision to remain anonymous. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented our solution to the problem of achieving user privacy 
in mobile networking environments. This solution is called the Mobile Network 
Privacy Architecture (MNPA). There are 4 main sections to the chapter as 
follows: first we present the overall architecture. Sections two and three describe 
the Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) and the Privacy Token Issuing Authority 
(PTIA) respectively. The fourth section explains how privacy-enhanced 
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communications are achieved using the MNPA. We will briefly discuss the 
outcomes of these sections. 
Section one introduces the MNPA. We started by giving a series of assumptions 
that have been made during the design phase. This leads us into a detailed view of 
the overall architecture, which contains two new logical entities, the PRC and the 
PTIA. The operation of both entities is presented in detail. One of the most 
interesting aspects of the PTIA is the capability to manage disputes. Next we 
discuss the new protocols that are needed to interact with these entities in order to 
allow privacy for the user. The protocols presented allow secure location update 
and anonymous post-payment service provision. 
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Chapter 5: Security Analysis of the MNPA 
In chapter 4 we presented the Mobile Network Privacy Architecture (MNPA). 
The MNPA consists of two new components that extend the typical mobile 
computing paradigm. The two components are the Privacy Routing Capability 
(PRC) and the Privacy Token Issuing Authority (PTIA). The PRC allows 
communications between two hosts to remain untraceable and uses new protocols 
based on Mix-networking [Chaurn, 1981]. The PTIA is a distributed certification 
authority that provides networks with certificates that allow them to provide 
anonymous authorization tokens to their subscribers. 
Having provided descriptions of these two components we discussed the 
implementation of privacy-enhanced communications using a series of new 
protocols for location registration, end-to-end communications, and anonymous 
billing. These protocols utilize the PRC and the PTIA within the MNPA. 
Here, in this chapter, we provide some analysis of the components and protocols 
in the MNPA. First we discuss general threats and vulnerabilities in the context of 
user privacy in mobile communications. This is followed by analysis of the PRC, 
PTIA, registration protocol and accountability protocol, each in terms of 
attackers, collusion, and trust required. 
5.1 Threats and Vulnerabilities 
Analysis of security in computer systems is a very difficult. task [Anderson and 
Needham, 1995, Anderson, 1994, Loscocco, et al., 1998, Schneier, 1998]. It is 
considered impossible to achieve total security and security engineering is really 
the task of risk reduction. The difficulty in security engineering lies in assessing 
the possible threats and observing vulnerabilities. Threats are events that might 
occur to compromise a systems confidentiality, integrity or availability. An 
example of a threat is the compromise of a user password. Vulnerabilities are 
weaknesses in a system that might lead to a threat being realized. A vulnerability 
that might lead to the threat of user passwords being compromised is that 
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password being transmitted over a network connection without being 
encrypted. An attack is the set of actions taken by a person in order to exploit a 
vulnerability. An attack against user passwords might involve a network packet 
'sniffer' able to detect and capture traffic used in protocols carrying passwords. 
These examples sound simple and indeed password security is fairly well 
understood [Abadi, et al., 1997, Mortis and Thompson, 1979]. However, in order 
to achieve total security every threat and vulnerability must be found and 
prevented. Many researchers have likened security to a chain, which is only as 
strong as its weakest link. 
Experience with system security demonstrates that potential attackers are 
considerably better at finding these weak links than researchers. Confidence in 
security takes time and can only really be achieved through openness. Hiding the 
implementation of a technique, also known as 'security through obscurity', in the 
hope that attackers won't discover how something works inevitably fails. There is 
a long list of systems security failures attributed to 'security through obscurity', a 
pertinent case being the encryption used in GSM [Wagner, et al., 1997, Young, 
1998]. 
In the context of the MNPA we are interested in specific threats to the system, 
others we are either not interested in or assume to be taken care of elsewhere. In 
the remainder of this section we try to classify the types of attacker and the 
attacks that may occur. Finally we examine the notion of trust and how this fits 
into the MNPA. 
5.1.1 Attackers and Attacks 
Before being able to assess the security of the MNPA we need to develop an 
understanding of the threats involved in the system. First we need to classify the 
types of attackers and the types of attacks. Attackers are the parties involved in 
mounting an attack, less formally known as 'crackers'. An attack is the series of 
operations performed by an attacker to compromise some subset of the system. 
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Attackers come in two basic forms; those with access to hosts on the network 
and those who can only access one or more links on a network. The first of these 
we call internal attackers (since they may have the same powers as authorized 
users, indeed they may be authorized users) and the latter we call external 
attackers (since they are not a legitimate part of the system, i. e. unauthorized 
users). Note that internal attackers are essentially a superset of external attackers 
since they can also read data on links connected to the host they control. An 
additional third type of attacker is one, either internal or external, who colludes 
with other attackers to perform an attack. This type of attacker we call a 
colluding attacker. 
The types of attack can also be classified into two basic forms; those against the 
privacy of a user and those against the system security. The first we call privacy 
attacks and the latter we call system attacks. We draw this distinction for two 
related reasons, to demarcate attacks that affect the privacy of the mobile user 
(privacy is after all the primary aim of the MNPA) and secondly to distinguish 
between attacks on a person and attacks on the network itself. 
In broad terms privacy attacks are aimed at compromising user data 
confidentiality whilst system attacks are aimed at compromising integrity. Privacy 
attacks must involve at least the revelation of a user identity, but are usually more 
involved. Data associated with a privacy attack within the MNPA can be 
classified into i. dentity privacy attacks, location privacy attacks, behaviour 
privacy attacks, and content privacy attacks. 
The first two of these simply refer respectively to compromise of user identity and 
location. A behaviour privacy attack is one that involves tracing specific activities 
a user performs. For example recording the services that a user connects to or the 
billing details associated with these connections. By creating this class of attack 
we wish to capture attacks on privacy that are not restricted to the other three 
types. Content attacks concern compromise of the payload of user messages, for 
example the -voice part of a telephone call. Note that attacks imply an identity 
attack as the starting point. 
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System attacks are generally thought of as those that could lead to fraud. Note 
that a legitimate mobile user could therefore have an interest in performing 
system attacks. As with our discussion of attackers we define a third type of 
attack called collusion attacks, those performed by colluding attackers by sharing 
information with each other. Collusion attacks could lead to either privacy or 
system attacks. 
5.1.2 Vulnerabilities 
At the beginning of this chapter vulnerabilities were defined as weaknesses in a 
system that may lead to threats being realized. Distributed communications 
networks are very complex systems and assessing vulnerabilities is a difficult 
task. Despite this it is possible to pinpoint general areas where vulnerabilities may 
occur by focusing on the levels of protection required for different types of data. 
Vulnerabilities occur for two distinct reasons; poor implementation and misuse, 
though it is possible to argue that the latter is an implementation issue since the 
ability to misuse should have been eliminated at requirements capture. However, 
the nature of open communications systems means that this is probably an 
impossible task. With this in mind our analysis attempts to assess the impact of 
vulnerabilities in implementation and operation of the various components of the 
MNPA. 
5.1.3 Trust 
A concept unique to distributed information systems is that of trust. Two different 
meanings can be applied to trust, both of which are important within the MNPA. 
Firstly there is cryptographic trust, which refers to the ability to trust messages 
according to the cryptography applied to them. For example, if Alice applies a 
digital signature to a message and Bob is able to verify this message (i. e. Bob is 
able to gain a certificate for Alice's public-key) then he can formally trust Alice 
authored the associated message. 
Page 99 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Nctworks 
A more difficult definition of trust is the broader notion of system trust. 
When a system shares information in order to perform a task it is necessary for 
one process to trust the other to act in a way that is both correct and honest. This 
distinction is important since a user may trust a component in terms of honesty 
but have doubts about it being able to act correctly. Unfortunately system trust is 
a largely intangible quality. However, cryptographic trust is a component of 
system trust. 
In our analysis we refer mostly to system trust, rather than taking a formal 
approach. In terms of cryptographic trust we attempt to informally examine the 
protocols to determine their trustworthiness, in system terms. We also reason 
about the levels of system trust required in various components and the levels of 
trust a user might expect of these components, in ternis of both honesty and 
competence. The issue is complicated somewhat by factoring in the possibility 
with which an element may be compromised (caused by low competence) leading 
to it acting dishonestly. The analysis first assesses the PRC and PTIA components 
before examining the registration and accountability protocols. 
5.2 Analysis of the Privacy Routing Capability 
The Privacy Routing Capability (PRC), as presented in chapter 4, acts as a logical 
separation between the local network and the communications partners of a 
mobile user. For example, during location registration a message is passed to the 
home network to allow mutual authentication to take place. This message travels 
through the PRC, thus preventing the home and local network learning the 
identity of each other, thereby enhancing the privacy of the user. The remainder 
of this section examines the potential attacks, vulnerabilities, collusion and trust 
in the PRC. 
5.2.1 Protocol Analysis 
The PRC protocol given in chapter 4 is repeated here. The leading parameters 
(FIR) indicate either forward or return directions. 
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(1) A 9ýX: Ft KX(KAYJP KAdyy KY(KAYJP KAY(Bý KAB(M)ll 
(2) X-: >Y: FKy[KAy), KAy[BKAB(MII. 9 
(3) Y -; ý B: F, KAB[M] 
B decrypts m to reveal the message plus return keying material for Y and X 
respectively; Ky(Z, KAy, Kz(A, KAZ)). The reply now returns to A as follows: 
(4) B4Y: A KYA KAYP KZ[AP KAZIJ) KAB[n) 
(5) y4Z: A KZ[A ) 
KA Zli KA Y[By KA B 
(6) Z-: ýA: RKAz[YKAy[BKAB[njj 
In this example a message, m, travels between two parties, A and B, via two PRC 
nodes, X and Y, before a return message, n, is sent between B and A, via two PRC 
nodes Y and Z. Without collaboration each PRC node can discover only the 
immediate source and destination of a message, plus the direction of a message - 
either forwards (F) or return (R). This can be shown to be true by examining 
message 2 from the example. 
In this message the final destination, B, is protected from X by the symmetric key 
KAy, shared between A and Y, that is in turn protected by Ky, the public key for Y. 
A message travelling between two nodes is different at each stage due to the 
removal of a layer of encryption; therefore no attacker can correlate a trace based 
only upon the message content. 
In the return direction, for example message 5, both the source and destination are 
included, yet only the same information is available to each node as in the 
forward direction. This is because the source, B, is protected from Z by KAy and 
the destination, A, is protected from Y by Kz. Traceability is the same as for the 
forward direction, though note that encryption is added rather than removed. 
Layering the encryption this way prevents the source from easily tracing the 
destination location where this is pseudonymous (though end-to-end 
pseudonymity is optional, and application dependent). 
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We have shown that the protocol is resistant to traceability in both directions 
against simple observation of messages by either internal or external attackers. 
More complex privacy attacks may be possible by sophisticated observations of 
the PRC network. An attacker capable of observing all links in the PRC can 
correlate messages based on timing and size in order to follow a message between 
source and destination. In the original proposal for Mix networks messages are 
resized into a standard length and batched to foil such attacks. 
Our scheme trades this level of protection in order to achieve efficiency. The 
justification for this is that first without this trade off the PRC would be 
intolerably inefficient and second the sophistication of such an attack is 
considered beyond all but the most extreme attacker. It may be argued that this 
type of attacker could more fruitfully perform these attacks by coercing PRC 
elements into collusion. 
Another type of attack on the PRC is denial of service, a system attack. These 
attacks are simple to make by any attacker capable of altering messages. For 
example, by replacing the keying information a PRC node is tricked into applying 
the wrong encryption on a message. The simplest way to defeat this is for the 
source node to include a hash value of the message being sent. More simple 
denial of service that simply attempts to block a system is rapidly becoming a 
critical operation in network security [Schwartau, 1999]. This is outside the scope 
of our research though obviously needs to be considered in future work. 
5.2.2 Collusion Attacks 
If all nodes in a PRC route collude then together they may mount a location 
privacy attack on the mobile user. Since the PRC only facilitates anonymity it is 
prevented from mounting an identification attack, as the mobile user is already 
pseudonymous when using the PRC. Where one node remains uncompromised 
then the scheme remains secure assuming the remaining nodes cannot correlate 
input and output messages (see above). This model is the same as most other mix- 
type schemes, and is the strongest approach we are aware of. Onion Routing 
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[Reed, et al., 1998] requires the use of a trusted proxy that performs routing 
and encryption on behalf its clients, though of course the user may control this 
server in some circumstances. 
If the PRC is compromised entirely then it may then collude with other elements 
of the MNPA in order to reveal the link between the two networks (local and 
home) to the colluding party. In turn the PRC may learn detailed location and 
identification information from the local and home networks respectively. So, 
given a reasonable level of trust in the PRC such attacks seem highly improbable. 
We examine the trust requirements for the PRC next. 
5.2.3 Trust 
The user must trust at least one PRC element in order to trust the operation of the 
overall PRC. There are several recommendations to achieve this. First, the user 
should decide on a suitable number of elements to use. Using too many will add 
performance overhead but increase the likelihood of secure anonymity whilst 
using too few makes the system less trustworthy. It has been suggested by other 
researchers involved in Onion Routing that five would be adequate. Another 
measure that can increase trust is to use as diverse a set of elements as possible. 
This diversity should be both administrative and geographical. Administrative 
diversity ensures that collusion becomes increasingly less likely whilst 
geographical diversity lowers the possibility of local effects such as legal and/or 
political pressure. Note that diversity in general reduces the potential of 
successful external attacks. 
Finally, an important operational aspect of using the PRC is to vary the elements 
used on a regular basis. If a compromise of the PRC occurs then all subsequent 
messages travelling on that route can be monitored. A changing route would 
mean that an increased number of elements would need to be compromised, 
therefore reducing the possibility of further attack. 
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5.3 Analysis of the Privacy Token Issuing Authority 
The Privacy Token Issuing Authority (PTIA), discussed in chapter 4, is a 
distributed authority that allows networks to obtain authorization certificates. 
These authorization certificates are used to issue tokens to mobile subscribers 
who use them to access remote networks and service providers in an anonymous 
yet accountable fashion. In the event of a service dispute the PTIA may be 
required to process token information to resolve the dispute. Except in the 
instance of a dispute the PTIA should not learn any information about the user 
involved due to the application of blind signatures on the token. 
The operation of the PTIA can be split into five major tasks, subscription, token 
issuing, key distribution, inter-process communication and dispute management. 
The only parties to communicate with the PTIA are subscribers; each subscriber 
shares a key with the PTIA. This prevents external attackers making an attack 
other than against keys. Therefore we concentrate on internal attacks taking each 
task in turn. Following this we examine collusion and trust requirements for the 
PTIA. 
5.3.1 Subscription 
The process of subscription to the PTIA involves a network or service provider 
being supplied with an account name and a key by some out-of-band method (e. g. 
physical transfer). Only messages between two parties sharing this key are 
readable, and there is no significance to an external attacker of such 
communication. A network or service provider cannot impersonate another 
without this key. As the subscription key is shared the PTIA could impersonate a 
network or service provider. We show this to be fruitless in the remainder of the 
PTIA analysis. Therefore we can say that the subscription process is sufficiently 
secure. 
5.3.2 Token Issuing 
The most important task the PTIA is involved in is issuing tokens. It has been 
shown that communications between the PTIA and its subscribers arc secure so 
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external attacks are not considered. The creation of a token is based on a 
blind signature applied to a message supplied by a PTIA subscriber. Security of 
this process against misuse by either party needs to be demonstrated. 
Token issuing requires three basic operations: request by the subscriber, issue by 
the PTIA and issue by the subscriber. The first two of these are as follows: 
Home 4 PTIA : KHp[Km, [Ky, Kmj*RKP) 
PTIA 4 Home : KHpjKj'[Id, Date, [Kff, Kmj *R Kp))j 
The subscriber, Home, provides a message encrypted with the shared subscriber 
key. This message contains a public key, Kff, belonging to Home and a composite 
message, (KH, Km) *RKP, made up from KH, the key of the intended mobile user, 
Km, both multiplied by the blinding factor RKP, where R is a random number 
chosen by Home, raised to the power of the PTIA public key. The second phase, 
token issuing, involves the PTIA taking the first message and adding an identifier, 
Id, and a date-stamp, Date, and applying a signature to the result. This is stored 
by the PTIA in addition to being sent to Home. 
The most obvious attack is for Home to provide a false message to be blind- 
signed, since the PTIA cannot read the message it is signing. Fortunately this 
attack is pointless as the only time it is checked is during a dispute when the 
PTIA would discover the fact. A second attack involves the PTIA falsely 
processing the message. This attack is not possible as Home can validate the 
signature has suitable parameters. 
The third phase, issuing to the subscriber, involves the network modifying the 
t )IRK result of phase two as follows; (KH, Kwl(rand, Id, Date, Kil((Id, Da eA KII, 
Km))). Here the network captures the identifier, Id, and date-stamp, Date, 
removes the blinding factor, generates a random number, rand, and signs the 
result. The token issued to the mobile user consists of this signature and the 
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public key used to create it. When a mobile user requires service of some 
kind it submits one of these tokens to the provider. 
The first attack to consider is an identification privacy attack on the token. The 
inclusion of the network public key suggests that the network (not the user) is 
identifiable. However, the network identity is not included with this key and the 
key is not available in any Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system. The identity 
associated with this key is only available to the PTIA and the mobile user, neither 
of whom need to make this attack. A second attack involves the network falsely 
processing the token following phase two. Again this attack fails to be useful as it 
only becomes relevant in a dispute, when the PTIA would discover the attack. 
A system attack is possible where a party replaces the public key with some other 
data therefore performing a denial of service. This is difficult to avoid but simple 
to detect as the key is used to validate the signature, something that would fail if 
the key were not the right one. We can therefore state that token issuing within 
the PTIA is suitably secure. 
5.3.3 Key Distribution 
The PTIA is composed of a number of clients each performing the various tasks. 
Each client possesses a public key that allows it to engage in issuing tokens and 
dispute management. These keys must be available to PTIA subscribers in order 
for them to validate tokens submitted to them. This is achieved by distributing a 
key set to each subscriber either when keys expire or are revoked by a PTIA 
client. 
The most pressing risk in key distribution is failure to update key revocation 
information in a timely manner [Naor and Nissim, 2000]. The benefit of the 
'push' form of key distribution we use, as opposed to the 'pull' of the 
certification approach, is that notification of any key revocation is more 
immediate. To combat the problem in the certification approach it is necessary to 
check a key with the authority every time it is used. Obviously there is likely to 
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remain some lag between compromise and revocation but this seems 
unavoidable, and to some extent outside the scope of the research presented here. 
The distribution of keys is protected by the subscription keys shared between the 
PTIA and its subscribers. Assuming these keys to be secure there appears to be no 
feasible attacks possible from external attackers. Internal attacks may come from 
either the PTIA or its subscribers. However, integrity is provided by the PTIA to 
the distribution so no falsification of the tables may take place (which seem like a 
pointless attack anyway). If a PTIA client is compromised then it might distribute 
false information, we consider this further when discussion trust later in this 
section. Aside from these issues we consider the key distribution process to be 
suitably secure. 
5.3.4 Inter-Process Communications 
If a PTIA client receives data protected by another clients' public key then it must 
forward it to the relevant client through the hierarchy as described in chapter 4. 
Keys shared between the clients adjacent in the hierarchy protect these 
communications. The only attacks we envisage are denial of service attacks. An 
attacker might be able to block messages travelling through parts of the hierarchy. 
A solution to this might be to make the hierarchy more robust by allowing more 
than one route through it. As mentioned in the previous paragraph a compromised 
node could create a problem, again we discuss this later. Aside from this issue 
inter-process communication appear suitably secure. 
5.3.5 Dispute Management 
When either a mobile user or a network/service provider has a dispute involving a 
PTIA token the PTIA is required to settle the dispute. This process involves 
examining evidence collected by the disputing parties to determine a fair 
outcome. The nature of the dispute will determine the required processing 
performed by the PTIA. The two instances where we explicitly state disputes may 
occur are during location registration and during the accounting protocol. We 
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shall see during analysis of these protocols that dispute management is 
suitably secure. 
5.3.6 Collusion Attacks 
Tokens issued by the PTIA are blindly signed, meaning that they cannot be linked 
to the recipient. The implication of this is that the PTIA cannot collaborate with 
other parties to reveal information about specific users. During the issuing phase 
the PTIA records the serial number of each token, which links the token to the 
user. An attacker who wishes to learn the association between two networks may 
use this information. The main candidate for such collaboration would seem to be 
the local network. 
This situation is somewhat complicated when the PTIA is involved in dispute 
management as considerable user data may be revealed. However the only 
collaboration threat at this stage would be one between the PTIA and a service 
providing network. If these two parties collude then complete service provision 
data can be combined with full identification data. We note later that the same 
risk applies in a collusion between the home network and the service providing 
network, a collusion that might be argued to be more likely. Alternatively given 
the relative authority of the PTIA this collusion might be more profitable for law 
enforcement access. Unfortunately if this were to happen, trust in the PTIA, and 
therefore the whole system would decrease. We discuss the trust of the PTIA 
next. 
5.3.7 Trust 
The PTIA requires a fairly low level of trust on the part of the user. Apart from 
the instance of dispute resolution the PTIA does not have access to sensitive user 
data. In assessing trust in the PTIA the user faces the problem of not being able to 
choose or control the choice of PTIA element to interact with since all interaction 
takes place on behalf of the home network of the user. Therefore the selection of 
home network must consider the associated PTIA subscription if possible. 
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5.4 Analysis of the Location Registration Protocol 
The new location registration protocol allows a mobile user to update their 
location within the network. This is a two-stage process, registering a location 
with a new local network and updating the current location with the home 
network. In order to perform this task mutual authentication is required between 
the three parties. 
5.4.1 Attacks 
Discussion of the protocol was provided in Chapter 4.4.1 where justification for 
the security of the protocol was laid out. The protocol is repeated here for 
convenience. 
Mobile-. 4 Local : regmtKAj'/n; tjmaKMjj[rmajj 
Local 4 Home : reg, It, Ki"[It, mt, rand, Kmil[rmaj] 
Home 4 Local : regKj'[randKmHjKL)) 
Local 4 Mobile : reg, Klil[rand, Kmjj[KLjjKj"[KA, [KmLjj 
The mobile is authenticated to the local network using a mobile token, mt, which 
is forwarded to the home network to allow it to update the location register. The 
origin of the token is proved via the encrypted random number, Kuii(rma). The 
local network is authenticated to the home network via the application of the 
public key to the second message. To do this the public key is first extracted from 
the privacy token, It, supplied by the local network. Next, the home network is 
authenticated to the local network by verification of the encryption applied to the 
third message, the key public key for which was supplied to the local network in 
mt. 
The home network supplies the mobile user with the public key of the local 
network, extracted from It, which is encrypted with the shared key between the 
mobile user and the home network to ensure only the mobile user can interpret it. 
The final message also contains a session key, KC'(Km(KmL), which can only be 
retrieved by an the fully authenticated user. 
All public keys used in the protocol are ones used within privacy tokens, the 
implication of which is that they remain unidentified. Therefore an identification 
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privacy attack is not feasible by examining the keys alone. The local and 
home networks are not identified during the protocol, and messages travel 
through the PRC, so a location privacy attack is not feasible without 
collaboration. Incorrect use of a token will not result in full authentication so a 
system attack is not feasible using tokens alone. 
External attack might include replay of tokens. However, successful completion 
of the protocol requires submission of a token containing a public key to which 
the author has the corresponding private key. An external attacker may also try to 
subvert the passing of a session key in the final message by inserting a different 
session key in its place. However, this fails due to the encryption of the key using 
the public key of the mobile user. 
An attack that may succeed is where a local network replayed tokens, possibly in 
order to gain payment from. the home network. However the home network is 
able to detect replays of tokens by keeping track of available token serial numbers 
for its users. 
5.4.2 Collusion 
The location registration protocol requires interaction between the mobile user, 
the local network, the home network, and the PRC. We consider effects of 
possible collusion between these parties, apart from the user. The home network 
and the PRC may collude to link the local network identity with the user identity. 
Similarly the PRC and local network may collude to link the current location with 
the identity of the home network. Neither of these cases constitutes a serious 
breach of privacy and so we consider the risk to be fairly low. The most serious 
collusion attack would be between the local and home network. These two parties 
hold all the sensitive information about the user and both are given an anonymous 
channel (during the protocol, via the PRQ with which to communicate. Therefore 
the user must have a high level of trust in the home network. We examine this 
trust requirement next. 
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5.4.3 Trust 
Trust in the local and home networks can be reduced here to trust in the home 
network, as the two must collaborate to link identity and location. Fortunately the 
user has considerable choice in the home network he chooses to accept service 
from. A variety of mechanisms to satisfy an assessment of trust could be 
employed from media reputation, personal recommendation and 
formal/governmental certification. As we noted in section 5.3.7 the choice of 
home network should also take into consideration the choice of PTIA 
subscription by each network. 
A strong case needs to be made to encourage (or mandate) publication of privacy 
protection records of service providers since many users are inevitably drawn to 
make choices based on more pressing requirements such as cost and service 
specifications rather than security issues. This priority problem cuts across many 
aspects of security; the human element is often the weakest point in a system. 
5.5 Analysis of the Accountability Protocol 
The accountability protocol presented in Chapter 4.4.3 allows a mobile user to 
obtain service from a network or service provider and remain anonymous, yet 
accountable for post-payment. There are three phases to the protocol, setup, 
provision and settling. The first phase involves the mobile user passing the 
provider a signed privacy token and any required service parameters. The token is 
signed by the provider and returned to the mobile user with further service 
parameters. The final step in the first phase is for the mobile to commit to the 
service providers parameters and again sign the (signed) token. The result of this 
signing we call an account. 
This repeated signing to create an account forms the basis of the second phase, 
provision. For each unit of service supplied by the provider a two-message 
protocol is performed. In the first message the provider adds the billing details to 
the account and signs it. The new account is sent to the mobile user with the unit 
of service. The mobile user acknowledges receipt by signing the account and 
returning it to the provider. 
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Once service provision is complete the third phase of the protocol takes place. If 
no dispute occurs then only two messages are exchanged. First, the details of the 
account are passed to the home network encrypted using a shared key, which is 
embedded into the message using the public key of the home network (extracted 
previously from the token). The home network recursively applies the public keys 
to the account until the token is revealed. If the resulting details tally then the 
account may be paid. The second message contains the payment for the local 
network, encrypted with the shared key provided in the previous message. Note 
that messages between the networks pass through the PRC, preventing linking of 
these two. 
5.5.1 Attacks 
The security of the whole protocol lies in the ability of the two parties to create 
non-repudiation of the service provision. The provision phase requires each party 
to sign the details of the provision before continuing. This means that no party 
can add, delete or modify units of service without the other party noticing. Even if 
one party did not notice then the home network would spot the inconsistency 
during settling. 
The main problem with this protocol is that the final unit of service can go 
unaccounted for if the mobile user fails to reply to it (deliberately or otherwise). 
A solution to this is to make final units of service carry no value and therefore 
unimportant if unpaid for. Privacy attacks are not possible unless the tokens can 
be attacked, which we have already determined to be suitably secure. 
The dispute process involves the submission of the account details by both parties 
to the PTIA for examination. These submissions are made using the secure 
subscriber association between provider and PTIA, This leads us to assume that 
the PTIA will receive the same accounts that were submitted by each party. If we 
further assume that the PTIA is capable of processing accounts correctly then we 
can state that the PTIA will arrive at the correct result. Although we have chosen 
to ignore the details of the concluding phase of dispute resolution it is important 
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to now note that this phase must include signed evidence on behalf of the 
PTIA demonstrating the findings of the account examination. This will prevent 
any further tampering by either party. 
An attack on the PTIA by a network attempting to compromise user privacy is 
possible. A network might request a dispute based on a token in order to 
determine from the PTIA evidence certain details about that user. We suggest that 
in order to reduce the likelihood of this attack the following two steps are taken; 
* Maintain the anonymity of parties involved when presenting evidence 
* Retain identifying details of disputes for examination by cited user 
Retention of dispute lists will enable concerned users their alleged behaviour 
record for anomalies. For example if all user tokens are disputed then the user can 
safely assume they are experiencing some kind of privacy attack. Publication of 
the records, with no user identification, may also aid in the trust process outlined 
in the previous section. 
5.5.2 Collusion 
The discussion of collusion for accountability follows closely that presented in 
the previous section. During dispute however the PTIA is also present in the 
protocol. The PTIA may collude with the local network to link location 
information and identity (if provided by dispute). The home network can collude 
with the PTIA to discover the identity of the local network. These risks are 
similar to those of the PRC collaboration attacks in section 5.2.2. 
5.5.3 Trust 
The trust required in the various parties involved in accounting procedures is 
similar to those presented previously. Perhaps the major difference is that the user 
must trust the parties to perform dispute resolution honestly. This can be simply 
overcome by ensuring, possibly via auditing, that the user to view evidence in 
cases when disputes are presented by the PTIA. 
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5.6 Analysis of End-to-End Communications 
Chapter 4 does not discuss at length end-to-end communications as these largely 
use the PRC. Therefore the security of the PRC is equivalent to the security of 
end-to-end communications, at least at the network layer. Where information is 
revealed at the application layer it is important that each party protects this using 
suitable application layer protocols. Examining all such protocols is obviously 
outside of the scope of this research. 
5.6.1 Attacks 
This leads us to document perhaps the only serious attack on end-to-end 
communications, which is a privacy attack by an end host. In this non-technical 
attack the end host persuades the mobile user to divulge information. We see no 
way around this attack other than alerting the user every time sensitive 
information is given out, and encouragement for education in computer security. 
A more serious version of this attack is where higher layer protocols (e. g. WAP 
[WAPForum, 2000]) automatically divulge this information without the 
knowledge of the user. It is important therefore to ensure that all applications 
contain configuration options that respect lower-layer setting (those within the 
MNPA). This leads to a situation whereby default options are determined by the 
lower layer protocols but can be over-ridden by user intervention at the 
application layer. 
5.6.2 Collusion 
The only collusion in this context is that between the PRC and the end-host. This 
problem is almost identical to the general trust and security of the PRC. The 
major difference is that whilst the user appears pseudonymous to the PRC under 
normal operation, the end-host may in this case have access to identification 
information with which to link network identification information with the PRC. 
This in turn could lead to collusion with that network resulting in a location 
privacy compromise. Depending on the power of the end-host this attack seems 
less likely than one directed by a network element. 
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5.6.3 Trust 
Mobile users need only a low trust in end-hosts. This is justifiable, as in most 
situations the PRC will take the security burden. When information is revealed to 
the end-host this is presumably because the mobile user trusts the end-host 
enough to be supplied with it. The main dimension of end-host trust is more that 
of judging competence. A user should only release information to an end-host if 
they consider them capable of handling that information sensibly. 
5.7 Summary 
Chapter four presented the Mobile Network Privacy Architecture (MNPA), whilst 
in this chapter we were concerned with analysis of the architecture. We began by 
extensively defining terminology to be used in the analysis. This terminology 
involves classifying threats, vulnerabilities and attacks. Trust is an important 
metric in the MNPA, although we treat it qualitatively rather than quantitively. 
Following this introductory analysis each significant section of the MNPA was 
analyzed according to the potential for attacks, collusion possibilities, and trust 
requirements. Overall the analysis was positive, showing that given reasonable 
trust levels in the components a user can achieve high levels of privacy. Our 
protocols appear to stand up well to scrutiny and the functionality of the elements, 
given the required assumptions (see 4.4.1), has been demonstrated to not be 
unreasonably vulnerable. 
The major area of concern is that of collusion between elements. On one hand 
total privacy compromise can result from certain combinations. Unfortunately 
there does not appear to be any way to ensure that collusion does not occur other 
than through negative reputations building up from those who are found to have 
compromised privacy. The bright side is that increased distributed processing of 
data leading to a larger number of administrative domains means that collusion 
opportunities may be reduced. 
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Chapter 6: Implementation and Evaluation 
The previous two chapters presented the Mobile Network Privacy Architecture 
(MNPA). First, chapter 4 laid out the operation of the architecture components, 
the Privacy Routing Capability (PRC), the Privacy Token Issuing Authority 
(PTIA) and the protocols that allow the implementation of privacy-cnhanced 
communications for mobile users. Then in chapter 5 an analysis of the MNPA 
was conducted, examining the security of the system in terms of attacks, threats 
and vulnerabilities, trust and collusion. 
In this chapter we present our evaluation work related to the Mobile Network 
Privacy Architecture (MNPA). First we discuss the aims of the prototype before 
detailing relevant parts of the prototype. Following this we provide a more 
general evaluation of the research. 
6.1 Aims of the Prototype Implementation 
The theoretical presentation of the MNPA answers many questions about the 
possibilities for privacy in mobile networks. However, it does not, nor did it 
attempt to, provide answers relating to how a practical implementation might 
fare. To examine some of the issues that might face such a practical 
implementation we performed some prototyping work in an experimental 
environment. We have limited this work to examining the effects of the protocols 
presented in chapter 4. The reason for this is first that these protocols require 
significant parts of each of the physical components to be prototyped and second 
that they allow us to isolate the main communications effects of the MNPA, in 
terms of data storage and communication, upon each element. Questions we wish 
to answer by developing a prototype are: 
What can be said about transferring the theory of the MNPA into 
practice? 
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Whilst our theory was developed with practicality in mind it is 
interesting to see how the MNPA will work in practice. We are 
particularly interested in the communications and storage needs of the 
architecture. 
e What can be said about the complexity of the system? 
A central guiding principle for Computer Systems design is the KISS 
principle (standing for Keep It Simple Stupid) [Lampson, 1983], this 
principle is particularly important for security. If a system cannot be easily 
understood and examined it will almost certainly contain weaknesses (e. g. 
the Risks Archive [Risks, 2000] contains details of many software system 
failures). There are two main reasons for this; increased difficulty in 
implementing the theory correctly and increased difficulty in producing 
sound theory. 
* Hat can be said about the scaling of the architecture? 
When developing theory it is often very difficult to foresee practical 
problems. A common problem is scaling, in which the size of the system 
contributes its own serious problems. In order to scale well a system 
should not degrade its performance when users or services are added. 
* Hat can be said about the effect of security mechanisms on 
performance? 
Unfortunately security mechanisms cause a certain amount of overhead to 
many system operations. Where such overhead is high there it is likely 
that any implementation will lower the security levels to compensate. 
# Nat can be said about the overall security of the system? 
Although there arc no meaningful formal measures of security that can be 
applied to systems we hope to be able to make statements about the 
possible insecurities of the system based on studying the communications 
and data storage within the prototype. 
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Having posed these questions we shall now discuss the design of our 
implementation. 
6.2 Detail of the Prototype Implementation 
This section first discusses the design of the individual components of the 
MNPA. We start by outlining the envirom-nent under which we carried out the 
implementation. 
6.2.1 Implementation Environment 
The hardware and software used for the implementation consisted of a small 
number of networked PCs running the Linux operating system. These machines 
are isolated from the main network in the building and typically have a low usage, 
principally by other research students. All code was written using the C 
programming language. The major benefit of this setup was the simplicity 
offered, whilst also allowing us to easily create networked applications therefore 
simulating the distributed nature of the architecture. 
To simulate a mobile communications network we chose to treat each machine as 
a separate domain. The implication of this is that each domain must be able to 
operate each of the components of the MNPA. Therefore each machine becomes 
a local network (and potentially a home network) into which a subscriber can 
roam. 
So, each machine must contain a PTIA element, access to the PRC, location 
databases (VLR/HLR), as well as the ability to host processes representing mobile 
hosts (MH), end hosts (EH) and service providers (SP). Migration of a MH is 
represented either by changing the port number of the connection (intra-domain) 
or changing machine (inter-domain). Migration between cells in a mobile network 
is not represented since this has no consequence to the MNPA. We will now 
describe the operation of each of the MNPA components within the prototype. 
Pap 118 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
6.2.2 Local Network 
A subscriber always connects to the MNPA via the Local Network (LN). The LN 
is responsible for managing any data connections that are made whilst the 
subscriber is within the LN area. In terms of the MNPA the LN manages the VLR 
database for the given local area. The VLR handles address space for a domain. 
This management involves the ability to update, add and delete subscribers via 
location registration. 
As well as managing the VLR each local network is capable of communicating 
with the PRC component and directly with other end hosts where necessary. In 
particular the local network is able to interact with the PTIA using a shared key 
between the two parties. 
When a new subscriber enters a domain and requires location update we model 
this by allowing the subscriber MH to send location update requests to a pre- 
defined port at the local network. Completion of location update results in the 
exchange of a new port number representing the MH location and address. 
6.2.3 Home Network 
Every subscriber is registered with a home network (HN). The purpose of the IIN 
is to act as the network service provider for each subscriber. Whilst a subscriber 
physically receives service from a LN the HN manages the long-terrn service. 
Two important aspects of this are maintaining a constant network identity and 
service billing. 
The HN implements the Home Location Register (HLR). The HLR records 
associations between real world identities and pseudonymous locations in order to 
allow messages to be routed towards a subscriber. Initiation of the registration 
protocol by a subscriber requires the interaction of the HN of that subscriber. 
Therefore our HN prototype is capable of authenticating registered subscribers. 
As with the IN the HN is also capable of communicating with the PRC, PTIA 
and other end hosts. , 
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6.2.4 PRC 
The Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) is a distributed application that allows 
messages to travel between hosts without being traced. The implementation is 
made up of a series of PRC processes located on the various machines. Each PRC 
element processes and forwards messages according to information contained in 
the input stream (see chapter 4). 
6.2.5 PTIA 
This is the most complex component of the MNPA. The PTIA is a distributed 
application, elements of which, although outside the domain of a LN, may 
logically reside in any location. The main functions of the PTIA are subscriptions, 
key distribution, token issuing, dispute management, and inter-PTIA messaging. 
Each element of the PTIA keeps a database of current subscriber networks 
(LNdN. This database stores details of the PTIA accounts held by that element. 
The most important data in the database is a list of every token currently in 
circulation for each subscriber to the PTIA. 
When networks (HN or LN) require new tokens these are created, logged in the 
database, and distributed to the requesting network. When a mobile subscriber 
uses the tokens they are submitted back to the originating for cancelling. This 
cancellation prevents the tokens from being reused. 
If any misuse of tokens is detected (by any party) then a dispute procedure is 
invoked (by that party). This involves examining the tokens to discover the 
correct action to take. Notification is then provided to the parties involved. A 
complete solution to dispute management will actually involve a series of steps 
outside the scope of the MNPA, which we therefore leave out. An example of 
such a step might be the provision of written contracts stating the implications of 
network misuse. 
A token that is submitted to a PTIA element may have originated in another PTIA 
element. When this situation is evident the PTIA must forward the tokens to the 
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relevant element. This process is transparent to the networks. We achieve this 
by organizing the PTIA elements into a hierarchy. Our prototype takes a 
simplistic approach to this naming problem by assigning one member as root 
elements and all others subordinate by one level. The root element performs only 
a routing capability, and its address is embedded into each remaining element. 
The final operation the PTIA must perform is public-key distribution. Each 
network subscribed to the PTIA is issued with a set of keys to enable the 
evaluation of tokens. When new keys are generated or old ones revoked then a 
new list of keys must be sent out to the networks via the PTIA elements. The 
distributed nature of the PTIA makes this task fairly simple but synchronization is 
required so that the operations are performed at the correct time. For simplicity 
we have chosen to make this every time the PTIA is run. 
6.2.6 Mobile Subscriber 
We represent mobile subscribers using a single process running on any one of the 
machines available. As noted in section 6.2.1, migration of a subscriber is 
performed by either altering the connection port of the process or by invoking a 
process on another machine (and subsequently killing the current one. ) 
Apart from migration we require the MH to be able to connect to a LN using the 
MNPA registration protocol. This involves both engaging in the protocol and 
interaction with the PRC. Once connected then MH communications (both 
inbound and outbound) to end hosts and connection to services are enabled, 
though we have not implemented any specific code for this. 
6.2.7 Service Provider 
Service providers (SPs) in the MNPA prototype simulate a variety of network 
services by altering various parameters. The important functionality of a service 
provider is that it is able to interact with the service provision protocol and the 
PTIA. We need to be able to enable different types of service to subscribers in 
order to evaluate the capability of the MNPA under different conditions. We have 
identified three different service parameters: 
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e Size of service data units (SDUs) 
e Number of SDUs per session 
9 Frequency of SDUs 
The MNPA will impose the largest overhead on services characterized by a high 
number of small SDUs that arrive in a short space of time. Setting these 
parameters is performed by manual interaction when the SP begins execution. 
PRC Privacy Routing Capability HN Home Network 
PTIA Privacy Token Issuing Authority LN Local Network 
MH Mobile Host 
I 
SP Service Provider 
Figure 6.1 Communications within theprototype MNPA 
Figure 6.1, above, shows the components of the MNPA prototype and the 
associated communication flows. The solid lines show actual flows of data whilst 
the dashed lines show logical flows of data. The dashed line between the Mobile 
Host (MH) and the Local and Home Networks (LN/HN) represents the location 
update protocol whilst the dashed line between a MH and a Service Provider (SP) 
via the LN represents the billing protocol. 
Page 122 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
6.3 Evaluation of the Prototype Implementation 
Having outlined the operation of the prototype we now provide some evaluation 
of the work. In this evaluation we are concerned with two major aspects of the 
operation of the system, data communicated over links and data stored by various 
elements. To do this we examine the implementation of the protocols for 
registration and accounting. We note that by examining the operation of these 
protocols we implicitly catch the operation of all the elements within the MNPA. 
Finally we attempt to answer the questions posed in 6.1. 
6.3.1 Registration Protocol 
The registration protocol requires the interaction of several parties. In logical 
terms the protocol operates between the MH, LN and HN. In addition to these 
parties the protocol makes use of both the PRC, for messages between the LN and 
HN, and the PTIA, for messages associated with privacy tokens. In this 
subsection we examine the data structures used for storage and communication 
and the processing requirements of each party at each stage of the registration 
protocol. 
Data Structures. In the registration protocol there are four main data structures, 
one for each message in the protocol. Each message, and therefore data structure 
only needs to be understood by two parties respectively. Additionally the tokens 
embedded in messages have their own data structure and there are several data 
structures representing various key data used in the protocol. Keys are either 256 
bytes in length for asymmetric (public) keys or 16 bytes for symmetric (secret) 
keys. The protocol message data structures are as follows, note that fields are in 
bytes and some may be variable (the minimum required length is given). 
Message I between Mobile Host and Local Network 
Messagel ( 
Reg [161 
Token 110641 
Encrypted (11921 Message 1 length - 2272 bytes 
Message 2 between local network and home network 
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Message2 ( 
Reg 1161 
Token [10641 
Encrypted [22081 Message 2 length = 3288 bytes 
Message 3 between home network and local network 
Message3 ( 
Reg [161 
Encrypted (2721 Message 3 length - 288 bytes 
Message 4 between local network and mobile host 
Message4 
Reg [161 
EncryptedPK [288] 
EncryptedSK [2561 
A token has the following structure 
Token ( 
Hkey 
EncryptedToken 
Rand 
Identifier 
Date 
Bsig 
) // message 4 length - 560 bytes 
(2561 
[161 
[163 
181 
[7681 
Token length - 1064 bytes 
The reason for the larger message sizes is that public keys require 256 bytes and 
a token requires 1064 bytes. Note that neither message 3 or 4 carry public keys or 
tokens so their lengths are considerably reduced. Messages 2 and 3 will in reality 
be slightly larger since they travel via the PRC. Transport through the PRC would 
add at least 64 bytes to a message, depending on the number of hops used. 
Processing and Storage. Given the protocol communication requirements we 
now examine the storage and processing requirements. During the protocol the 
parties involved are required to store various data structures. Construction of 
messages requires cryptographic operations. Both these aspects will cause 
overhead to the system. We examine each of the three parties in turn. 
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Mobile Host. During the protocol the mobile hosts processes 
messages 1 and 4, a total communication overhead of 2832 bytes. In 
addition to these messages the mobile host need to store a token (1064 
bytes), its public key pair (512 bytes), two shared secret keys (32 bytes), 
and PRC keying data (64+ bytes). Therefore the storage overhead of the 
protocol for the mobile host is at least 6008 bytes. The processing cost of 
encryption to the mobile host is four public key operations and two secret 
key operations. Preparing the message for transport via the PRC requires 
one extra secret key operation per hop. 
Local Network. The local network is required to process all four 
messages during the registration protocol, a communication overhead of 
6408 bytes. The storage requirement for the protocol involves a public key 
pair (512 bytes), a shared secret session key (16 bytes), and a token (1064 
bytes). Addressing data also requires storage, in this case PRC keying data 
(64+ bytes) and a pseudonym address for the VLR (16 bytes). Therefore 
the total storage overhead for the local network in the registration protocol 
is at least 8080 bytes. The encryption processing overhead to the local 
network is seven public key operations (including three to evaluate the 
token). Additional secret key operations are required for preparation of 
messages for transport via the PRC, as mentioned above. 
Home Network. Only messages 2 and 3 are processed by the home 
network, a total of 3576 bytes. The storage requirements for the home 
network involve a shared secret key (16 bytes), a public key pair (512 
bytes), and the PRC keying data to be stored in the HLR database (80+ 
bytes). The total storage overhead is therefore 4184 bytes. The encryption 
overhead involves five public key operations (including three to validate a 
token) and two secret key operations. 
Discussion. The storage requirements for the registration protocol range from 
4148 to 8080 bytes. The major concern here is the scaling of the system. In order 
to manage large numbers of subscribers potentially in a simultaneously active 
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state the overhead would appear to be very large. We make the assumption 
that only a proportionately small number of location updates will occur 
simultaneously, for example hundreds, which would impose short-term storage in 
the region of a megabyte. The long-term storage for each party is considerably 
less, 1672 bytes for the local network and 608 bytes for the home network. This 
would appear to be a reasonably small figure for scaling. Even allowing for tens 
of thousands of subscribers per mobile switch the total storage would only be in 
the region of tens of megabytes. 
Encryption processing overhead can also limit the potential of a communications 
network. Secret key operations are of less concern to us as designers than public 
key operations are. Indeed, Schneier gives an estimate of a difference factor of 
1000 [Schneier, 1996]. The mobile host is required to perform four operations 
during the protocol, three of which are in the last phase (recovering the session 
key). 
Given that location update is a relatively infrequent process it may be argued that 
the performance need not be as high as in some other functions. The other side of 
this argument is that location update is most important to maintain continuation 
of a channel on the move, and that mobile terminals are often less powerful than 
their fixed relatives. We feel that the number of public key operations is still 
small and unlikely to affect performance except in the most constrained of 
environments. Of course the development of more efficient and improved 
performance hardware will hopefully make this less important. 
Public key encryption overhead for the network elements was stated as five and 
seven operations for the home and local networks respectively. The power 
constraints on the network are likely to be less important but the problem of 
scaling comes into play heavily. If we assume that possible hundreds of 
simultaneous requests are present then the number of public key operations will 
be 5-7 times this. Clearly this would require dedicated hardware to perform 
adequately. We note again at this point that advancements in hardware make this, 
if not immediately possible, then hopefully possible soon. 
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6.3.2 Billing Protocol 
The billing protocol also requires the interaction of several parties. In logical 
terms the protocol operates between the MH, LN and HN. In addition to these 
parties the PTIA is required for messages associated with dispute resolution. In 
this subsection we examine the data structures used for storage and 
communication and the processing requirements of each party at each stage of the 
billing protocol. 
Data Structures. In the billing protocol there are seven main data structures, one 
for each message in the protocol, with a further two for the optional dispute 
phase. Additionally the tokens embedded in messages have their own data 
structure and there are several data structures representing various key data used 
in the protocol. We covered this information in the previous section. The protocol 
message data structures are as follows, note that fields are in bytes and some may 
be variable (the minimum required length is given). 
Messages 1-3 (account setup) between mobile host and local network 
MessageAS ( 
Src [161 
Dest [161 
Encrypted [11281 Message length - 1160 bytes 
Message 4-5 (service provision) between local network and mobile host 
MessagesPi { 
Src [161 
DeBt (161 
Encrypted [1146+Nl Message length - 1178+N 
bytes 
MessageSP2 { 
Src (161 
Dest [161 
Encrypted [11301 Message length - 1130 bytes 
Message 6-7 (account settling) between local network and mobile host 
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MessageST1 ( 
Src [161 
Dest 1161 
SessionKey [256] 
Encrypted [2706+(32*NU)l 
// message length w 2994+(32*NU) bytes 
MessageST2 ( 
Src [161 
Dest E161 
Encrypted [13201 Message length w 1352 bytes 
Message 8-9 (dispute management) between local and home network, and PTLA 
MessageDM1 ( 
Src [161 
Dest [161 
Encrypted [2738+(32*NU)l 
I // message length - 2770 + (32*NU) bytes 
MessageDM2 ( 
Src [161 
Dest [161 
Encrypted [10801 message length = 1112 bytes 
Processing and Storage. In the billing protocol we can observe that there is 
approximately R bytes of data for account set up and approximately 2k bytes per 
unit of service. Account settling overhead is dependent on the number of service 
units provided but will be upwards of 4k bytes. Dispute management costs a 
similar amount of communications overhead as settling. The additional storage 
overhead for the protocol is as follows: for the mobile host the protocol imposes 
requirements for a token (1064 bytes), a shared session key (16 bytes), service 
parameters (64+ bytes), three public keys (756 bytes) and the account details 
(2378 bytes + 32 bytes per service unit). The local network requires the same 
amount of storage per client. The home network is required to allow for a session 
key (16 bytes), a public key (256 bytes) and the payment details (256+ bytes). In 
addition the dispute management phase requires the local and home networks and 
the PTIA to store a secret key each (16 bytes). Note also that long-term storage of 
billing and dispute data is likely to occur for legal reasons. 
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These figures are more problematic than those for location update since service 
provision is likely to be more frequent. Simultaneous service of tens of thousands 
may become difficult, however it is our intention that these protocols be 
distributed amongst an increased number of service providers thereby distributing 
the load more evenly. Also note that the storage requirements for the mobile user 
are low (approximately 4k bytes), this is in line with the common assumption that 
resources are limited in typical mobile terminals. 
The encryption overhead for the local network and mobile host is one public key 
and one secret key operation per message. Based on the discussion in the previous 
subsection we claim this to be a reasonable overhead. During the settling phase 
the local network performs an additional single public and secret key encryptions. 
The home network must evaluate the account that requires it to perform 
approximately two public key operations per service unit. If a dispute occurs then 
the local network and the PTIA are required to perform significant encryption 
overhead, namely two public key operations per service unit of data (plus the 
extra public key operations performed during setup and setting). 
Whilst the evaluation phase of the billing protocol by the home network (and 
PTIA in the case of disputes) impose this overhead we must note that this phase is 
primarily designed to occur offline at times suitable to the parties involved. We 
feel that this justifies what is otherwise a potentially expensive task. 
6.3.3 Prototype Evaluation 
In 6.1 we posed a series of question that we would like to ask of the prototype 
implementation. In this section we repeat these questions and attempt to draw 
answer for them. 
* "at can be said about transferring the theory of the MNPA into 
practice? 
The MNPA theory did not have to be altered during the parts of the 
implementation we performed. The protocols were sufficiently general to 
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allow us to make simple coding decisions. The major difficulty we 
observed was making decisions about the size of data elements. Other 
implementation decisions that may need to be made as the prototype 
scales would be to put limits on the capacity of the various elements. The 
theory of the MNPA did not, in the case of our experiments, appear to 
obstruct decisions about non-MNPA functionality. 
What can be said about the complexity of the system? 
Complexity in any system is problematic but this is especially so where 
security is involved. In the MNPA experimental prototype we were able to 
keep the system relatively simple, though a fully functional 
implementation would be considerably more complex. The security 
aspects of the system do not appear to add significant complexity. Each 
component has clearly defined roles to play in the architecture and the 
distributed (and loosely coupled) nature of the MNPA enable this relative 
simplicity. Of course all mobile systems are complex, this is unavoidable, 
but the point remains that we feel our solution is reasonable in this 
respect. 
Hat can be said about the scaling ofthe architecture? 
A dramatic increase in the number of participants of a communications 
system may bring about unanticipated problems. These problems are 
caused by the effects of bottlenecks in system resources such as 
bandwidth and storage space. Scaling issues specific to the MNPA are 
likely to be focused on the storage aspects and the encryption overhead of 
the protocols. We have assessed these on a per component basis and we 
feel that under reasonable loading and hardware assumptions the 
architecture will scale to accommodate potentially very large numbers of 
users (tens of thousands per mobile switch). 
# Nat can be said about the effect of security mechanisms on 
performance? 
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This question turns out to be answered somewhat by the previous 
question. Poor performance in encryption operations will cause delay in 
the MNPA protocols. Whilst we have taken this into consideration in the 
design we still rely on capable hardware implementations of encryption. 
Public key operations are typically very slow, however the mobile station 
usually only has to make a small number in any one protocol. Network 
encryption may be problematic when the system begins to experience 
heavy load, particularly during the billing protocol. It is our suggestion 
here that dedicated encryption hardware be specified for network servers. 
* Hat can be said about the overall security of the system? 
Software Engineers are guided by the principle for testing that 'a 
successful test is one that finds bugs'. Security analysis is very similar, 
there is no serious expectation that you will create 100% security, 
however security should be viewed as a process that is ongoing 
throughout the system lifetime. Our implementation experiments with the 
MNPA did not attempt to investigate the best practice for secure 
programming. 
Indeed our lack of emphasis in this direction has made us realize the 
importance of running code in secure operating system environments 
combined with robust code. During tests to capture and examine 
communications data we were able to determine little about the content 
but were able to cause components to behave unexpectedly by pushing 
erroneous data back at them. 
6.4 Overall Project Evaluation 
This section is divided into two parts, first a comparison of our work with 
existing work in the area and then a discussion of the shortcomings of the MNPA. 
The aim here is to take a very broad view of the research and look at the overall 
achievements and the problems remaining. 
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6.4.1 Comparison with Related Work 
In this section we outline how our architecture, the MNPA, improves on previous 
research results and achieves our requirements (see chapter 3). Unlike the existing 
solutions the MNPA combines the notion of network anonymity with privacy 
enhancing protocols to create a system-wide protection of privacy. The Privacy 
Routing Capability (PRC) provides network anonymity in the MNPA whilst the 
Privacy Token Issuing Authority (PTIA) and the new protocols provide the 
privacy enhancements. 
The existing work in network anonymity suffers from being largely impractical. 
The efforts that address this make their compromises in ways unsuitable for use 
in the MNPA. Other work tends to address the security model and the theoretical 
issues, leaving aside the practicality. The most important works in network 
anonymity, related to ours, are the Onion Routing project [Reed, et al., 1998] and 
Real-Time Mixes [Jerichow, et al., 1998]. 
The PRC is an efficient solution to network anonymity since it lowers the 
overhead of public key encryption by making this an offline process for the user. 
Instead only symmetric encryption is used online (by the user). The PRC is also a 
relatively simple solution; this means that analysis is relatively straightforward. 
This is significant since it would more likely lead to a secure implementation. The 
PRC solves the problems of Onion Routing by removing the trusted proxy 
component and does not suffer from the network dependencies that Real-Time 
Mixes do. 
In chapter 3 we reviewed various schemes for privacy in mobile communications. 
Our conclusions were that although many useful solutions have been presented 
for privacy none of these attempt to achieve all of the requirements we set out 
earlier that chapter, particularly those of privacy protection from internal parties. 
Existing commercial systems such as GSM [Rahnema, 1993] and MobilelP 
[Perkins, 1997] both offer low levels of security but privacy of location 
information and protection from internal attacks is not a priority. It is important 
that future mobile data networks have this as a priority. 
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The major research efforts such as [Molva, et al., 1994] and [Horn and Preneel, 
1998] provide higher levels of privacy, the latter being one of only a few to 
address billing in mobile systems. However, the highest levels of privacy are 
again not a priority. Whilst it may be argued that the highest levels are not widely 
necessary we feel that a system should offer them in the instances where it is 
required. The exact reasons for wanting privacy are often implied to be negative 
to society but we prefer to leave this concern for others to tackle. 
By using the PRC within the MNPA to create network anonymity we 
demonstrated new protocols that allow privacy-enhanced activity to take place 
within a mobile network. As discussed, this is by incorporating the PTIA tokens 
into the protocols to allow anonymous authentication to occur. The protocols we 
describe are relatively compact with modest computation required from the 
interacting parties. An additional property of these protocols when combined with 
the PTIA is the ability to provide non-repudiation for service provision. 
The protocols and supporting components of the MNPA introduce overhead that 
is not present in existing proposals. This is unsurprising given that increased 
security typically equates to decreased performance. The importance of this 
degradation of performance is perhaps not great since it is expected that the 
highest levels of privacy will be used in niche applications (most likely ones with 
less strict performance constraints) and for more sensitive users. We suggest 
therefore it may be important to provide configurable privacy, for example by 
using existing protocols for less sensitive applications. This is discussed further in 
the next chapter. 
6.4.2 Shortcomings of the MNPA 
Whilst the MNPA solves an interesting problem with some novel aspects there 
remains several shortcomings. This section outlines these problems. 
9 Trust. In the analysis of chapter 5 we discussed the trust requirements 
within the MNPA. While a considerable amount of control over personal 
Page 133 
An Architcaure for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
data is shifted towards the user it remains true that some data can be 
compromised by elements of the network operating in an incorrect 
manner. This may involve external attacks on hosts that are not properly 
secured or indeed dishonest behaviour by system operators. We have tried 
to make the implications as low as possible, but it seems inevitable that at 
least some trust will always be required. This shortcoming can be reduced 
by education of users and open information sharing concerning the 
performance of operators. 
9 Efficiency. Security mechanisms, e. g. encryption algorithms and 
protocols, impose performance overhead onto a system. These overheads 
are typically in some way proportional to the level of security required. 
Users should expect this to be the case, although clearly effort should 
always be made to reduce these as far as possible. 
In the case of the MNPA the main additional overheads (above other 
systems) are in the use of the PRC and the more complex protocols 
needed to achieve privacy. Although the components of the MNPA were 
designed to be practical it seems likely that for more perfortnance 
sensitive applications, such as broadband multimedia, these overheads 
may be too costly at the present time (this is not to say that in the future 
this will be such a problem, indeed it was until recently considered 
impractical to use public-key operations in mobile devices). As we 
discussed in the previous section, configuration of privacy will be 
necessary in order to cope with environments where the highest levels of 
security cannot be provided. Note that it is important the user retains 
knowledge and control of such choices. 
e Implementation. The experimental work on the MNPA prototype was 
pleasing in terms of the series of question we asked ourselves beforehand 
(see 6.3.3). The main limitations we identified were the requirement for a 
secure operating environment for the MNPA components and the possible 
scaling problem of the encryption overhead. 
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During the design of the architecture we chose to assume such an 
environment to allow us to focus on the network aspects. This assumption 
may well choose to be a dangerous one, but we certainly hope that 
improvements are made in both future operating systems and education 
for systems administration. 
The problem of encryption overhead is pertinent for two reasons. First, it 
is still a widely held assumption that mobile terminals have very limited 
resources. Second, that public key operations are prohibitive except in 
offline environments. We counter the first of these by predicting that as 
third generation multimedia capable terminals appear then the resource 
issue will decline in importance. The latter problem can be similarly 
addressed by ensuring that network providers keep up to date with 
upgrades to dedicated encryption hardware. 
e Legal Issues. Perhaps the major problem with the MNPA is the 
requirements it aims to achieve - full privacy of user behaviour. Most 
western governments are under intense pressure from law enforcement 
agencies and an increasingly hysterical media to rid the world of the so- 
called 'four horsemen of the infocalypse', namely paedophiles, drug 
cartels, terrorists, and money-launderers. 
The result of this pressure looks likely to be new legislation to reduce 
rights to protect ones online privacy and increase investigatory powers. 
We note that few laws are currently in place, though many governments 
are proceeding with legislation in this area. Despite this unknown future 
we feel it is still extremely valuable to be able to demonstrate the highest 
levels of privacy. We discuss potential resolve of this problem in chapter 
7. 
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided an evaluation of the MNPA. The evaluation consisted 
of presentation of an experimental prototype and the associated results followed 
by an overall evaluation of the project focusing on comparison with previous 
research results and the shortcomings of our work. We posed a series of questions 
that our prototype experiments set out to answer and we were indeed able to 
answer these favourably. Comparison with previous work and discussion of 
shortcomings of our work showed that the major aim of achieving user privacy in 
mobile networks has been fulfilled, but that there are some constraints on this 
achievement, most notably concerns about performance. These concerns are 
briefly addressed. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work 
This thesis has presented a novel solution to what is a major obstacle to 
protecting the online behaviour of users of mobile networks. This comes at a time 
when there is great expectation of ubiquitous use of a new generation of mobile 
networks capable of high bandwidth multimedia. At the same time online privacy 
is a major concern amongst all levels of user. Privacy concerns are believed by 
many to be a significant inhibitor to the expansion of our online lives. 
This final chapter presents a summary of the thesis, its findings and offerings. 
From the work we have done we also identify future directions to improve our 
architecture and associated issues. This is followed by concluding remarks on the 
research. 
7.1 Thesis Summary 
Chapter 1 of this thesis introduced the context of the work, namely distributed 
systems and the importance of security and privacy within them. It was identified 
that mobile networks do not offer a high degree of privacy and yet privacy is 
viewed as an inhibitor to online activity. Our aims for the thesis in achieving high 
levels of privacy mobile communications we presented next followed by a 
summary of the novelty of the results. 
In chapter 2 and 3 we presented the background to the work. First, in chapter 2 we 
presented an introduction to communications networks, including mobile 
networks. This was followed by a discussion of computer and communications 
security. The last part of chapter 2 discussed privacy in detail including the legal 
implications. Chapter 3 introduced the requirements for security and privacy in 
mobile networks according to our aims [Askwith, et al., 1997]. The user must be 
able to achieve privacy against both parties external and internal to the network, 
and yet be able to satisfy the service provider requirements for fraud prevention. 
The main operations identified were as follows: 
* Authentication 
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o Users must be able to register location updates with the local 
network without revealing identity. 
o Users must be able to register location updates with the home 
network without revealing the actual location (the location is said 
to be pseudonymous). 
Accountability 
o Service providers must be able to collect recompense for any 
service provided to users without requiring the user to compromise 
their privacy. 
Communications 
o Users must be able to communicate with other hosts in the 
network and maintain the desired level of privacy. 
The remainder of chapter 3 examined existing related work on privacy, focusing 
on mobile network solutions. We concluded from the literature that no existing 
proposal satisfies the requirements. In particular, solutions fall into two broad 
categories; those that cover mobile communications in a broad fashion but have a 
lower set of requirements for privacy and those that look at a less general scenario 
but have a high privacy requirement. 
We then presented our solution to the requirements for user privacy in mobile 
networks in chapter 4. We called this the Mobile Network Privacy Architecture 
(MNPA) [Askwith, et al., 1998, Askwith, et al., 2000a, Askwith, et al., 2000b]. It 
extends the existing de facto topology by placing two new physical components 
into the network and supplying protocols, that utilize these components, to 
achieve registration and service provision accountability. The two new 
components are called the Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) and the Privacy 
Token Issuing Authority (PTIA). 
The purpose of the PRC is to enable untraceable communications between two 
hosts in the network. It is an extension of an idea first presented in [Chaum, 
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1981], called digital-mixes. Our method reduces the real-time overhead for 
users [Askwith, et at., 2000b) by pre-computing the least efficient operations and 
removing the strongest security requirements found in some related solutions. 
The PTIA is a third party distributed application resident in the MNPA, whose 
purpose is to manage privacy tokens. A privacy token is based on an anonymous 
public-key certificate (based on two public-keys; the user and the home network 
of the subscriber). Each home network collects an issuing certificate. from the 
PTIA and then distributes complete privacy tokens to its users. These tokens then 
allow a user to engage in privacy-enhanced protocols with other parts of the 
network. 
In addition to issuing privacy tokens the PTIA may also be required to act in 
dispute involving privacy tokens. If a network or a user is not satisfied by the 
result of part of a protocol then it may submit the data to the PTIA for evaluation. 
Although we do not discuss the precise legal operations required the technical 
solution is certainly novel. 
Following the presentation of the MNPA we provide analysis in chapter S. This 
consists of examining the type of attacks considered relevant to the architecture. 
Many attack scenarios are considered but the most problematic area for security is 
shown to be in system trust and in collusion within the MNPA. Trust is not a 
tangible quality of networks but we feel our solution lowers the requirements to a 
reasonable level. Collusion between the various elements of the MNPA is 
considered and we conclude that although such collusion may be useful for future 
requirements for law enforcement to utilize the risks are reasonably low currently. 
A prototype implementation of the MNPA was presented in chapter 6. This 
implementation focuses on trying to determine the feasibility of the MNPA. The 
conclusions from the implementation were essentially favourable. Although we 
were able to determine little about the security effects, performance estimates 
seem within acceptable levels. The second part of chapter 6 provides an 
evaluation of the project. We discussed shortcomings, of which there arc several, 
Page 139 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
and the positive aspects. On the positive side we have presented a novel 
framework into which flexible privacy policies may be developed for user privacy 
in mobile environments. In addition our results improve on previous published 
results in that they meet our requirements, as set out in chapter 3. However, the 
major problems affecting this framework are the less technical ones, people. 
Firstly political influence tends to be unfavourable towards privacy, and second it 
seems at this stage at least that problems of trust are both difficult to reason about 
and difficult to design into the framework. 
7.2 Contributions 
The MNPA takes a global approach to security and privacy in mobile networks, 
with particular emphasis on achieving high levels of privacy. The contribution of 
this work to the field is summarized as follows: 
* We have identified a set of requirements for achieving security and 
privacy in mobile networks [Askwith, et al., 1997]. These requirements 
take into account both the system providers perspective and the user 
perspective. We believe our requirements for privacy to be more thorough 
than previous attempts. A critical analysis of previous research literature 
demonstrates this to be the case. 
9 We have developed a new architecture, the Mobile Network Privacy 
Architecture (MNPA) [Askwith, et al., 1998, Askwith, et al., 2000a], to 
meet our requirements. The MNPA has the following major contributions: 
oA new more efficient method for untraceable communications 
between two network hosts called the Privacy Routing Capability 
(PRC) [Askwith, et al., 2000b]. 
oA novel third party application for enabling privacy enhanced 
communications based on anonymous certificates, called the 
Privacy Token Issuing Authority (PTIA). The PTIA is also capable 
of acting in disputes between users and service providers (where 
tokens are in use). 
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oA new location registration protocol that allows the update of 
user location information both locally and with the registered 
home network. Local update is provided with both mutual 
authentication and privacy of identification. Remote location 
update, that of updating the home network register, is provided 
without revealing the physical location, i. e. the location is 
pseudonymous. 
oA new billing protocol that allows post-payment of services within 
a network. The protocol offers anonymity to the user and non- 
repudiation to both parties. Disputes can be solved by the PTIA. 
9 We have shown through analysis that the MNPA, and therefore user 
privacy in a mobile environment, is possible given certain constraints, 
such as well engineered software and robust cryptosystcms. The main 
constraint is that the network itself must operate within certain user- 
network trust parameters. We have outlined these parameters informally, 
e Our final contribution is to pose questions for further research. Details of 
these questions are given in the following section. 
7.3 Future Work 
So far in this chapter we have reiterated the project aims, findings and main 
results and considered the novel contributions of our work. While the 
contributions of this research are valuable it raises, as research should, some 
interesting questions. This section deals with, in our view, the more significant of 
these questions. 
7.3.1 Integration with Existing Technologies 
To increase the applicability of the MNPA theory we need to ensure it is flexible 
enough to cope with implementation in a variety of environments. We can narrow 
this down to two important scenarios, the Internet and 3rd Generation Systems 
(3Gs). Therefore it needs to be determined whether the MNPA could be adapted 
to work in these two important settings. 
Page 141 
An Arditecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
The Internet is currently based on the Internet Protocol (IP) though an updated 
protocol (IPv6) [Stallings, 1996] is being deployed in many networks. IPv6 will 
contain support for mobility. In addition a modified version of IP called MobileIP 
[Perkins, 1997] has been developed to combat the lack of mobility in IP. In 
addition IPSec [Kent and Atkinson, 1998] provides for confidentiality and 
authentication services in IP, and will be a part of IPv6 and Mobile IP. 
Integrating the MNPA into these would require either modification of these 
protocols to include the ability to cope with our protocols of some method of 
encapsulating our protocols into them. By using encapsulation it may be possible 
to allow a mobile device to connect to non-MNPA compliant networks by using a 
PRC node to act as a home agent. This PRC node would not provide the 
authentication but rather would forward it as requested. We note however that 
this may require modification of the PRC to cope with this functionality. 
3Gs are envisioned to be a heterogeneous set of various network types 
internetworked via a 3G core network. This is beneficial to any potential 
integration of the MNPA into 3Gs since compliant networks could operate our 
protocols on top of the core network. Those networks not part of the MNPA may 
be able to accept devices if they encapsulate MNPA protocols into the core access 
network protocols in a similar fashion described above. 
7.3.2 Application of MNPA to Fixed Networking 
Although mobility is going to be a major part of all future communications 
networks it is certain that fixed access will be prevalent. We consider that there 
are possibilities for adapting the MNPA for use with fixed terminals. First, the 
PRC can be used separately to achieve network anonymity and second the privacy 
tokens issued by the PTIA (and then by the home network to the user) may be 
used in conjunction with the PRC to allow users to connect to service providers 
anonymously and retain accountability. 
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Increasingly both business and consumers are looking to perform commercial 
transactions online, so called E-Commerce. The value of data in E-Commerce 
transactions will presumably be moderately high, in many cases deserving of high 
privacy protection. The MNPA could be ideal in such a situation, as it would 
allow a user to subscribe to a service provider who is capable of issuing privacy 
tokens. Note also, that the service provider does not need to be the same service 
provider that provides network level access. If E-Commerce service providers 
sign up to the PTIA network then they will be able to allow anonymous, yet 
accountable, subscription from users. The issue for further work is to examine 
what changes, if any, are required to the protocols to take account of the different 
nature of access. 
7.3.3 Routing decisions within the PRC 
In our discussion of the PRC we deliberately left out any decision as to how a 
mobile might choose a route through the PRC. This deliberate decision was made 
principally so we could give a clearer picture of the operation of the PRC but also 
since this problem is not a security issue. Clearly it remains a problem since the 
efficiency of the PRC is vital to the feasibility of the MNPA. The actual routing 
algorithm is not necessarily a problem since much work has already been done in 
this area2, e. g. (Baker and Atkinson, 1997, Moy, 1998, Rehkter and Li, 1998]. 
The problem for the PRC is that it relies on Source Routing which has tended not 
to be used on the Internet due to it's problems with scalability (nodes need to be 
aware of routes, instead of allowing the network to handle the problem). 
The future work for PRC routing lies in how the mobile terminal might achieve 
this operation well. Presumably the mobile terminal must be able to gain 
sufficient information from the access point to determine the global position and 
any relevant local and intermediate conditions affecting routing. A significant 
concern will be to balance the computation between terminal and network, it 
would not be reasonable to require the ten-ninal to dynamically collect and store 
large routing tables. 
2A search at hn-/Aiinwww. ira. uka. de/biblio&rVlyMistributed/rfc, htmI reveals over 50 different RFCs 
relating to Internet routing. 
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In our evaluation of the PRC we noted that when a user moves location between 
sending a message through the PRC and receiving a reply the communication 
would fail. One suggestion we offer to combat this problem is to deposit with the 
local network a short-term PRC address at the point of handover. This may 
require a new protocol to be created for handover since the mobile user must be 
able to prepare a PRC route from the new location to the old one. 
7.3.4 Access to Data for Law Enforcement 
Apart from some discussion during the background chapters we have not 
considered the problem of law enforcement access to data within the MNPA. The 
main reasons for this are first that we wanted to focus on creating an architecture 
that was a simple as possible in meeting our requirements. Second, it is not clear 
what requirements law enforcement has, or whether these are justified (even 
without the complication of differing requirements each nation may propose). The 
civil rights issues of strong capabilities should be closely scrutinized. Third, as 
noted by [Abelson, et al., 1997], incorporating law enforcement access into 
communications system would almost certainly lead to the introduction of new 
vulnerabilities. 
However, legislation is likely to dictate some form of access [Koops, 1997a] and 
service providers and network operators would clearly require solutions for 
compliance. Access to data is likely to be one of two forms, access to content and 
access to identification/location information. The simplest solution to the former 
would be some form of Key Recovery, despite the general inadvisability of these 
schemes. Key Recovery could be operated independently of the MNPA, perhaps 
through external Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [Chokhani, 1994]. 
Access to identification/location information to allow law enforcement to identify 
traffic is more complicated since no one party, apart from the mobile user, holds 
both data. The home network needs to provide law enforcement with the identity 
associated to the appropriate privacy tokens. Given this, a protocol needs to be 
implemented to allow law enforcement to query the PRC to reveal the location of 
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the local network where the mobile user is currently registered. Monitoring 
of the local network for traffic associated with that user may still not reveal 
enough details since it one of the most important pieces of data for law 
enforcement is likely to be the identities of the suspects communications partners. 
Again if these are protected a protocol is required to query the PRC for this data. 
7.3.5 Usability of Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
The remaining questions for further work are all related to usability. First we look 
at general usability issues before discussing trust modeling and finally at 
configurability of privacy. Security is widely understood to be very difficult to 
achieve, one major impediment to which is the human element. From a rather 
unscientific viewpoint if a mistake can be made to compromise security then a 
user will almost certainly make that mistake at some point. This is backed up by 
research into the Human Computer Interface (HCI) of PGP [Whitten and Tygar, 
1999]. Users struggle with security because the concepts are often quite complex 
and the goals are usually at odds with the goals of the task in hand, i. e. security 
can been seen as trying to stop certain things happening rather than making them 
happen. 
The MNPA is a complex architecture potentially requiring knowledge of many 
different parameters to achieve the users' privacy goals. It is unreasonable to 
expect non-expert users to be able to navigate all these decisions safely without a 
very carefully thought out user interface. An interface needs to be able to make as 
much of the underlying technology transparent to the user yet also inform the user 
of the privacy implications of their decisions, including trust requirements which 
we examine next. 
A further consideration would be to aid the developer community through, for 
example, a Privacy Middleware. Such software would abstract the privacy and 
security mechanisms in such a way that the developer could more easily 
incorporate them into their applications. 
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7.3.6 Reasoning about Trust and Privacy 
During our analysis we discussed the trust issues the user needs to consider when 
using the MNPA. These decisions are largely subjective and thus essentially a 
risk management exercise. This is obviously not an ideal situation and it would be 
preferable if there existed some way of formally reasoning about trust scenarios. 
We are not currently aware of any such capabilities with regard to privacy. 
Also, privacy itself is a complex concept that requires more formal analysis. 
When a user interacts with an element of a system it would be useful to determine 
what information is at risk and what information may be provided without 
concern. The parameters for privacy analysis within the MNPA are complex due 
to the number of parties involved. 
In common with the last subsection any reasoning about trust and privacy is also a 
usability issue since a user needs to be able to make decisions about their privacy 
requirements on the spot. Therefore any results of trust modeling need to be 
useful to the user as well as developers and researchers. Tools provided to 
researchers and developers would be very different from those needed by users 
since the user is only interested in themselves whereas the planning of entire 
systems, including interactions between elements is the concern in research and 
development. 
7.3.7 Configuring User Privacy 
Differing levels of privacy are likely to be required depending on the situation a 
user find themselves in. Factors likely to affect a decision about a suitable privacy 
level will include; perceived value of data involved, performance requirements 
(e. g. provision of video might require low security overbeads), local security 
policies, communications partners. Any one of these, amongst many others, could 
influence a degradation of privacy. 
Privacy levels may range from no privacy, though this might not be advisable 
from a system security perspective, through to the highest level we have sought in 
this work. In chapter 3 we described six basic levels of privacy beginning and 
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ending with these two. The levels in between describe states that protect 
information from external attacks, local network attacks, and home network 
attacks respectively. Whilst this categorization has proved useful for analyzing 
existing results and setting a target for the highest privacy, it is probably not 
flexible enough to describe user policies. 
Future work in this direction then, requires first that a way of describing privacy 
levels is developed that can be used to allow a user to describe their privacy 
policy. Following this we need a way to translate this policy so that the correct 
protocol parameters are used. Ideally no serious alterations to protocols should 
occur, but clearly a need for more careful examination of how parameters might 
be included is needed. 
7.3.7 Denial of Service 
Recently attacks on the availability of networks services have become more 
common and increasingly serious. These attacks are called Denial of Service 
attacks (DoS) [Needham, 1994b]. The reason that they are common is because 
they are often very easy to mount due to the fact that they abuse normal 
acceptable operations within a service. A typical example of a DoS attack is when 
an attacker floods a web server with bogus requests. If enough requests are made 
together then the act of processing all requests could cause the server to overload 
and crash. 
In the MNPA we have not given priority to DoS attacks as these are lower in 
priority to a user than privacy. However, future development of the MNPA should 
include consideration of this class of attack. Places major targets for DoS attacks 
are the two protocols and the PRC. The two protocols need to be able to detect 
false requests ideally without performing the whole protocol. Although the 
protocols partly deal with this (via token checking), it could be improved. The 
PRC could be flooded with data by simple a DoS attack. An attacker could 
attempt to send very large messages that carry no payload apart from PRC hop 
information and have no destination. Some kind of access control to the PRC 
might solve this potential problem. 
Page 147 
An Architecture for User Privacy in Mobile Networks 
7.4 Summary 
Communications networks are becoming an increasingly important part of 
everyday life throughout the world with the rapid expansion of both the Internet 
and mobile telephony. Third generations mobile systems that will carry a wide 
variety of data on behalf of users are soon to be introduced. Amidst all this 
information revolution users are becoming alarmed at the possibilities for privacy 
intrusions from both external sources (i. e. crackers) and internal sources (i. e. 
corporations and governments). The aim of this thesis was to investigate and 
provide solutions to strong privacy in mobile communications. 
We set about defining the problem so as to gain a set of requirements. These 
requirements were threefold, first, to be able to perform mutual authentication 
with the local and home networks to achieve location registration whilst 
maintaining location and identification privacy. Second, to be able to receive 
service from a provider without privacy compromise whilst also being able to 
maintain accountability for and service received. Finally, we needed to be able to 
communicate with any host in the network in an anonymous way, 
Existing solutions related to privacy in mobile communications were shown to 
fail to meet all of our requirements, though many are excellent solutions in terms 
of their intended goals. Two major problems emerged from the literature, first, 
many solutions aim for lower privacy goals than those we wished to achieve and 
secondly many related solutions concern themselves with a narrower target than 
the security and privacy of the whole network. 
The main direction of our work has been to combine network anonymity with 
privacy enhancing technologies to achieve privacy for all user behaviour thereby 
satisfying our initial requirements [Askwith, et al., 1997]. The result is a new 
architecture entitled the Mobile Network Privacy Architecture (MNPA) (Askwith, 
et al., 1998, Askwith, et al., 2000a]. The MNPA describes two supporting 
physical components, the Privacy Routing Capability (PRC) [Askwith, et al., 
2000b] and the Privacy Token Issuing Authority (PTIA) [Askwith, et al., 2000a]. 
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The PRC enables network anonymity for individual messages whilst the 
PTIA assists in creating anonymous authorization tickets for users. In addition to 
these components are two new privacy-enhancing protocols, one for location 
registration and update, and one for service billing. These protocols protect 
against intrusions of privacy from external and internal attacks. 
Our analysis of the MNPA showed that given awareness of certain operational 
assumptions the desired security of the system is achievable. Additionally, we 
believe that the architecture and its components are flexible enough to cope with 
the new developments in mobile networking. This presents exciting possibilities 
for the future of communications, possibilities that are currently being inhibited 
by user concerns over online privacy. It is our thesis therefore that the MNPA can 
contribute to the development of mobile networking in the 21" century by 
offering a realistic approach to satisfying strong user privacy requirements. 
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